Re: [DNSOP] Re: Last Call: draft-ietf-dnsop-reflectors-are-evil (Preventing Use of Recursive Nameservers in Reflector Attacks) to BCP

2007-09-28 Thread Dean Anderson
On Fri, 28 Sep 2007, Paul Wouters wrote: > On Fri, 28 Sep 2007, Dean Anderson wrote: > > > Maybe its not mentioned because its not a practical solution. But > > whatever the reason it isn't mentioned, a 25 million user VPN is not > > going to happen with 10/8. A comcast person recently complained

Re: [DNSOP] Re: getaddrinfo() and searching

2007-09-28 Thread Mark Andrews
> > > --On Friday, 28 September, 2007 09:48 +1000 Mark Andrews > <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote: > > >... > >> It's not. Even without IPv6, having search domains means you > >> can get unexpected results. If that's not acceptable, don't > >> complain, but put a period behind your FQDNs. > > > >

Re: [DNSOP] Re: Last Call: draft-ietf-dnsop-reflectors-are-evil (Preventing Use of Recursive Nameservers in Reflector Attacks) to BCP

2007-09-28 Thread Paul Wouters
On Fri, 28 Sep 2007, Dean Anderson wrote: > Maybe its not mentioned because its not a practical solution. But > whatever the reason it isn't mentioned, a 25 million user VPN is not > going to happen with 10/8. A comcast person recently complained on PPML > that there wasn't enough RFC1918 space fo

Re: [DNSOP] Re: Last Call: draft-ietf-dnsop-reflectors-are-evil (Preventing Use of Recursive Nameservers in Reflector Attacks) to BCP

2007-09-28 Thread Joe Abley
On 28-Sep-2007, at 1516, Dean Anderson wrote: Not widely supported in clients. Therefore, not a solution. In fact, it's quite feasible in operating systems which can run a local instance of (say) BIND9. It would be fair to say that installing and configuring BIND9 on an average laptop is

Re: [DNSOP] Re: Last Call: draft-ietf-dnsop-reflectors-are-evil (Preventing Use of Recursive Nameservers in Reflector Attacks) to BCP

2007-09-28 Thread Dean Anderson
On Fri, 28 Sep 2007, Stephane Bortzmeyer wrote: > On Thu, Sep 27, 2007 at 06:45:55PM -0700, > Paul Hoffman <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote > a message of 36 lines which said: > > > It ignores one of the main reasons that many organizations purposely > > choose to provide recursive lookup to the publ

Re: [DNSOP] Re: Last Call: draft-ietf-dnsop-reflectors-are-evil (Preventing Use of Recursive Nameservers in Reflector Attacks) to BCP

2007-09-28 Thread Paul Hoffman
At 12:04 PM -0400 9/28/07, Joe Abley wrote: On 28-Sep-2007, at 1136, Paul Hoffman wrote: It is not "obvious", at least to some of the people I have spoken with. It is also not obvious to VPN vendors; otherwise, they would have easy-to-use settings to make it happen. I'm surprised by that com

Re: [DNSOP] Re: Last Call: draft-ietf-dnsop-reflectors-are-evil (Preventing Use of Recursive Nameservers in Reflector Attacks) to BCP

2007-09-28 Thread Paul Wouters
On Fri, 28 Sep 2007, Joe Abley wrote: > I'm surprised by that comment. > > I think it's a common use case that organisations who deploy VPNs have split > DNS; that is, namespaces available through internal network resolvers that do > not appear in the global namespace. In my experience, it is norm

Re: [DNSOP] Re: Last Call: draft-ietf-dnsop-reflectors-are-evil (Preventing Use of Recursive Nameservers in Reflector Attacks) to BCP

2007-09-28 Thread Paul Wouters
On Fri, 28 Sep 2007, Jaap Akkerhuis wrote: > There are two major reasons for an organization to not want roaming > users to trust locally-assigned DNS servers. > > Open recursive servers doesn't help in against man in the middle > attacks. If you want to avoid that use VPN's or (for DNS) T

Re: [DNSOP] Re: Last Call: draft-ietf-dnsop-reflectors-are-evil (Preventing Use of Recursive Nameservers in Reflector Attacks) to BCP

2007-09-28 Thread Joe Abley
On 28-Sep-2007, at 1136, Paul Hoffman wrote: It is not "obvious", at least to some of the people I have spoken with. It is also not obvious to VPN vendors; otherwise, they would have easy-to-use settings to make it happen. I'm surprised by that comment. I think it's a common use case that

[DNSOP] Re: Last Call: draft-ietf-dnsop-reflectors-are-evil (Preventing Use of Recursive Nameservers in Reflector Attacks) to BCP

2007-09-28 Thread Paul Hoffman
At 9:19 AM +0200 9/28/07, Stephane Bortzmeyer wrote: On Thu, Sep 27, 2007 at 06:45:55PM -0700, Paul Hoffman <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote a message of 36 lines which said: > It ignores one of the main reasons that many organizations purposely choose to provide recursive lookup to the public, na

Re: [DNSOP] Re: getaddrinfo() and searching

2007-09-28 Thread John C Klensin
--On Friday, 28 September, 2007 09:48 +1000 Mark Andrews <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote: >... >> It's not. Even without IPv6, having search domains means you >> can get unexpected results. If that's not acceptable, don't >> complain, but put a period behind your FQDNs. > > Please state wer

[DNSOP] Re: Last Call: draft-ietf-dnsop-reflectors-are-evil (Preventing Use of Recursive Nameservers in Reflector Attacks) to BCP

2007-09-28 Thread Jaap Akkerhuis
There are two major reasons for an organization to not want roaming users to trust locally-assigned DNS servers. Open recursive servers doesn't help in against man in the middle attacks. If you want to avoid that use VPN's or (for DNS) TSIG. I seem to remember that the ID actually

Re: [DNSOP] Re: Last Call: draft-ietf-dnsop-reflectors-are-evil (Preventing Use of Recursive Nameservers in Reflector Attacks) to BCP

2007-09-28 Thread Joao Damas
It does indeed as Stephane pointed out. Opening up your resolver so you can server roaming users, without further protection, is, at best, naive. Joao On 28 Sep 2007, at 12:15, Jaap Akkerhuis wrote: There are two major reasons for an organization to not want roaming users to tru

[DNSOP] Re: Last Call: draft-ietf-dnsop-reflectors-are-evil (Preventing Use of Recursive Nameservers in Reflector Attacks) to BCP

2007-09-28 Thread John C Klensin
--On Thursday, 27 September, 2007 18:45 -0700 Paul Hoffman <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote: > The Security Considerations section for this document is much > too narrow. It ignores one of the main reasons that many > organizations purposely choose to provide recursive lookup to > the public, namely for

[DNSOP] Re: Last Call: draft-ietf-dnsop-reflectors-are-evil (Preventing Use of Recursive Nameservers in Reflector Attacks) to BCP

2007-09-28 Thread Paul Hoffman
The Security Considerations section for this document is much too narrow. It ignores one of the main reasons that many organizations purposely choose to provide recursive lookup to the public, namely for their own roaming users. Without an open, known-good nameserver at a fixed address, roaming

[DNSOP] Re: Last Call: draft-ietf-dnsop-reflectors-are-evil (Preventing Use of Recursive Nameservers in Reflector Attacks) to BCP

2007-09-28 Thread Stephane Bortzmeyer
On Thu, Sep 27, 2007 at 06:45:55PM -0700, Paul Hoffman <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote a message of 36 lines which said: > It ignores one of the main reasons that many organizations purposely > choose to provide recursive lookup to the public, namely for their > own roaming users. No, it is *not* ig