Re: xts fuzz testing and lack of ciphertext stealing support

2019-07-18 Thread Ard Biesheuvel
On Thu, 18 Jul 2019 at 19:03, Pascal Van Leeuwen wrote: > > > > > For XTS, you have this additional curve ball being thrown in called the > > > > "tweak". > > > > For encryption, the underlying "xts" would need to be able to chain the > > > > tweak, > > > > from what I've seen of the source the

Re: xts fuzz testing and lack of ciphertext stealing support

2019-07-18 Thread Herbert Xu
On Thu, Jul 18, 2019 at 04:35:26PM +, Pascal Van Leeuwen wrote: > > Tthen there's still the issue of advancing that last tweak. From what I've > seen, > the xts implementation does not output the last tweak so you would have to > recompute it locally in cts.c as block_cipher_enc(iv) * alpha^j

Re: [dm-devel] [PATCH 1/2] blk-mq: add callback of .cleanup_rq

2019-07-18 Thread Ming Lei
On Thu, Jul 18, 2019 at 10:52:01AM -0400, Mike Snitzer wrote: > On Wed, Jul 17 2019 at 11:25pm -0400, > Ming Lei wrote: > > > dm-rq needs to free request which has been dispatched and not completed > > by underlying queue. However, the underlying queue may have allocated > > private stuff for thi

Re: [dm-devel] [git pull] additional device mapper changes for 5.3

2019-07-18 Thread pr-tracker-bot
The pull request you sent on Thu, 18 Jul 2019 16:53:08 -0400: > git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/device-mapper/linux-dm.git > tags/for-5.3/dm-changes-2 has been merged into torvalds/linux.git: https://git.kernel.org/torvalds/c/3bfe1fc46794631366faa3ef075e1b0ff7ba120a Thank you! --

[dm-devel] [git pull] additional device mapper changes for 5.3

2019-07-18 Thread Mike Snitzer
Hi Linus, When I sent my pull last Friday I had overlooked some email that Nikos (cc'd) sent that same morning concerning review of my dm-snapshot discard changes that were merged over the weekend. In addition, Nikos inquired about his dm-kcopyd subjob size default adjustment I had requested some

RE: xts fuzz testing and lack of ciphertext stealing support

2019-07-18 Thread Pascal Van Leeuwen
> > > For XTS, you have this additional curve ball being thrown in called the > > > "tweak". > > > For encryption, the underlying "xts" would need to be able to chain the > > > tweak, > > > from what I've seen of the source the implementation cannot do that. > > > > You simply use the underlying

RE: xts fuzz testing and lack of ciphertext stealing support

2019-07-18 Thread Pascal Van Leeuwen
> > > > Hmmm ... so the generic CTS template would have to figure out whether it is > > wrapped > > around ECB, CBC, XTS or whatever and then adjust to that? > > That's not hard to do. Right now cts only supports cbc. IOW > if you pass it anything else it will refuse to instantiate. > Ah, I s

Re: [dm-devel] xts fuzz testing and lack of ciphertext stealing support

2019-07-18 Thread Herbert Xu
On Thu, Jul 18, 2019 at 06:19:24PM +0200, Ard Biesheuvel wrote: > > Note that for software algorithms such as the bit sliced NEON > implementation of AES, which can only operate on 8 AES blocks at a > time, doing the final 2 blocks sequentially is going to seriously > impact performance. This means

Re: xts fuzz testing and lack of ciphertext stealing support

2019-07-18 Thread Ard Biesheuvel
On Thu, 18 Jul 2019 at 17:51, Herbert Xu wrote: > > On Thu, Jul 18, 2019 at 03:43:28PM +, Pascal Van Leeuwen wrote: > > > > Hmmm ... so the generic CTS template would have to figure out whether it is > > wrapped > > around ECB, CBC, XTS or whatever and then adjust to that? > > That's not hard

Re: xts fuzz testing and lack of ciphertext stealing support

2019-07-18 Thread Herbert Xu
On Thu, Jul 18, 2019 at 03:43:28PM +, Pascal Van Leeuwen wrote: > > Hmmm ... so the generic CTS template would have to figure out whether it is > wrapped > around ECB, CBC, XTS or whatever and then adjust to that? That's not hard to do. Right now cts only supports cbc. IOW if you pass it a

RE: xts fuzz testing and lack of ciphertext stealing support

2019-07-18 Thread Pascal Van Leeuwen
> > In fact, using the current cts template around the current xts template > > actually does NOT > > implement standards compliant XTS at all, as the CTS *implementation* for > > XTS is > > different from the one for CBC as implemented by the current CTS template. > > The template is just a nam

Re: xts fuzz testing and lack of ciphertext stealing support

2019-07-18 Thread Herbert Xu
On Thu, Jul 18, 2019 at 10:40:54AM +, Pascal Van Leeuwen wrote: > > In fact, using the current cts template around the current xts template > actually does NOT > implement standards compliant XTS at all, as the CTS *implementation* for XTS > is > different from the one for CBC as implemented

Re: xts fuzz testing and lack of ciphertext stealing support

2019-07-18 Thread Herbert Xu
On Thu, Jul 18, 2019 at 01:19:41PM +0200, Milan Broz wrote: > > Also, I would like to avoid another "just because it is nicer" module > dependence (XTS->XEX->ECB). > Last time (when XTS was reimplemented using ECB) we have many reports with > initramfs > missing ECB module preventing boot from AE

Re: [dm-devel] [PATCH 1/2] blk-mq: add callback of .cleanup_rq

2019-07-18 Thread Mike Snitzer
On Wed, Jul 17 2019 at 11:25pm -0400, Ming Lei wrote: > dm-rq needs to free request which has been dispatched and not completed > by underlying queue. However, the underlying queue may have allocated > private stuff for this request in .queue_rq(), so dm-rq will leak the > request private part.

Re: xts fuzz testing and lack of ciphertext stealing support

2019-07-18 Thread Milan Broz
On 18/07/2019 12:40, Pascal Van Leeuwen wrote: ... >> See the reference in generic code - the 3rd line - link to the IEEE standard. >> We do not implement it properly - for more than 12 years! >> > > Full XTS is XEX-TCB-CTS so the proper terminology for "XTS without CTS" would > be XEX-TCB. > But

RE: xts fuzz testing and lack of ciphertext stealing support

2019-07-18 Thread Pascal Van Leeuwen
> -Original Message- > From: linux-crypto-ow...@vger.kernel.org > On Behalf Of Milan Broz > Sent: Thursday, July 18, 2019 9:40 AM > To: Herbert Xu ; Ard Biesheuvel > > Cc: Horia Geanta ; linux-cry...@vger.kernel.org; > dm-devel@redhat.com > Subject: Re: xts fuzz testing and lack of cip

Re: xts fuzz testing and lack of ciphertext stealing support

2019-07-18 Thread Herbert Xu
On Thu, Jul 18, 2019 at 09:28:03AM +0200, Ard Biesheuvel wrote: > > If we were adding XTS to the kernel today, then I would agree with > you. But xts() has an established meaning now, and I don't think it > makes sense to update all implementations for a theoretical use case, > given that no portab

Re: xts fuzz testing and lack of ciphertext stealing support

2019-07-18 Thread Milan Broz
On 18/07/2019 09:21, Herbert Xu wrote: > On Thu, Jul 18, 2019 at 09:15:39AM +0200, Ard Biesheuvel wrote: >> >> Not just the generic implementation: there are numerous synchronous >> and asynchronous implementations of xts(aes) in the kernel that would >> have to be fixed, while there are no in-kern

Re: xts fuzz testing and lack of ciphertext stealing support

2019-07-18 Thread Ard Biesheuvel
On Thu, 18 Jul 2019 at 09:22, Herbert Xu wrote: > > On Thu, Jul 18, 2019 at 09:15:39AM +0200, Ard Biesheuvel wrote: > > > > Not just the generic implementation: there are numerous synchronous > > and asynchronous implementations of xts(aes) in the kernel that would > > have to be fixed, while ther

Re: xts fuzz testing and lack of ciphertext stealing support

2019-07-18 Thread Herbert Xu
On Thu, Jul 18, 2019 at 09:15:39AM +0200, Ard Biesheuvel wrote: > > Not just the generic implementation: there are numerous synchronous > and asynchronous implementations of xts(aes) in the kernel that would > have to be fixed, while there are no in-kernel users that actually > rely on CTS. Also, i

Re: [dm-devel] xts fuzz testing and lack of ciphertext stealing support

2019-07-18 Thread Ard Biesheuvel
On Thu, 18 Jul 2019 at 08:52, Herbert Xu wrote: > > On Wed, Jul 17, 2019 at 08:08:27PM +0200, Ard Biesheuvel wrote: > > > > Since the kernel does not support CTS for XTS any way, and since no > > AF_ALG users can portably rely on this, I agree with Eric that the > > only sensible way to address th