On Nov 11, 2011, at 6:35 PM, Brian Mathis wrote:
The data on the laptop belongs to the company, end of story.
But it's not "end of story". OP has a policy of specifically permitting
non-work use of the laptop, which means, by definition, there is
non-work data on the laptop which DOESN'T be
> From: discuss-boun...@lists.lopsa.org [mailto:discuss-
> boun...@lists.lopsa.org] On Behalf Of Zack Williams
>
> covers other scenarios as well, like "employee hit by truck".
I prefer to say "hit the lottery." ;-) Either way they're never coming
back. ;-) I mean :-( I mean...
___
> From: discuss-boun...@lists.lopsa.org [mailto:discuss-
> boun...@lists.lopsa.org] On Behalf Of Sam R
>
> The problem comes if he, like so many people, reused the laptop password
> somewhere else and says, "Um, no. Sorry." because that would give us
> access to more than just the home directory.
If a company terminates an employee they should consider everything
the employee has to be lost. Businesses should require employees to
keep data in central, backed up locations, e.g., file servers,
databases, version control. Anything on laptop is transient and can be
lost.
When a company terminat
On Fri, Nov 11, 2011 at 18:35, Brian Mathis <
brian.mathis+lo...@betteradmin.com> wrote:
> The data on the laptop belongs to the company, end of story.
I believe EU privacy laws disagree with this to some extent, unless it was
stated up front that only work-related materials were to be stored on
On Nov 11, 2011, at 6:35 PM, Brian Mathis wrote:
> The data on the laptop belongs to the company, end of story.
But it's not "end of story". OP has a policy of specifically permitting
non-work use of the laptop, which means, by definition, there is non-work data
on the laptop which DOESN'T be
I'm surprised at the responses here so far. This is a pretty
cut-and-dry situation. If the user is required to return documents
after termination, they must provide the password. The concern of "in
a recoverable form" is silly. No court would agree that a person
complied with that statement if
Not that it helps in this instance, but I'd recommend considering a key escrow
policy up-front. There are disk encryption products that support a centralized
key escrow. I think we use PGP whole-disk encryption for laptops that carry
sensitive information here at Cornell.
Cornell's key escrow
On Nov 11, 2011, at 13:11 , Sam R wrote:
> This particular user had gone so far as to have their home directory
> encrypted. We didn't do this for him, but this is good! This laptop traveled
> with the user, and we really didn't want a "left in a taxi" information
> breach.
Most encryption syst
On Fri, 11 Nov 2011, Chris Manly wrote:
Not that it helps in this instance, but I'd recommend considering a key escrow
policy up-front. There are disk encryption products that support a centralized
key escrow. I think we use PGP whole-disk encryption for laptops that carry
sensitive informa
On Fri, Nov 11, 2011 at 03:11:17PM -0500, Sam R wrote:
> The problem comes if he, like so many people, reused the laptop password
> somewhere else and says, "Um, no. Sorry." because that would give us
> access to more than just the home directory. The Company CEO is of the
> opinion that this is
On Fri, Nov 11, 2011 at 03:11:17PM -0500, Sam R spake thusly:
> The problem comes if he, like so many people, reused the laptop
> password somewhere else and says, "Um, no. Sorry." because that
> would give us access to more than just the home directory. The
IMHO the data is gone. The company shou
I've just run into something I haven't before, and I'm a little unclear
about where the footing is. We recently let go one of our remote workers,
and in the process retrieved all of the company hardware that they had
(phone and laptop). We're one of those smaller enlightened companies
that attr
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