Re: SINGLESOCK - How much to strip away?

2018-06-01 Thread Hal Murray via devel
Richard Laager said: > FWIW, for me, at least, the typical cases for daemons are: > A) bind to localhost only (preferably at least ::1, else 127.0.0.1) > B) bind to everything (with additional control happening in the kernel) ntpd has 2 cases. A) Client only - leaf node on the tree. (forest?

Re: SINGLESOCK - How much to strip away?

2018-06-01 Thread Richard Laager via devel
On 06/01/2018 10:06 PM, Mark Atwood via devel wrote: > As I type and think more, I ask, "What does Chrony do?", and I look at > [https://chrony.tuxfamily.org/doc/3.3/chrony.conf.html].  It has a > "bindaddress" directive, which uses IP address, not interface name.  And > only one bind address can b

Re: SINGLESOCK - How much to strip away?

2018-06-01 Thread Gary E. Miller via devel
Yo Mark! On Fri, 1 Jun 2018 20:06:44 -0700 Mark Atwood via devel wrote: > But I do understand the pushback against that from GEM, and have been > thinking about it for the past few days. I'm all for iptables, or at least the modern equivalent. But iptables does not adress the issue of binding

Re: SINGLESOCK - How much to strip away?

2018-06-01 Thread Mark Atwood via devel
I still want to strip it all and delegate it to iptables, case OMEGA. But I do understand the pushback against that from GEM, and have been thinking about it for the past few days. As I type and think: one of the fundamental problems with having longrunner daemons try to keep track of addresses,

Re: NTS, Big picture

2018-06-01 Thread Hal Murray via devel
Thanks. devel@ntpsec.org said: > This is just off the top of my head, but I wonder if this is ultimately > going to need an SSH-style "leap of faith" trust model. For example, the > first time NTP starts up, it would ignore the NotBefore and NotAfter > attributes, but validate everything else in t

Re: NTS, Big picture

2018-06-01 Thread Richard Laager via devel
On 06/01/2018 02:30 AM, Hal Murray via devel wrote: > The catch is that the web certificates have expiration times and the code > assumes the clock is reasonable. This isn't limited to "web certificates", but applies to certificates generally. Certificate expiration is fundamentally incompatible

Re: NTS, Big picture

2018-06-01 Thread Hal Murray via devel
> IIRC draft 10 didn't specify any certificate signing or out of channel > distribution. I thought I saw something like that, but that was a while ago and I was expecting it and I wasn't reading that section carefully. Plan A is to piggyback on the web certificate structure. Basically, the