Re: Orphaning Tremulous

2015-07-20 Thread Nikos Mavrogiannopoulos
On Mon, 2015-07-20 at 12:49 +0200, Jan Kaluža wrote: > Hi, > > I'm orphaning tremulous and tremulous-data packages. The upstream is > dead and it fails to compile against new speex in rawhide. I think > the package is more or less ready for retirement, but maybe someone > else would like to fix

Re: Sponsors - who does (not) work on FE-NEEDSPONSOR tickets

2015-08-20 Thread Nikos Mavrogiannopoulos
On Thu, 2015-08-20 at 10:50 +0200, Miroslav Suchý wrote: > > That said, I considering your ongoing campaign to be harmful to > > Fedora. > > I'm really sad to hear this. > > I was just watching the ongoing reports of want-to-be-contributors > how hard is to get sponsored; reports how Fedora >

firewalld from a server perspective

2014-08-01 Thread Nikos Mavrogiannopoulos
Hello, I'm maintaining a VPN server in fedora and I'm wondering whether I'd need to integrate firewalld to that. After reading the information in https://fedoraproject.org/wiki/FirewallD I don't think I'm sure what I'm supposed to do. There are two issues: 1. Should my service turn on the firewal

Re: firewalld from a server perspective

2014-08-01 Thread Nikos Mavrogiannopoulos
On Fri, 2014-08-01 at 08:47 -0400, Miloslav Trmač wrote: > > 2. What zone should the server put the clients they connect. Should > > there be some special vpn zone or should I use one of the existing ones? > > (none of the existing looks very reasonable for that). > How are the clients connected e

rebasing protobuf-c (and soname bump)

2014-08-04 Thread Nikos Mavrogiannopoulos
Hello, The protocol buffer-c package was orphaned, and due to a dependency I'm now the maintainer. There is a request for 1.0.0 in F21 [0]. That is the first stable release since 2011, which bumps the soname, as well as requires the .proto files to be recompiled. Is there a reason for not rebasing

Re: ca-certificates 2014.2.1 will remove several still valid CA certificates with weak keys

2014-09-08 Thread Nikos Mavrogiannopoulos
On Sat, 2014-09-06 at 01:58 +0200, Kai Engert wrote: > The failure is with the s3.amazonaws.com host. > Looking at the certificates the server sends: > $ openssl s_client -showcerts -connect s3.amazonaws.com:443 2>&1 \ > |egrep " s:| i:" > 0 s:/C=US/ST=Washington/L=Seattle/O=Amazon.com Inc./CN

Re: ca-certificates 2014.2.1 will remove several still valid CA certificates with weak keys

2014-09-08 Thread Nikos Mavrogiannopoulos
On Mon, 2014-09-08 at 09:00 -0500, Michael Catanzaro wrote: > > I guess this is verification based on the rfc5280 path validation. > > Unlike that NSS ignores the provided trust chain and tries to construct > > a new one internally. That's interesting and happens to work around the > > issue here

Re: ca-certificates 2014.2.1 will remove several still valid CA certificates with weak keys

2014-09-09 Thread Nikos Mavrogiannopoulos
On Mon, 2014-09-08 at 23:26 -0700, Adam Williamson wrote: > On Mon, 2014-09-08 at 09:00 -0500, Michael Catanzaro wrote: > > On Mon, 2014-09-08 at 10:06 +0200, Nikos Mavrogiannopoulos wrote: > > > Unfortunately only NSS works. Both openssl and gnutls fail to connect to > >

splitting a subpackage to proper package process

2014-09-11 Thread Nikos Mavrogiannopoulos
Hello, There is a package which includes a subpackage that I'd like it split as a proper package (possibly with different maintainers). Is there some special process for that or does it have to follow the full process for new packages as in [0]? regards, Nikos [0]. https://fedoraproject.org/wiki

Re: splitting a subpackage to proper package process

2014-09-11 Thread Nikos Mavrogiannopoulos
On Thu, 2014-09-11 at 12:25 +0200, Michael Schwendt wrote: > On Thu, 11 Sep 2014 12:15:49 +0200, Nikos Mavrogiannopoulos wrote: > > > Hello, > > There is a package which includes a subpackage that I'd like it split > > as a proper package (possibly with differen

Re: splitting a subpackage to proper package process

2014-09-11 Thread Nikos Mavrogiannopoulos
On Thu, 2014-09-11 at 08:00 -0400, Stephen Gallagher wrote: > > Ok, but on this case we have both vpnc and vpnc-script from > > vpnc.spec. If vpnc-script becomes a separate package (with its own > > repository), does it qualify as new package? If not (as it is > > already there) what would be the

unresponsive maintainer: chkr

2014-09-30 Thread Nikos Mavrogiannopoulos
Hello, I've requested the maintainer of vpnc to split vpnc-script from this package and allow a new package that can be maintained independently (I can be maintainer of it). The reason for the split is that the vpnc-script package is used in more than just vpnc, and him being unresponsive prevents

Re: unresponsive maintainer: chkr

2014-09-30 Thread Nikos Mavrogiannopoulos
On Tue, 2014-09-30 at 16:50 +0200, Christian Krause wrote: > Hi Nikos, > > I'm sorry that I haven't responded earlier. I was under the impression > that your request only affected EPEL and that you have contacted the > EPEL maintainer now. I just re-read the conversation - it looks like > that I h

Re: havege in polarssl not enabled and maintainer refuses to enable it (#1069394)

2014-10-01 Thread Nikos Mavrogiannopoulos
On Wed, 2014-10-01 at 08:33 -0400, Matthew Miller wrote: > On Wed, Oct 01, 2014 at 08:52:03AM +0300, Jonathan Dieter wrote: > > The havege functions in the polarssl package are currently disabled > > in the Fedora package. Newer releases of dolphin-emu, which are in > > a popular external reposito

enhancing crypto policies for other languages than C

2014-10-16 Thread Nikos Mavrogiannopoulos
Hello, The currently proposed fedora maintainer instructions for the system-wide crypto policy are mainly for the C language. Could some experienced in other languages (e.g., ruby/python) propose some text for them? https://fedoraproject.org/wiki/User:Nmav/CryptoPolicies regards, Nikos -- dev

Re: ca-certificates 2014.2.1 will remove several still valid CA certificates with weak keys

2014-10-31 Thread Nikos Mavrogiannopoulos
On Fri, 2014-10-31 at 14:05 +0100, Kai Engert wrote: > On Wed, 2014-10-15 at 12:28 +0200, Vít Ondruch wrote: > > Nevertheless, I am still unsure how to proceed with RubyGems. Should I > > ship the bundled certificates again? Or should I wait until somebody > > notices? > > Sorry for my late reply,

Re: ca-certificates 2014.2.1 will remove several still valid CA certificates with weak keys

2014-10-31 Thread Nikos Mavrogiannopoulos
On Fri, 2014-10-31 at 09:49 -0500, Michael Catanzaro wrote: > > > We should work with the upstream OpenSSL and the GnuTLS projects, > > and > > > motivate them to implement more advanced path building. This would > > be a > > > long term project. > > Is there some issue with gnutls in F21? As far a

Re: ca-certificates 2014.2.1 will remove several still valid CA certificates with weak keys

2014-10-31 Thread Nikos Mavrogiannopoulos
On Fri, 2014-10-31 at 16:11 +0100, Reindl Harald wrote: > > Are you sure that this is the case with the current package? My F21 can > > no longer connect to network to test, but gnutls in it should > > reconstruct the chain similarly to what nss does (not very similarly to > > be precise but the e

Re: ca-certificates 2014.2.1 will remove several still valid CA certificates with weak keys

2014-10-31 Thread Nikos Mavrogiannopoulos
- Original Message - > This isn't a recent change, see [1]. I presume Amazon is most likely > still broken in Epiphany (when these roots are removed) as there's been > no action on [1], where we decided that gnutls-cli accepted > www.amazon.com because it uses certs if they're valid for eit

ocaml expert for review?

2015-03-10 Thread Nikos Mavrogiannopoulos
Hi, I've tried to package two ocaml-based packages. I have no idea about the language and tried to follow the guidelines in [0]. If there any experts in packaging in that language I'd appreciate a review (in exchange for another review if needed): https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=120038

Harden_all_packages_with_position-independent_code + guile modules

2015-03-12 Thread Nikos Mavrogiannopoulos
In rawhide building the gnutls guile bindings fails, and that's related to the new hardening flags being enabled with [0]. The failure is quite peculiar since the loading of a dynamic module fails [1] which already is position independent. Could someone explain what do the new flags in rawhide do (

Re: Harden_all_packages_with_position-independent_code + guile modules

2015-03-13 Thread Nikos Mavrogiannopoulos
On Thu, 2015-03-12 at 18:49 +0100, Till Maas wrote: > On Thu, Mar 12, 2015 at 10:41:49AM -0400, Adam Jackson wrote: > > > We may want to revisit this, honestly. The actual proposal was just to > > build executables as PIE, right? Forcing -z now is a bit more than > > maybe was expected. > Yes, i

Re: Harden_all_packages_with_position-independent_code + guile modules

2015-03-16 Thread Nikos Mavrogiannopoulos
On Thu, 2015-03-12 at 10:41 -0400, Adam Jackson wrote: > On Thu, 2015-03-12 at 13:45 +, Petr Pisar wrote: > > On 2015-03-12, Nikos Mavrogiannopoulos wrote: > > > In rawhide building the gnutls guile bindings fails, and that's related > > > to the new harde

Re: Harden_all_packages_with_position-independent_code + guile modules

2015-03-16 Thread Nikos Mavrogiannopoulos
On Mon, 2015-03-16 at 10:19 +0100, Reindl Harald wrote: > > Am 16.03.2015 um 09:47 schrieb Nikos Mavrogiannopoulos: > > What was the rationale of adding -z now to the hardening flags? Looking > > its description doesn't reveal any "hardening" features, and the g

Re: Harden_all_packages_with_position-independent_code + guile modules

2015-03-18 Thread Nikos Mavrogiannopoulos
On Mon, 2015-03-16 at 10:57 +0100, Nikos Mavrogiannopoulos wrote: > > Am 16.03.2015 um 09:47 schrieb Nikos Mavrogiannopoulos: > > > What was the rationale of adding -z now to the hardening flags? Looking > > > its description doesn't reveal any "hardening&quo

Re: Harden_all_packages_with_position-independent_code + guile modules

2015-03-19 Thread Nikos Mavrogiannopoulos
On Wed, 2015-03-18 at 11:37 -0700, Moez Roy wrote: > >>> > FULL RELRO > >>> > http://tk-blog.blogspot.co.at/2009/02/relro-not-so-well-known-memory.html > >>> If that's all we got I suggest to remove this flag or (better) provide a > >>> way for applications that use modules to compile themselves, w

help needed with python for patching rpmlint

2015-03-23 Thread Nikos Mavrogiannopoulos
Hi, I've attempted modifying rpmlint to assist with detecting the packages that need to be modified for the system wide crypto policies. However, although the required functionality is there, I have not managed to make the patch useful to be included upstream and I am not as fluent in python to ma

nettle, gnutls: soname version bump in rawhide

2015-04-27 Thread Nikos Mavrogiannopoulos
Hello, Next week I plan to update nettle to 3.1.1 and gnutls to 3.4.0 in rawhide. That would require a recompilation of the packages that depend on them. Any objections? regards, Nikos -- devel mailing list devel@lists.fedoraproject.org https://admin.fedoraproject.org/mailman/listinfo/devel Fe

Re: nettle, gnutls: soname version bump in rawhide

2015-04-28 Thread Nikos Mavrogiannopoulos
On Mon, 2015-04-27 at 16:33 +0200, Kalev Lember wrote: > On 04/27/2015 03:56 PM, Nikos Mavrogiannopoulos wrote: > > Hello, > > Next week I plan to update nettle to 3.1.1 and gnutls to 3.4.0 in > > rawhide. That would require a recompilation of the packages that depend > &

F23: disable RC4 and SSL 3.0 by default

2015-04-28 Thread Nikos Mavrogiannopoulos
On Mon, 2015-04-27 at 10:45 -0400, Jan Kurik wrote: > Hi all! > Fedora 22 is at its Beta stage now, so it is time to take a closer look on > Fedora 23 plans. A change I should have proposed earlier but didn't have the time, is to disable SSL 3.0 and RC4 from F23 by default. That will only affect

Re: F23 System Wide Change: Disable SSL3 and RC4 by default

2015-04-28 Thread Nikos Mavrogiannopoulos
On Tue, 2015-04-28 at 10:15 -0400, Russell Doty wrote: > > == Scope == > > * Proposal owners: The crypto-policies package has to be updated to > > accommodate the new policies. > > * Other developers: Should verify that their package works after the > > change. That is that their package doesn't

ping6 and other tool6 awkwardness

2015-05-12 Thread Nikos Mavrogiannopoulos
While working for an updated ipcalc to support ipv6 transparently, I figured we have more tools which are not IPv6-ready and awkwardly provide an additional tool with a -6 suffix, supposedly for separate IPv6 support. That looks like a relic of the past, we still drag. IPv6 support should be transp

Re: ping6 and other tool6 awkwardness

2015-05-12 Thread Nikos Mavrogiannopoulos
On Tue, 2015-05-12 at 09:04 +0100, Richard W.M. Jones wrote: > > While working for an updated ipcalc to support ipv6 transparently, I > > figured we have more tools which are not IPv6-ready and awkwardly > > provide an additional tool with a -6 suffix, supposedly for separate > > IPv6 support. That

Re: ping6 and other tool6 awkwardness

2015-05-12 Thread Nikos Mavrogiannopoulos
On Tue, 2015-05-12 at 09:56 +0200, Nikos Mavrogiannopoulos wrote: > While working for an updated ipcalc to support ipv6 transparently, I > figured we have more tools which are not IPv6-ready and awkwardly > provide an additional tool with a -6 suffix, supposedly for separate > IPv6 s

Re: Checking the ABI of packages submitted to the updates-testing Fedora repository

2015-06-08 Thread Nikos Mavrogiannopoulos
On Fri, 2015-06-05 at 08:00 -0400, Stephen Gallagher wrote: > > > > and > > here is what stuck to my mind. Others are of course welcome to add > > > > what > > I have forgotten and to correct me when I a wrong. > > > > To start, we'd like to have an automated way to check the ABI > > compatib

Re: Checking the ABI of packages submitted to the updates-testing Fedora repository

2015-06-08 Thread Nikos Mavrogiannopoulos
On Mon, 2015-06-08 at 09:39 +0200, Dodji Seketeli wrote: > Of course, nobody likes ABI *breakage*. And I agree that if all ABI > breakage could be detected automatically, ABI breakages would never > make > it into stable releases. > The thing is, the tool detects ABI *changes*. Some changes are

Re: Checking the ABI of packages submitted to the updates-testing Fedora repository

2015-06-08 Thread Nikos Mavrogiannopoulos
On Mon, 2015-06-08 at 11:53 +0300, Alexander Bokovoy wrote: > > I have not seen the output of abicheck (I use abi-compliance > > -checker > > personally but I guess abidiff is as good). However, I'm not sure > > about > > which changes which are not breakages you mean? I'm not aware of > > ABI >

ocaml dependencies in rawhide

2015-06-19 Thread Nikos Mavrogiannopoulos
On Fri, 2015-06-19 at 12:13 +, build...@fedoraproject.org wrote: > > ocaml-config-file has broken dependencies in the rawhide tree: > On x86_64: > ocaml-config-file-1.2-4.fc23.x86_64 requires ocaml(runtime) > = 0:4.02.1 > ocaml-config-file-1.2-4.fc23.x86_64 requires ocaml(Obj) =

orphaned nuttcp

2020-07-02 Thread Nikos Mavrogiannopoulos
Hi, I've orphaned the nuttcp component. It is long time since I last used it, and I do not plan updating it again. If you like networking tools this may be a package for you! regards, Nikos ___ devel mailing list -- devel@lists.fedoraproject.org To unsu

Re: Can we use emulation of other architectures to run integration tests?

2020-07-30 Thread Nikos Mavrogiannopoulos
On Thu, Jul 30, 2020 at 12:25 PM Aleksandra Fedorova wrote: > > Hi, all, > > I'd like to get some understanding on the current state of emulation > of other architectures. > > In the current CI infra we have infinite(*) access to x86_64 compute > resources, but we haven't yet got our hands on any

packages from bitbucket

2014-02-26 Thread Nikos Mavrogiannopoulos
Hello, I've submitted a while ago a review-request on a package [0] that is taken from bitbucket.org. Unfortunately there was no reviewer yet, and I suspect that is because unlike github [1] we have no rules on how to handle bitbucket. Have other packagers experienced something similar in other so

Re: F21 System Wide Change: System-wide crypto policy

2014-02-27 Thread Nikos Mavrogiannopoulos
On Thu, 2014-02-27 at 16:35 +, Colin Walters wrote: > wrote: > > and being applied after executing update-crypto-profiles. (Note: it > > would be better to have a daemon that watches those files and runs > > update-crypto-profiles automatically) > Was the option of patching the libraries to *di

Re: F21 System Wide Change: System-wide crypto policy

2014-02-27 Thread Nikos Mavrogiannopoulos
On Thu, 2014-02-27 at 08:42 -0800, Toshio Kuratomi wrote: > > After that the administrator should be assured that any application > > that uses the system settings will follow a policy that adheres to > > the configured profile. > > Ideally setting a profile should be setting: > > * the acceptable

Re: F21 System Wide Change: System-wide crypto policy

2014-02-27 Thread Nikos Mavrogiannopoulos
On Thu, 2014-02-27 at 10:12 -0700, Andrew Lutomirski wrote: > > == Detailed Description == > > The idea is to have some predefined security levels such as LEVEL-80, > > LEVEL-128, LEVEL-256, > > or ENISA-LEGACY, ENISA-FUTURE, SUITEB-128, SUITEB-256. These will be the > > security levels > > that th

Re: F21 System Wide Change: System-wide crypto policy

2014-02-28 Thread Nikos Mavrogiannopoulos
On Thu, 2014-02-27 at 10:58 -0700, Andrew Lutomirski wrote: > >> For reference, there isn't a well-established, widely accepted > >> symmetric cipher with 256-bit security. AES-256 is weak [1] and > >> should probably not be used at all, let alone by anyone who wants a > >> 256-bit security level

Re: F21 System Wide Change: System-wide crypto policy

2014-02-28 Thread Nikos Mavrogiannopoulos
On Thu, 2014-02-27 at 17:59 +, Richard W.M. Jones wrote: > > How is an admin supposed to know what levels such as the above are, and why > > they might choose a particular one? > Supplemental question: > Why wouldn't you always want to choose the most secure one? > > I believe the proposal is

Re: F21 System Wide Change: System-wide crypto policy

2014-02-28 Thread Nikos Mavrogiannopoulos
On Thu, 2014-02-27 at 10:37 -0800, Andrew Lutomirski wrote: > In that case, why not give full control: > allowed_ciphers = AES-192, AES-256, Salsa20/12, Salsa20/20 > allowed_groups = modp >= 2048, P-256, Curve25519 > allowed_hashes = SHA-3, ... > allowed_modes = CTR, OCB, XTS, GCM > allowed_macs =

Re: F21 System Wide Change: System-wide crypto policy

2014-02-28 Thread Nikos Mavrogiannopoulos
On Thu, 2014-02-27 at 11:52 -0500, Bill Nottingham wrote: > > == Detailed Description == > > The idea is to have some predefined security levels such as LEVEL-80, > > LEVEL-128, LEVEL-256, > > or ENISA-LEGACY, ENISA-FUTURE, SUITEB-128, SUITEB-256. These will be the > > security levels > > that t

fedpkg build failing (due to NSS?)

2014-03-02 Thread Nikos Mavrogiannopoulos
Hello, I'm trying to make an update for #1071795 using 'fedpkg build' for gnutls fails consistently for f20 and rawhide with the error: "BuildrootError: could not init mock buildroot, mock exited with status 30; see root.log for more information" Although it says see root.log, I don't see anythin

Re: fedpkg build failing (due to NSS?)

2014-03-03 Thread Nikos Mavrogiannopoulos
On Mon, 2014-03-03 at 16:34 +0800, Mathieu Bridon wrote: > > That is completely the wrong way to communicate this and it doesn't > > "get them the news" and in fact often stops people getting critical > > security or stability fixes for a pathetic little game. The way to > > communicate this proble

Re: F21 System Wide Change: System-wide crypto policy

2014-03-05 Thread Nikos Mavrogiannopoulos
On Tue, 2014-03-04 at 17:19 +0100, Miloslav Trmač wrote: > 2014-02-27 17:22 GMT+01:00 Jaroslav Reznik : > = Proposed System Wide Change: System-wide crypto policy = > https://fedoraproject.org/wiki/Changes/CryptoPolicy > > Unify the crypto policies used by different

policy on pkg-config?

2014-03-19 Thread Nikos Mavrogiannopoulos
Hello, Is there some policy for package maintainers and pkg-config? My issue is that a package (libev) used pkg-config for some time, but later dropped it (for legitimate reasons as upstream didn't like that). However, should we really care about upstream in cases like that? I was making a packag

Re: GnuTLS issue (Mandos Server/Client)

2014-04-03 Thread Nikos Mavrogiannopoulos
On Wed, 2014-04-02 at 10:50 -0600, Nathanael D. Noblet wrote: > CentOS 6 = gnutls 2.8.5 > F20 = gnutls 3.1.20 > The server is a python app and sets the priority string as follows: > priority=SECURE256:!CTYPE-X.509:+CTYPE-OPENPGP > this is fed to some gnutls function somewhere in the stack. Do

Re: GnuTLS issue (Mandos Server/Client)

2014-04-04 Thread Nikos Mavrogiannopoulos
On Thu, 2014-04-03 at 11:14 -0600, Nathanael D. Noblet wrote: > > Does it really use TLS with openpgp certificates? If yes, I doubt you > > could make 2.8.5 interoperate with gnutls 3.1.20. GnuTLS was modified in > > 3.1.x to adhere with RFC6091 which was incompatible the previous attempt > > to h

Re: Deprecate setjmp/longjmp? [was Re: Maybe it's time to get rid of tcpwrappers/tcpd?]

2014-04-28 Thread Nikos Mavrogiannopoulos
On Sun, 2014-04-27 at 23:02 +0100, Andrew Price wrote: > On 24/04/14 15:13, Lennart Poettering wrote: > > We probably should make setjmp()-freeness a requirement for > > all code included in Fedora. > > Would it be worth the effort, and how feasible is it anyway? setjmp and longjmp are tools, tha

Re: Deprecate setjmp/longjmp? [was Re: Maybe it's time to get rid of tcpwrappers/tcpd?]

2014-04-28 Thread Nikos Mavrogiannopoulos
On Mon, 2014-04-28 at 10:10 +0100, Daniel P. Berrange wrote: > > To the point, if a program uses setjmp and longjmp it is often that > > there was no other way to do it. You cannot for example have a > > co-routine/fiber implementation in C without setjmp() and longjmp(). > That's not correct - yo

Re: PSA: don't make your polkit policies desktop centric

2014-05-05 Thread Nikos Mavrogiannopoulos
On Mon, 2014-05-05 at 14:21 +0200, Stef Walter wrote: > >> The no prevents use of the service from remote > >> sessions such as ssh or Cockpit. > >> > >> The poorly named tag controls the default policy for users > >> logged in from any non-monitor+keyboard session. That is, sessions that > >> do

Re: F22 System Wide Change: Replace Yum With DNF

2014-06-13 Thread Nikos Mavrogiannopoulos
On Fri, 2014-06-13 at 14:53 +0200, Jan Zelený wrote: > > So not wanting users to complain about “yum” no longer having some > features > > is the only reason for dropping the yum name I have seen in this thread > > (also called “setting expectations”); have I missed other reasons? > > No, there

orphaning radiusclient-ng

2015-10-08 Thread Nikos Mavrogiannopoulos
Hello, I'll orphan radiusclient-ng with the purpose of dropping it from the next releases of Fedora. This is an old unmaintained library replaced by any of the following packages (the latter has an API compatible subpackage). * https://admin.fedoraproject.org/pkgdb/package/freeradius-client/ * htt

fedora notifications

2015-12-08 Thread Nikos Mavrogiannopoulos
Hi,  I'm quite lost with the fedora notifications [0] for email. Do you know which is the option to send me an email once a package is ready to be pushed to stable? (i.e., when the waiting period has passed or the feedback reached the threshold). regards, Nikos [0]. https://apps.fedoraproject.org

Re: orphaning radiusclient-ng

2015-12-18 Thread Nikos Mavrogiannopoulos
replacing it (the latter is drop in replacement). On Thu, 2015-10-08 at 10:46 +0200, Nikos Mavrogiannopoulos wrote: > Hello, >  I'll orphan radiusclient-ng with the purpose of dropping it from the > next releases of Fedora. This is an old unmaintained library replaced > by any

wml

2016-01-05 Thread Nikos Mavrogiannopoulos
Hi,  Are there users of website meta-language using fedora? I use it for some projects and thought it would be a useful addition. If you are a user of it please do the review for it at: https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=1295710 regards, Nikos -- devel mailing list devel@lists.fedoraproje

Re: Testing chrony seccomp support

2016-01-18 Thread Nikos Mavrogiannopoulos
On Mon, 2015-10-05 at 13:58 +0200, Miroslav Lichvar wrote: > In chrony 2.2-pre1 was added support for system call filtering with > the kernel seccomp facility. In chrony it's mainly useful to reduce > the damage from attackers who can execute arbitrary code, e.g. > prevent > gaining the root privil

Re: Testing chrony seccomp support

2016-01-18 Thread Nikos Mavrogiannopoulos
On Mon, 2016-01-18 at 12:51 +0100, Florian Weimer wrote: > On 01/18/2016 11:02 AM, Nikos Mavrogiannopoulos wrote: > > > As Florian suggested it makes more sense to compartmentalize chrony > > so > > that only a small controlled part of it needs to run with seccomp. >

seccomp support [was: Testing chrony seccomp support]

2016-01-19 Thread Nikos Mavrogiannopoulos
On Mon, 2016-01-18 at 09:51 -0600, Michael Catanzaro wrote: > > I appreciate what you are trying to do, but those seccomp filters > > totally break encapsulation.  I have no idea how to support this > > properly, in a sustainable way.  It appears very difficult to do > > this > > for independently

Re: Testing chrony seccomp support

2016-01-20 Thread Nikos Mavrogiannopoulos
On Mon, 2016-01-18 at 14:15 +0100, Miroslav Lichvar wrote: > On Mon, Jan 18, 2016 at 11:02:44AM +0100, Nikos Mavrogiannopoulos > wrote: > > As Florian suggested it makes more sense to compartmentalize chrony > > so > > that only a small controlled part of it needs to

Re: Testing chrony seccomp support

2016-01-22 Thread Nikos Mavrogiannopoulos
On Wed, 2016-01-20 at 14:09 +0100, Florian Weimer wrote: > On 01/20/2016 01:12 PM, Nikos Mavrogiannopoulos wrote: > > > If you have complex structures to be transfered you may want to > > rely on > > something automated to serialize/deserialize requests. That will &g

Re: Testing chrony seccomp support

2016-01-22 Thread Nikos Mavrogiannopoulos
On Mon, 2016-01-18 at 12:51 +0100, Florian Weimer wrote: > On 01/18/2016 11:02 AM, Nikos Mavrogiannopoulos wrote: > > > As Florian suggested it makes more sense to compartmentalize chrony > > so > > that only a small controlled part of it needs to run with seccomp. >

Re: F25 Self Contained Change: NSS enforces the system-wide crypto policy

2016-05-23 Thread Nikos Mavrogiannopoulos
On Fri, 2016-05-20 at 10:01 -0500, Michael Catanzaro wrote: > On Fri, 2016-05-20 at 11:48 +0200, Jan Kurik wrote: > > > > As it is now, the System-wide crypto policy in F24 is only enforced > > by > > the OpenSSL and GnuTLS TLS libraries. > Keep in mind that the system policy is still overridden b

Re: F25 Self Contained Change: NSS enforces the system-wide crypto policy

2016-05-23 Thread Nikos Mavrogiannopoulos
ontained Change: NSS enforces the system-wide > > crypto policy = > > https://fedoraproject.org/wiki/Changes/NSSCryptoPolicies > > > > Change owner(s): > > * Nikos Mavrogiannopoulos > > > > As it is now, the System-wide crypto policy in F24 is only enf

Re: Why GUI software update tool is broken for me

2016-06-15 Thread Nikos Mavrogiannopoulos
On Wed, 2016-06-15 at 10:14 +0200, Ade wrote: > Hi all > > I dont really want this to be a negative post, just want to share > something in order to start a healthy discussion > > Background > Im a Fedora desktop user, have been for many years, going all the way > back to Fedora Core 1 - I use Fe

Re: Why GUI software update tool is broken for me

2016-06-16 Thread Nikos Mavrogiannopoulos
On Wed, 2016-06-15 at 12:41 -0400, Russell Doty wrote: > > Running tracer for a while can really open your eyes to how many > > things > > need restarting after normal updates flow.  > > > > One thing that might make this less annoying to people would be > > ability > > to schedule the reboot fo

Re: A new way of writing secure code

2016-07-04 Thread Nikos Mavrogiannopoulos
On Mon, 2016-07-04 at 05:40 +, Ralf Senderek wrote: > Dear developers,  > > for all who wish to add reliable encryption and authentication > services to their projects with ease, I'd like to draw your > attention to cryptlib, which is available in F23, F24, rawhide > and EPEL 7 stable reposito

notion of base or minimal image

2016-07-19 Thread Nikos Mavrogiannopoulos
Hi,  Is there some notion or definition of a Fedora minimal or base image? I couldn't find some documentation on that. I would like to modify some script which a package on the critical path depends on, from bash to perl and I would like to understand whether that could affect any fedora images. r

Re: OpenSSL-1.1.0 COPR for Rawhide

2016-07-25 Thread Nikos Mavrogiannopoulos
On Fri, 2016-07-22 at 19:11 +0200, Michael Stahl wrote: > On 22.07.2016 16:53, Simo Sorce wrote: > > > > On Fri, 2016-07-22 at 16:48 +0200, Tomas Mraz wrote: > > > > > > > > > 2. Add compat 1.0.2 package which would be used by 3rd party > > > applications and also temporarily by applications tha

heads up: engine_pkcs11 merged with libp11

2016-08-01 Thread Nikos Mavrogiannopoulos
Hi,  The upstream projects libp11 and engine_pkcs11 have been merged under the libp11 umbrella. As such, I plan to retire engine_pkcs11, and merge it with libp11. The only drawback that I see from that move, is that one would not find the engine_pkcs11 package at the packagedb search https://admin.

updating the fedora defensive guide

2016-08-01 Thread Nikos Mavrogiannopoulos
Hi,  I've realized that the Fedora defensive guide [0] is the only guide we have to introduce the C TLS and crypto libraries we have, as well as provide a defensive style in using them. However, it is quite out- dated, and misses information which may be standard requirement in the future (e.g., su

Re: F26 System Wide Change: OpenSSL 1.1.0

2016-09-16 Thread Nikos Mavrogiannopoulos
On Fri, 2016-09-16 at 16:13 +0200, Dan Horák wrote: > On Fri, 16 Sep 2016 15:06:13 +0100 > David Woodhouse wrote: > > > > > On Fri, 2016-09-16 at 15:39 +0200, Jan Kurik wrote: > > > > > > We will also > > > add compat openssl102 package so the applications and other > > > dependencies which are

duplicate package on fresh install

2016-09-23 Thread Nikos Mavrogiannopoulos
Hello,  A user posted some issue on gnutls [0], and it turned out that after a fresh install of f24 that user had two versions of the library installed. I have no idea why this can be or whether that should be expected from the installer/updater. Any insights? regards, Nikos [0]. https://bugzilla

Re: F26 System Wide Change: OpenSSL 1.1.0

2016-09-29 Thread Nikos Mavrogiannopoulos
On Wed, 2016-09-28 at 11:43 -0400, Matthew Miller wrote: > On Wed, Sep 28, 2016 at 03:13:34PM +0100, Tomasz Kłoczko wrote: > > > > Is it any official Fedora policy/call to move away from openssl? > > As far as I know, no. There was this attempt: > https://fedoraproject.org/wiki/FedoraCryptoConsol

Re: [SO-NAME BUMP] jsoncpp 1.7.7 comes to rawhide (and maybe to fc25)

2016-10-02 Thread Nikos Mavrogiannopoulos
On Mon, 2016-10-03 at 06:10 +0200, Björn Esser wrote: > Chain-build is running:  > https://koji.fedoraproject.org/koji/taskinfo?taskID=15917326 However it doesn't seem to work: Error: nothing provides libjsoncpp.so.1()(64bit) needed by cmake-3.6.2- 4.fc26.x86_64 Also fc25 buildroot is broken for

Re: OpenSSL 1.1.0 in Rawhide very soon

2016-10-11 Thread Nikos Mavrogiannopoulos
On Tue, 2016-10-11 at 16:46 +, Petr Pisar wrote: > On 2016-10-11, Remi Collet wrote: > > > > It doesn't seem possible to use a compat library (else we will very > > probably going to encounter issues is both library versions are > > used in > > the same process, because of the numerous librar

Re: "Workstation" Product defaults to wide-open firewall

2014-12-09 Thread Nikos Mavrogiannopoulos
On Tue, 2014-12-09 at 17:29 +1030, William B wrote: > > > I just happened to look at the firewalld default settings, and I > > > was not amused when I noticed this: > > > http://pkgs.fedoraproject.org/cgit/firewalld.git/tree/FedoraWorkstation.xml > > > > > > > > > > > This "firewall" is a joke!

review-swap

2015-01-05 Thread Nikos Mavrogiannopoulos
Hi, I'm happy to review a package in exchange for freeradius-client library: https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=1171129 regards, Nikos -- devel mailing list devel@lists.fedoraproject.org https://admin.fedoraproject.org/mailman/listinfo/devel Fedora Code of Conduct: http://fedoraprojec

System-wide crypto policy transition tracker

2015-01-06 Thread Nikos Mavrogiannopoulos
Hello, I've created a transition tracker to system-wide crypto policy at: https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=1179209 Currently it contains bugs filled against openssl and gnutls applications in Fedora. If you use some application which utilizes SSL/TLS and isn't included in the tracker f

Re: System-wide crypto policy transition tracker

2015-01-07 Thread Nikos Mavrogiannopoulos
On Tue, 2015-01-06 at 12:16 -0500, Christopher wrote: > Are there any guidelines for enforcing crypto policies in Java > applications. > Primarily, I was thinking about those Java applications that use JSSE > system properties or similar user-driven configuration to specify > keystores. Are those

Re: System-wide crypto policy transition tracker

2015-01-07 Thread Nikos Mavrogiannopoulos
On Tue, 2015-01-06 at 18:41 +0100, Till Maas wrote: > On Tue, Jan 06, 2015 at 04:20:55PM +0100, Nikos Mavrogiannopoulos wrote: > > > I've created a transition tracker to system-wide crypto policy at: > > https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=1179209 > Should the

Re: System-wide crypto policy transition tracker

2015-01-07 Thread Nikos Mavrogiannopoulos
On Tue, 2015-01-06 at 11:27 -0600, Michael Cronenworth wrote: > On 01/06/2015 09:20 AM, Nikos Mavrogiannopoulos wrote: > > I've created a transition tracker to system-wide crypto policy at: > > https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=1179209 > > > > Currently

Re: System-wide crypto policy transition tracker

2015-01-07 Thread Nikos Mavrogiannopoulos
On Wed, 2015-01-07 at 09:18 +0100, Petr Spacek wrote: > > Currently it contains bugs filled against openssl and gnutls > > applications in Fedora. If you use some application which utilizes > > SSL/TLS and isn't included in the tracker feel free to request it use > > the policy, and include a link

Re: System-wide crypto policy transition tracker

2015-01-07 Thread Nikos Mavrogiannopoulos
On Tue, 2015-01-06 at 09:55 -0700, Kevin Fenzi wrote: > > Currently it contains bugs filled against openssl and gnutls > > applications in Fedora. If you use some application which utilizes > > SSL/TLS and isn't included in the tracker feel free to request it use > > the policy, and include a link

curve25519 [was: OpenSSL missing NIST p224r1]

2015-01-10 Thread Nikos Mavrogiannopoulos
- Original Message - > I surprised that tor supports any of the NIST curves given questions about > how they were developed and that 25519 is available as an alternative. It was never an alternative to the NIST curves because it was never part of any standard, and doesn't support key excha

amending the new package process

2015-01-21 Thread Nikos Mavrogiannopoulos
Hi, I've added few packages last year using the new package process: https://fedoraproject.org/wiki/New_package_process_for_existing_contributors I'm not sure which fedora body (FPC or FESCO) is responsible for this document, that's why that mail is sent here. In all cases, I'm interested on othe

Re: amending the new package process

2015-01-21 Thread Nikos Mavrogiannopoulos
On Wed, 2015-01-21 at 12:10 +0100, Vít Ondruch wrote: > > I'd like to propose an amendment to allow > > bringing packages even if no reviewers are available (the typical case). > > > > Step 6: ... If the proposed package is not reviewed for 2 months, the > > package must be reviewed by the submitte

Re: amending the new package process

2015-01-22 Thread Nikos Mavrogiannopoulos
On Thu, 2015-01-22 at 09:57 -0500, Miloslav Trmač wrote: > > That's wishful thinking. I proposed that rule in order to make apparent > > the fact that there are not enough reviewers and new packages are > > blocked in the queue. Ignoring the fact isn't going to make it go away. > True, there are n

Re: amending the new package process

2015-01-22 Thread Nikos Mavrogiannopoulos
On Thu, 2015-01-22 at 15:08 +0100, Mathieu Bridon wrote: > On Thu, 2015-01-22 at 14:49 +0100, Zbigniew Jędrzejewski-Szmek wrote: > > Unfortunately review swaps don't work for new packagers, before they are > > sponsored. They are encouraged to do informal reviews, but those reviews > > don't carry

Re: amending the new package process

2015-01-22 Thread Nikos Mavrogiannopoulos
On Thu, 2015-01-22 at 11:30 -0500, Matthew Miller wrote: > > > Penalize in what sense? > > In the sense, that in addition to packaging something new you have to > > review something else in order to get your new package in. If reviewing > > is voluntary it should affect every packager the same, n

Re: amending the new package process

2015-01-24 Thread Nikos Mavrogiannopoulos
- Original Message - > 2015-01-21 11:49 GMT+01:00 Nikos Mavrogiannopoulos : > > > > Step 6: ... If the proposed package is not reviewed for 2 months, the > > package must be reviewed by the submitter, and a git module with the > > master branch will be appro

Re: amending the new package process

2015-01-24 Thread Nikos Mavrogiannopoulos
- Original Message - > I think the last bullet point here is the important part. I understand > the disposition for a technical solution, but someone that just drops > their package in - even after two months - isn't really getting a sense > of community out of the experience. The proces

looking for Jeffrey C. Ollie

2015-02-10 Thread Nikos Mavrogiannopoulos
Hi, I've filled in https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=1170578 and I'd like to replace radiusclient-ng-utils with freeradius-client-utils. Does anyone have more recent contact information of Jeffrey C. Ollie (j...@ocjtech.us). regards, Nikos -- devel mailing list devel@lists.fedoraproje

Re: Proposal to (formally/easily) allowing multiple versions of the same library installable

2015-02-13 Thread Nikos Mavrogiannopoulos
On Fri, 2015-02-13 at 15:21 +0330, Hedayat Vatankhah wrote: > Dear all, > I don't know if this has been discussed before, but I didn't find any. > Summary: I have a proposal to make it easier for maintainers to have > multiple versions of the same library in distro (by making it > *naturally* possi

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