Re: pipenv removal in F40

I would like to unretire the package and take ownership of it. Could anyone possibly sponsor me? I have rebased it to the latest upstream version, 2024.0.0, and omitted some patches that were already merged upstream. You can find the logs and files here: https://download.copr.fedorainfracloud.

Fedora rawhide compose report: 20240609.n.0 changes

OLD: Fedora-Rawhide-20240608.n.1 NEW: Fedora-Rawhide-20240609.n.0 = SUMMARY = Added images:2 Dropped images: 2 Added packages: 2 Dropped packages:0 Upgraded packages: 12 Downgraded packages: 0 Size of added packages: 66.91 KiB Size of dropped packages:0 B

[Test-Announce] 2024-06-10 @ 15:00 UTC - Fedora Quality Meeting

# Fedora Quality Assurance Meeting # Date: 2024-06-10 # Time: 15:00 UTC (https://fedoraproject.org/wiki/Infrastructure/UTCHowto) # Location: https://matrix.to/#/#meeting:fedoraproject.org?web-instance[element.io]=chat.fedoraproject.org Greetings testers! It's meeting time again. Here is a handy l

Re: uploading big sources to lookaside cache

Would using any of: https://fedoraproject.org/wiki/Test_Machine_Resources_For_Package_Maintainers for the upload to solve the issue? I guess not, since it may be wise to avoid authentication on machines with shared root access, but I'm posting this since Fedora may have some other resources like t

uploading big sources to lookaside cache

I was just thinking... for users with a limited upload bandwidth it is a pain to upload big sources to the lookaside cache. What about implementing a way to avoid the chain "user downloads the source -> user upload the source to lookaside cache" by having some service running in the infrastruct

Re: F41 Change Proposal: Make OpenSSL distrust SHA-1 signatures by default (system-wide)

Dear Roberto On Sun, Jun 9, 2024 at 1:16 PM Roberto Ragusa wrote: > On 6/9/24 11:27, Dmitry Belyavskiy wrote: > > > > On Sun, Jun 9, 2024 at 11:22 AM Zbigniew Jędrzejewski-Szmek < > zbys...@in.waw.pl > wrote: > > > > In https://fedoraproject.org/wiki/SHA1SignaturesG

Re: F41 Change Proposal: Make OpenSSL distrust SHA-1 signatures by default (system-wide)

On 6/9/24 11:27, Dmitry Belyavskiy wrote: On Sun, Jun 9, 2024 at 11:22 AM Zbigniew Jędrzejewski-Szmek mailto:zbys...@in.waw.pl>> wrote: In https://fedoraproject.org/wiki/SHA1SignaturesGuidance : > At the moment, we don't provide a

Re: F41 Change Proposal: Make OpenSSL distrust SHA-1 signatures by default (system-wide)

On Sun, Jun 9, 2024 at 11:22 AM Zbigniew Jędrzejewski-Szmek < zbys...@in.waw.pl> wrote: > In https://fedoraproject.org/wiki/SHA1SignaturesGuidance: > > At the moment, we don't provide a public API to enable SHA-1 signature > > support in OpenSSL programmatically. We ask you to respect the system >

Re: F41 Change Proposal: Make OpenSSL distrust SHA-1 signatures by default (system-wide)

Dear Björn, On Sun, Jun 9, 2024 at 12:39 AM Björn Persson wrote: > > == Summary == > > OpenSSL will no longer trust cryptographic signatures using SHA-1 by > > default, starting from Fedora 41. > > Validating DNS resolvers are still required to be able to validate > signatures made with SHA-1. R

Re: F41 Change Proposal: Make OpenSSL distrust SHA-1 signatures by default (system-wide)

In https://fedoraproject.org/wiki/SHA1SignaturesGuidance: > At the moment, we don't provide a public API to enable SHA-1 signature > support in OpenSSL programmatically. We ask you to respect the system > administrator's configuration choice on this. We're planning to work > with OpenSSL upstream t

Re: F41 Change Proposal: Make OpenSSL distrust SHA-1 signatures by default (system-wide)

Vitaly Zaitsev via devel wrote on Sun, Jun 09, 2024 at 09:15:56AM +0200: > On 08/06/2024 00:43, Aoife Moloney wrote: > > OpenSSL will no longer trust cryptographic signatures using SHA-1 by > > default, starting from Fedora 41. > > What about Git? AFAIK, AFAIK, Git heavily uses both SHA-1 and SHA-

Re: F41 Change Proposal: Make OpenSSL distrust SHA-1 signatures by default (system-wide)

On 08/06/2024 00:43, Aoife Moloney wrote: OpenSSL will no longer trust cryptographic signatures using SHA-1 by default, starting from Fedora 41. What about Git? AFAIK, AFAIK, Git heavily uses both SHA-1 and SHA-2 to validate objects and commits. -- Sincerely, Vitaly Zaitsev (vit...@easycod

Re: Review request for gmobile

On 08/06/2024 07:09, Tomi Lähteenmäki wrote: Hi, I sent a review request for gmobile [1] a bit over two weeks ago. The gmobile is written in C and it is dependency of phosh and phoc and upcoming phrog package. If someone would have time to review the request it would be great. -Tomi [1]