On 10/6/15, 11:07 PM, "dev on behalf of Hyunseok" wrote:
>Hi,
>
>Can we generate 9k jumbo frames using the latest pktgen?
Internally I do not create mbufs larger then 2K at this time in Pktgen. I
guess it could be changed, but I do not have the time. If you want to
submit a patch that would be
On 10/06/15 18:00, Michael S. Tsirkin wrote:
> On Tue, Oct 06, 2015 at 05:49:21PM +0300, Vlad Zolotarov wrote:
>>> and read/write the config space.
>>> This means that a single userspace bug is enough to corrupt kernel
>>> memory.
>> Could u, pls., provide and example of this simple bug? Because
On 10/06/2015 05:07 PM, Michael S. Tsirkin wrote:
> On Tue, Oct 06, 2015 at 03:15:57PM +0300, Avi Kivity wrote:
>> btw, (2) doesn't really add any insecurity. The user could already poke at
>> the msix tables (as well as perform DMA); they just couldn't get a useful
>> interrupt out of them.
> P
Hi,
Can we generate 9k jumbo frames using the latest pktgen?
Thanks!
-hs
On Tue, Oct 06, 2015 at 05:49:21PM +0300, Vlad Zolotarov wrote:
> >and read/write the config space.
> >This means that a single userspace bug is enough to corrupt kernel
> >memory.
>
> Could u, pls., provide and example of this simple bug? Because it's
> absolutely not obvious...
Stick a value th
On 10/06/15 16:58, Michael S. Tsirkin wrote:
> On Tue, Oct 06, 2015 at 11:23:11AM +0300, Vlad Zolotarov wrote:
>> Michael, how this or any other related patch is related to the problem u r
>> describing?
>> The above ability is there for years and if memory serves me
>> well it was u who wrote ui
On Tue, Oct 06, 2015 at 03:15:57PM +0300, Avi Kivity wrote:
> btw, (2) doesn't really add any insecurity. The user could already poke at
> the msix tables (as well as perform DMA); they just couldn't get a useful
> interrupt out of them.
Poking at msix tables won't cause memory corruption unless
On Tue, Oct 06, 2015 at 11:23:11AM +0300, Vlad Zolotarov wrote:
> Michael, how this or any other related patch is related to the problem u r
> describing?
> The above ability is there for years and if memory serves me
> well it was u who wrote uio_pci_generic with this "security flaw". ;)
I answe
On Tue, Oct 06, 2015 at 08:33:56AM +0100, Stephen Hemminger wrote:
> Other than implementation objections, so far the two main arguments
> against this reduce to:
> 1. If you allow UIO ioctl then it opens an API hook for all the crap out
> of tree UIO drivers to do what they want.
> 2. If
From: "Alejandro.Lucero"
Signed-off-by: Alejandro.Lucero
Signed-off-by: Rolf.Neugebauer
---
tools/dpdk_nic_bind.py |8 ++--
tools/setup.sh | 122 ++--
2 files changed, 101 insertions(+), 29 deletions(-)
diff --git a/tools/dpdk_nic_bind.
From: "Alejandro.Lucero"
Signed-off-by: Alejandro.Lucero
Signed-off-by: Rolf.Neugebauer
---
doc/guides/nics/index.rst |1 +
doc/guides/nics/nfp.rst | 270 +
2 files changed, 271 insertions(+)
create mode 100644 doc/guides/nics/nfp.rst
diff -
From: "Alejandro.Lucero"
Current Netronome's PMD just supports Virtual Functions. Future Physical
Function support will require specific Netronome code here.
Signed-off-by: Alejandro.Lucero
Signed-off-by: Rolf.Neugebauer
---
lib/librte_eal/common/include/rte_pci.h |1 +
lib/librte_eal/l
From: "Alejandro.Lucero"
Signed-off-by: Alejandro.Lucero
Signed-off-by: Rolf.Neugebauer
---
MAINTAINERS |9 +
config/common_linuxapp |6 +
doc/guides/rel_notes/release_2_2.rst |8 +
drivers/net/Makefile |1 +
drivers/net/nf
From: "Alejandro.Lucero"
This patchset adds a new PMD for Netronome?s NFP-6xxx card along with a new
UIO driver, documentation and minor changes to configuration scrips.
Alejandro.Lucero (4):
This patch adds a PMD driver for Netronome NFP PCI cards.
This patch adds a new UIO driver for Netro
Hi Marc,
On Sun, Oct 04, 2015 at 11:12:46PM +0200, Marc Sune wrote:
>[...]
> /**
> + * Device supported speeds bitmap flags
> + */
> +#define ETH_LINK_SPEED_AUTONEG (0 << 0) /*< Autonegociate
> (all speeds) */
> +#define ETH_LINK_SPEED_NO_AUTONEG(1 << 0) /*< Disable autoneg
On 10/06/2015 10:33 AM, Stephen Hemminger wrote:
> Other than implementation objections, so far the two main arguments
> against this reduce to:
>1. If you allow UIO ioctl then it opens an API hook for all the crap out
> of tree UIO drivers to do what they want.
>2. If you allow UIO M
Le 6 oct. 2015 09:54, "Stephen Hemminger" a
?crit :
>
> On Mon, 5 Oct 2015 19:54:35 +0200
> Adrien Mazarguil wrote:
>
> > Mellanox OFED 3.1 [1] comes with improved APIs that Mellanox ConnectX-4
> > (mlx5) adapters can take advantage of, such as:
> >
> > - Separate post and doorbell operations on
On 10/06/15 01:49, Michael S. Tsirkin wrote:
> On Tue, Oct 06, 2015 at 01:09:55AM +0300, Vladislav Zolotarov wrote:
>> How about instead of trying to invent the wheel just go and attack the
>> problem
>> directly just like i've proposed already a few times in the last days:
>> instead
>> of lim
On Tue, 2015-10-06 at 08:35 +0100, Stephen Hemminger wrote:
> On Mon, 5 Oct 2015 11:26:08 -0400
> Chas Williams <3chas3 at gmail.com> wrote:
>
> > diff --git a/lib/librte_eal/common/include/rte_pci.h
> > b/lib/librte_eal/common/include/rte_pci.h
> > index 83e3c28..852c149 100644
> > --- a/lib/li
On Mon, 5 Oct 2015 19:54:35 +0200
Adrien Mazarguil wrote:
> Mellanox OFED 3.1 [1] comes with improved APIs that Mellanox ConnectX-4
> (mlx5) adapters can take advantage of, such as:
>
> - Separate post and doorbell operations on all queues.
> - Lightweight RX queues called Work Queues (WQs).
>
On Mon, 5 Oct 2015 11:26:08 -0400
Chas Williams <3chas3 at gmail.com> wrote:
> diff --git a/lib/librte_eal/common/include/rte_pci.h
> b/lib/librte_eal/common/include/rte_pci.h
> index 83e3c28..852c149 100644
> --- a/lib/librte_eal/common/include/rte_pci.h
> +++ b/lib/librte_eal/common/include/rt
Other than implementation objections, so far the two main arguments
against this reduce to:
1. If you allow UIO ioctl then it opens an API hook for all the crap out
of tree UIO drivers to do what they want.
2. If you allow UIO MSI-X then you are expanding the usage of userspace
device
On Tue, Oct 06, 2015 at 01:09:55AM +0300, Vladislav Zolotarov wrote:
> How about instead of trying to invent the wheel just go and attack the problem
> directly just like i've proposed already a few times in the last days: instead
> of limiting the UIO limit the users that are allowed to use UIO to
On Oct 6, 2015 12:55 AM, "Michael S. Tsirkin" wrote:
>
> On Thu, Oct 01, 2015 at 11:33:06AM +0300, Michael S. Tsirkin wrote:
> > Just forwarding events is not enough to make a valid driver.
> > What is missing is a way to access the device in a safe way.
>
> Thinking about it some more, maybe some
On Thu, Oct 01, 2015 at 11:33:06AM +0300, Michael S. Tsirkin wrote:
> Just forwarding events is not enough to make a valid driver.
> What is missing is a way to access the device in a safe way.
Thinking about it some more, maybe some devices don't do DMA, and merely
signal events with MSI/MSI-X.
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