issatisfaction if it prevents 74% of the members from being able to change
the Constitution. But maybe changing the supermajority requirement would be
too controversial to include in the overall proposal."
*
The current members of the committee are:
Anthony Towns, [EMAIL PROTECTED] (Debian
Raul Miller wrote:
>On Mon, Dec 18, 2000 at 03:41:21PM -0600, Norman Petry wrote:
>> ... we have formed a joint committee to develop a proposal, which we
>> will probably present to Debian for internal discussion in about a
>> month's time (I'm just guessi
Raul Miller wrote:
>Drats.
>
>I guess that means I should either change the name (pull out smith)
>or change the mechanism. Straw poll (mostly I'm interested in hearing
>what people who have sponsored the proposal think): should I go for the
>quick fix (change name from Smith/Condorcet to Condor
is
to be commended for having chosen such an excellent system for making group
decisions. For those of us on the EM list
(http://www.eskimo.com/~robla/em/) who study these things, Condorcet's
method is widely regarded as the best single-winner method available. We
are very pleased that there is at least one organisation in the real world
that's putting it to good use.
Cheers,
Norman Petry
Darren O. Benham wrote:
>>
>> Except that Chris Lawrence is mistaken as to how Condorcet's method is
>> implemented within the Debian Project. Yesterday he wrote:
>>
>Chris is not mistaken.
That's strange... in my post I gave an example from one of Debian's previous
elections proving (I think) t
amongst ourselves, and have selected one or two
first-rate methods that we would recommend for Debian, as well as some
simpler approaches that would probably also be adequate. It would probably
be best if one or two interested Debian members discuss this matter with us
privately, and help us develop a single, polished proposal that could then
be taken back to Debian as a whole for consideration (to avoid boring
everyone here with a subject that's probably not of much interest or direct
relevance to the Debian project).
Please let us know if you are interested in working on this.
Sincerely,
Norman Petry
I just noticed that I made (at least) one error in my description of
pairwise methods. I wrote:
>Unfortunately, it would be very tedious/impractical to
>hold a series of separate two-way elections between all the available
>options, since the number of elections needed is equal to the square of t
Steve Greenland wrote:
> I'm not sure it really makes any sense to have alternatives with
> different majority requirements[1]. The recent case of an ammendment
> that had an (arguably) different requirement than the original GR came
> from two issues:
I agree with you that supermajority requirem
Buddha Buck wrote:
> The Smith Set is defined as the smallest set of options that are not
> defeated by any option outside the Smith Set.
This definition of the Smith set is incorrect. Suppose we have:
A>B, B>C, A=C, A>D, B>D, C>D. ('>' means 'dominates', or beats pairwise)
Then by your defini
Raul Miller wrote:
> I would like to know if anyone have a specific problem with the following
> concept of cumulative preference:
>
> An individual ballot prefers option A to option B, if:
>
> (*) Option A is mentioned at some preference, and option B is not
> mentioned at all, or
> (*) Option A
Raul Miller wrote:
>
>Hmm.. the constitution already states that votes are cast by email.
>[Which makes a lot of sense, when you think about the technologies
>involved -- email queues, web doesn't, and signing of email is a well
>established technology.] And, personally, I'm not comfortable with
isfaction if it prevents 74% of the members from being able to change
the Constitution. But maybe changing the supermajority requirement would be
too controversial to include in the overall proposal."
*
The current members of the committee are:
Anthony Towns, aj@azure.humbug.org.au (D
Raul Miller wrote:
>On Mon, Dec 18, 2000 at 03:41:21PM -0600, Norman Petry wrote:
>> ... we have formed a joint committee to develop a proposal, which we
>> will probably present to Debian for internal discussion in about a
>> month's time (I'm just guessing on the
Raul Miller wrote:
>Drats.
>
>I guess that means I should either change the name (pull out smith)
>or change the mechanism. Straw poll (mostly I'm interested in hearing
>what people who have sponsored the proposal think): should I go for the
>quick fix (change name from Smith/Condorcet to Condorc
ect is
to be commended for having chosen such an excellent system for making group
decisions. For those of us on the EM list
(http://www.eskimo.com/~robla/em/) who study these things, Condorcet's
method is widely regarded as the best single-winner method available. We
are very pleased that ther
Darren O. Benham wrote:
>>
>> Except that Chris Lawrence is mistaken as to how Condorcet's method is
>> implemented within the Debian Project. Yesterday he wrote:
>>
>Chris is not mistaken.
That's strange... in my post I gave an example from one of Debian's previous
elections proving (I think)
amongst ourselves, and have selected one or two
first-rate methods that we would recommend for Debian, as well as some
simpler approaches that would probably also be adequate. It would probably
be best if one or two interested Debian members discuss this matter with us
privately, and help us develo
I just noticed that I made (at least) one error in my description of
pairwise methods. I wrote:
>Unfortunately, it would be very tedious/impractical to
>hold a series of separate two-way elections between all the available
>options, since the number of elections needed is equal to the square of
Steve Greenland wrote:
> I'm not sure it really makes any sense to have alternatives with
> different majority requirements[1]. The recent case of an ammendment
> that had an (arguably) different requirement than the original GR came
> from two issues:
I agree with you that supermajority require
Buddha Buck wrote:
> The Smith Set is defined as the smallest set of options that are not
> defeated by any option outside the Smith Set.
This definition of the Smith set is incorrect. Suppose we have:
A>B, B>C, A=C, A>D, B>D, C>D. ('>' means 'dominates', or beats pairwise)
Then by your defin
Raul Miller wrote:
> I would like to know if anyone have a specific problem with the following
> concept of cumulative preference:
>
> An individual ballot prefers option A to option B, if:
>
> (*) Option A is mentioned at some preference, and option B is not
> mentioned at all, or
> (*) Option A
Raul Miller wrote:
>
>Hmm.. the constitution already states that votes are cast by email.
>[Which makes a lot of sense, when you think about the technologies
>involved -- email queues, web doesn't, and signing of email is a well
>established technology.] And, personally, I'm not comfortable with
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