On Fri, May 23, 2003 at 12:54:50AM +0200, Jochen Voss wrote:
> I fully agree. But then the per-option quorum has this problem, too.
> And here it is harder to understand (see my example) and more relevant
> (can occur for votes with many voters) than in the case of global
> quorum.
> This problem
Hi,
Anthony Towns wrote:
[ Analysis snipped ]
> If only nine developers find A acceptable, well, it deserves to lose.
Thank you. I wrote two days ago that
>Nick Phillips wrote:
>> If a winning option would be discarded due to quorum requirements, then
>> I think the vote should probably be consid
Hello,
On Thu, May 22, 2003 at 08:45:51PM -0400, Raul Miller wrote:
> I'm going to focus only on your claim that this page shows an example
> of the violation of monotonicity by Manoj's proposal.
>
> Monotonicity (http://electionmethods.org/evaluation.html#MC) requires
> "With the relative order
Hello,
On Fri, May 23, 2003 at 02:45:30PM +1000, Anthony Towns wrote:
> Ugh, that's an overcomplicated example. Here's a simpler one:
Did you read it carefully?
> Three options, A, B and D (the default option). Quorum is 10. Votes are:
>
> 9 ABD
> 4 BDA
>
> A defeauts B, 9:4; B defe
Hi,
Jochen Voss wrote:
> My example: The winner among the interesting options changes
> because an uninteresting option fails quorum.
That is a property of any Condorcet conflict resolution system. You can't
avoid it unless you throw the entire vote out and start over.
The fact that few peo
Hallo,
it is necessary to distinguish between the participation
criterion and the monotonicity criterion.
The participation criterion says that a set of additional
voters who strictly prefer candidate A to candidate B must
not change the winner from candidate A to candidate B. The
Condorcet crite
Hallo,
here is an extreme violation of the participation criterion.
Situation 1:
A:B=206:94
A:C=160:140
A:D=161:139
A:E=162:138
A:F=96:204
B:C=202:98
B:D=163:137
B:E=164:136
B:F=205:95
C:D=203:97
C:E=93:207
C:F=165:135
D:E=228:72
D:F=166:134
E:F=201:9
On Fri, May 23, 2003 at 08:49:04AM +0200, Jochen Voss wrote:
> Hello,
>
> On Thu, May 22, 2003 at 08:45:51PM -0400, Raul Miller wrote:
> > I'm going to focus only on your claim that this page shows an example
> > of the violation of monotonicity by Manoj's proposal.
> >
> > Monotonicity (http://e
On Fri, May 23, 2003 at 08:54:32AM +0200, Jochen Voss wrote:
> On Fri, May 23, 2003 at 02:45:30PM +1000, Anthony Towns wrote:
> > Ugh, that's an overcomplicated example. Here's a simpler one:
> Did you read it carefully?
No, I didn't, and since it's so complicated I wouldn't expect to
understand i
Anthony Towns wrote:
>
> Yes, that's why we're in favour of per-option quorums, which don't
> introduce flawed incentives for little reason other than matching
> tradition.
instead, the per-option quorum will throw out the IDW in favour of a
less-favoured option due to quorum requirements.
R=15
On Fri, 2003-05-23 at 00:45, Anthony Towns wrote:
> And, as I've already posted elsewhere, you'll note there's no problem
> at all here if number of votes received is twice the quorum, which,
> historically, it almost always is.
Not almost. Always. Quorum was calculated wrong in the old elections
On Fri, May 23, 2003 at 09:26:49AM -0700, John H. Robinson, IV wrote:
> instead, the per-option quorum will throw out the IDW in favour of a
> less-favoured option due to quorum requirements.
Exactly.
For example: Ballot contains A, B and default option D.
Quorum is 10.
Manoj Srivastava wrote:
>
> Right. Leads to a lot of soul searching -- I no longer know
> whether I am helping or hurting my candidate by expressing my true
> preference.
>
> I should not be put in this position.
worst case scenario: everyone feels the way you do. no one votes.
tw
Hallo,
John wrote (23 May 2003):
> instead, the per-option quorum will throw out the IDW in
> favour of a less-favoured option due to quorum requirements.
>
> R=15
> 10 ABD
> 5 BDA
I suggest that one should at first calculate the ranking of
the candidates according to the beat path method and th
Hello,
On Sat, May 24, 2003 at 12:23:17AM +1000, Anthony Towns wrote:
> On Fri, May 23, 2003 at 08:54:32AM +0200, Jochen Voss wrote:
> > Did you read it carefully?
>
> No, I didn't, and since it's so complicated I wouldn't expect to
> understand it properly even if I had. I hate complicated examp
> > I should not be put in this position.
On Fri, May 23, 2003 at 10:49:08AM -0700, John H. Robinson, IV wrote:
> worst case scenario: everyone feels the way you do. no one votes.
> two week discussion period resumes, or the amendment is withdrawn.
False.
With your proposal, the worst case s
On Fri, May 23, 2003 at 08:46:13PM +0200, Jochen Voss wrote:
> In my example local quorum causes the following problem:
> dropping an irrelevant option changes which
> relevant option wins the election.
> Global quorum does not have this problem.
The way you've apparently defined your terms: Yes,
Hello Manoj,
On Wed, May 21, 2003 at 10:31:14AM -0500, Manoj Srivastava wrote:
> On Tue, 20 May 2003 22:43:59 +0200, Matthias Urlichs <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
> said:
> > John H. Robinson, IV wrote:
> > - 2. If the ballot has a quorum requirement R any options other
> > - than the default option whic
On Fri, May 23, 2003 at 09:29:36AM +0200, Matthias Urlichs wrote:
> Hi,
>
> Jochen Voss wrote:
> > My example: The winner among the interesting options changes
> > because an uninteresting option fails quorum.
>
> That is a property of any Condorcet conflict resolution system. You can't
> av
On Fri, May 23, 2003 at 09:37:51PM +0200, Jochen Voss wrote:
> Sorry, but I think your logic here is strange. Why do you think
> that the amendment is superfluous? Do you claim that you version
> and John's version are the same?
http://www.bartleby.com/61/71/S0897100.html
Superfluous does not m
Raul Miller wrote:
> > > I should not be put in this position.
>
> On Fri, May 23, 2003 at 10:49:08AM -0700, John H. Robinson, IV wrote:
> > worst case scenario: everyone feels the way you do. no one votes.
> > two week discussion period resumes, or the amendment is withdrawn.
>
> False.
i was
If it were impossible to rank options equally, then the combination of a
global quorum and an an elimination of unacceptable option (options to
which the default is preferred by a majority) would have essentially the
same effect as a per-option quorum.
This is easy to see. Every ballot would
On Fri, May 23, 2003 at 05:24:59PM -0400, Buddha Buck wrote:
> Imagine a vote along the lines of:
> 100 ballots of the form:
>[1] Red,[ ] Blue,[ ] Default
>
> 100 ballots of the form:
>[1] Red,[ ] Blue,[1] Default
>
> 25 ballots of the form:
>[ ] Red,[1] Blue,[
> "John" == John H Robinson, IV <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> writes:
John> we have two examples of where per-option quorum is flawed:
John> Example 1:
John> 2 options + default, R=15. 15 voters. 10 vote ABD, 5 vote
John> BDA
John> result: Condorcet would select option A Proposed
Sam Hartman wrote:
>
> Aj has made what seems to me to be a compelling argument that
>
> 1) local quorum is not flawed in this case
>
> 2) The Debian community wants B to win votes of this form.
>
> What we are saying is that we are giving minorities the power in
> certain limited cases to over
On Fri, May 23, 2003 at 04:40:49PM -0700, John H. Robinson, IV wrote:
> Sam Hartman wrote:
> >
> > Aj has made what seems to me to be a compelling argument that
> >
> > 1) local quorum is not flawed in this case
> >
> > 2) The Debian community wants B to win votes of this form.
> >
> > What we
On Fri, May 23, 2003 at 04:40:49PM -0700, John H. Robinson, IV wrote:
> correct me if i am wrong, but, isn't quorum suppoed to _prevent_
> minority rule? now you are saying that minority rule is good, and
> desired?
What do you mean?
There are forms of minority rule which quorum prevents, and the
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