Fellow developers,
I propose the following amendment to the Condorcet/Clone Proof SSD vote
tallying Constitutional amendment. This amendment supersedes the
amendment proposed in Message-ID: <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
If the sponsor rejects this change, I request seconds on this amendment,
so that it app
On Tue, May 20, 2003 at 12:19:33PM -0700, John H. Robinson, IV wrote:
>The amendment uses the concept of a Quorum requirement to inhibit
>"stealth decisions" by only a handful of developers. While this is a
>good thing, the per-option quorum from the amendment has a tendency to
>fur
Hi,
You actually propose two separate amendments. Please don't do that, it smells
of politics. :-/
John H. Robinson, IV wrote:
- 2. If the ballot has a quorum requirement R any options other
-than the default option which do not receive at least R votes
-ranking that option
Matthias Urlichs wrote:
>
> You actually propose two separate amendments. Please don't do that, it
> smells of politics. :-/
the changes are related, if just 2 was changed, then the majority
requirements in 3 have an undesired side-effect.
let me find that message . .
= http://lists.debian.org
Raul Miller wrote:
> On Tue, May 20, 2003 at 12:19:33PM -0700, John H. Robinson, IV wrote:
> >The amendment uses the concept of a Quorum requirement to inhibit
> >"stealth decisions" by only a handful of developers. While this is a
> >good thing, the per-option quorum from the amendment
Hi,
John H. Robinson, IV wrote:
> Matthias Urlichs:
> > The point of wording it the "old" way was that any option which is ranked
> > below the default by a majority is removed before starting the algorithm.
>
I was talking about (super)majority requirements (WRT the default option)
here.
> Not
Hi,
Oh, as a sponsor of the GR, I suppose I should clarify that I
am not going to accept this amendment; I consider it a bad one. This
makes our vote method fail the monoticity criteria
(http://www.electionmethods.org/evaluation.htm). See Scenario 2 below.
I'll present two (pe
On Tue, May 20, 2003 at 02:39:08PM -0700, John H. Robinson, IV wrote:
> example: quorum of 20, two ballots on the measure, plus the default
> option. two major schools of thought: those that support option A, and
> those that support option B.
If the quorum of 20 is significant, neither school of
Manoj Srivastava wrote:
>
>
> Scenario A:
> Suppose the tech ctte has 10 members, and is trying to vote on
> the rainbow vote. The quorum is 4. (If you recall, the rainbow vote
> had 10 options).
>
> All 10 members vote -- and they all like like different
> colors, except that t
Raul Miller wrote:
> On Tue, May 20, 2003 at 02:39:08PM -0700, John H. Robinson, IV wrote:
> >
> > this is a strawman, because if > achieve the R+1>default per-item quota.
>
> Expressed in terms of scenario: A vs B, quorum 20
>
> Case 1:
>
> 15 ABD
> D wins
15 Case 2:
> 15 ABD
> 8 BDA
> A w
> > Expressed in terms of scenario: A vs B, quorum 20
> >
> > Case 1:
> >
> > 15 ABD
> > D wins
On Tue, May 20, 2003 at 05:30:29PM -0700, John H. Robinson, IV wrote:
> 15 > Case 2:
> > 15 ABD
> > 8 BDA
> > A wins
> >
> > Here, the vote(s) for B caused A to win.
>
> these are new votes, not re
On Tue, May 20, 2003 at 05:00:41PM -0700, John H. Robinson, IV wrote:
> the proposal brings the Quorum voting method back to the Condorcet
> standard,
For reference, "back to the Condorcet standard" is not what we
want here. The default option allows allows us to combine condorcet
preferential vo
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