Re: Condorcet Voting and Supermajorities (Re: [CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENT] Disambiguation of 4.1.5)

2000-11-21 Thread Rob Lanphier
Hi all, You guys caught me sleeping. This is the type of discussion I joined the list to chime in on :) On Tue, 14 Nov 2000, Buddha Buck wrote: > Could someone explain to me, in simple terms, how Condorcet-based > voting schemes work in the face of a supermajority requirement? Well, I thi

Re: Condorcet Voting and Supermajorities (Re: [CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENT] Disambiguation of 4.1.5)

2000-11-21 Thread Anthony Towns
On Tue, Nov 21, 2000 at 12:30:28AM -0800, Rob Lanphier wrote: > You guys caught me sleeping. This is the type of discussion I joined the > list to chime in on :) Heh :) > On Tue, 14 Nov 2000, Buddha Buck wrote: > Here's how it would work. Voters rank all candidates or options, but also > p

Re: Condorcet Voting and Supermajorities (Re: [CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENT] Disambiguation of 4.1.5)

2000-11-21 Thread Steve Greenland
On 21-Nov-00, 03:42 (CST), Anthony Towns wrote: > On Tue, Nov 21, 2000 at 12:30:28AM -0800, Rob Lanphier wrote: > > On Tue, 14 Nov 2000, Buddha Buck wrote: > > Here's how it would work. Voters rank all candidates or options, but also > > put in a "cut line" above which all candidates/options are

RE: Condorcet Voting and Supermajorities (Re: [CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENT] Disambiguation of 4.1.5)

2000-11-21 Thread Norman Petry
Steve Greenland wrote: > I'm not sure it really makes any sense to have alternatives with > different majority requirements[1]. The recent case of an ammendment > that had an (arguably) different requirement than the original GR came > from two issues: I agree with you that supermajority requirem

RE: Condorcet Voting and Supermajorities (Re: [CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENT] Disambiguation of 4.1.5)

2000-11-21 Thread Junk Mail
On Tue, 21 Nov 2000, Norman Petry wrote: > status quo, it must do so against 3-1 odds (or whatever). Therefore, to > determine the winner, just multiply the votes for the status quo by 3 > against every alternative before comparing. For example, suppose we have > the following pair of vote total

Re: Condorcet Voting and Supermajorities (Re: [CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENT] Disambiguation of 4.1.5)

2000-11-21 Thread Markus Schulze
Dear Buddha, you wrote (14 Nov 2000): > Could someone explain to me, in simple terms, how > Condorcet-based voting schemes work in the face of > a supermajority requirement? > > My understanding of Condorcet is that a ballot like > Anthony Towns used as an example ("Remove non-free > // We Love no

Re: Condorcet Voting and Supermajorities (Re: [CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENT] Disambiguation of 4.1.5)

2000-11-21 Thread Anthony Towns
On Tue, Nov 21, 2000 at 08:43:44AM -0600, Steve Greenland wrote: > On 21-Nov-00, 03:42 (CST), Anthony Towns wrote: > > On Tue, Nov 21, 2000 at 12:30:28AM -0800, Rob Lanphier wrote: > > > On Tue, 14 Nov 2000, Buddha Buck wrote: > > > Here's how it would work. Voters rank all candidates or options

Re: Condorcet Voting and Supermajorities (Re: [CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENT] Disambiguation of 4.1.5)

2000-11-21 Thread Raul Miller
On Tue, Nov 14, 2000 at 12:00:05AM -0500, Buddha Buck wrote: > Could someone explain to me, in simple terms, how Condorcet-based > voting schemes work in the face of a supermajority requirement? Have you read A.6.7 (and A.6.8) of the debian constitution? -- Raul

Re: Condorcet Voting and Supermajorities (Re: [CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENT] Disambiguation of 4.1.5)

2000-11-21 Thread Rob Lanphier
Hi all, You guys caught me sleeping. This is the type of discussion I joined the list to chime in on :) On Tue, 14 Nov 2000, Buddha Buck wrote: > Could someone explain to me, in simple terms, how Condorcet-based > voting schemes work in the face of a supermajority requirement? Well, I th

Re: Condorcet Voting and Supermajorities (Re: [CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENT] Disambiguation of 4.1.5)

2000-11-21 Thread Anthony Towns
On Tue, Nov 21, 2000 at 12:30:28AM -0800, Rob Lanphier wrote: > You guys caught me sleeping. This is the type of discussion I joined the > list to chime in on :) Heh :) > On Tue, 14 Nov 2000, Buddha Buck wrote: > Here's how it would work. Voters rank all candidates or options, but also >

Re: Condorcet Voting and Supermajorities (Re: [CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENT] Disambiguation of 4.1.5)

2000-11-21 Thread Steve Greenland
On 21-Nov-00, 03:42 (CST), Anthony Towns <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote: > On Tue, Nov 21, 2000 at 12:30:28AM -0800, Rob Lanphier wrote: > > On Tue, 14 Nov 2000, Buddha Buck wrote: > > Here's how it would work. Voters rank all candidates or options, but also > > put in a "cut line" above which all ca

RE: Condorcet Voting and Supermajorities (Re: [CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENT] Disambiguation of 4.1.5)

2000-11-21 Thread Norman Petry
Steve Greenland wrote: > I'm not sure it really makes any sense to have alternatives with > different majority requirements[1]. The recent case of an ammendment > that had an (arguably) different requirement than the original GR came > from two issues: I agree with you that supermajority require

RE: Condorcet Voting and Supermajorities (Re: [CONSTITUTIONALAMENDMENT] Disambiguation of 4.1.5)

2000-11-21 Thread Junk Mail
On Tue, 21 Nov 2000, Norman Petry wrote: > status quo, it must do so against 3-1 odds (or whatever). Therefore, to > determine the winner, just multiply the votes for the status quo by 3 > against every alternative before comparing. For example, suppose we have > the following pair of vote tota

Re: Condorcet Voting and Supermajorities (Re: [CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENT] Disambiguation of 4.1.5)

2000-11-21 Thread Markus Schulze
Dear Buddha, you wrote (14 Nov 2000): > Could someone explain to me, in simple terms, how > Condorcet-based voting schemes work in the face of > a supermajority requirement? > > My understanding of Condorcet is that a ballot like > Anthony Towns used as an example ("Remove non-free > // We Love n

Re: Condorcet Voting and Supermajorities (Re: [CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENT] Disambiguation of 4.1.5)

2000-11-21 Thread Anthony Towns
On Tue, Nov 21, 2000 at 08:43:44AM -0600, Steve Greenland wrote: > On 21-Nov-00, 03:42 (CST), Anthony Towns <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote: > > On Tue, Nov 21, 2000 at 12:30:28AM -0800, Rob Lanphier wrote: > > > On Tue, 14 Nov 2000, Buddha Buck wrote: > > > Here's how it would work. Voters rank all c

Re: Condorcet Voting and Supermajorities (Re: [CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENT] Disambiguation of 4.1.5)

2000-11-21 Thread Raul Miller
On Tue, Nov 14, 2000 at 12:00:05AM -0500, Buddha Buck wrote: > Could someone explain to me, in simple terms, how Condorcet-based > voting schemes work in the face of a supermajority requirement? Have you read A.6.7 (and A.6.8) of the debian constitution? -- Raul -- To UNSUBSCRIBE, email to