On Mon, Dec 16, 2002 at 01:27:17AM +1100, Clinton Mead wrote:
> Here, A wins, even though a superminority of people prefer the status quo.
> In my opinion, supermajority requirements are set to make sure major
> changes need very popular support, to ensure that major changes only
> happen when ab
On Mon, Dec 16, 2002 at 01:27:17AM +1100, Clinton Mead wrote:
> Here, A wins, even though a superminority of people prefer the status quo.
> In my opinion, supermajority requirements are set to make sure major
> changes need very popular support, to ensure that major changes only
> happen when ab
On Mon, Dec 16, 2002 at 01:27:17AM +1100, Clinton Mead wrote:
> I'm a little confused about the default option, and what the intention
> of a supermajority is.
In general? Or in the case of the "hybrid theory"
proposal? [As that proposal violates monotonicity,
I don
Raul Miller wrote:
On Wed, Dec 11, 2002 at 12:54:21AM +1100, Clinton Mead wrote:
This is interesting. But how is the default option different to the
status quo?
The default option resolves nothing.
If the default option is "further discussion": unless a decision is made
to drop the i
On Mon, Dec 16, 2002 at 01:27:17AM +1100, Clinton Mead wrote:
> I'm a little confused about the default option, and what the intention
> of a supermajority is.
In general? Or in the case of the "hybrid theory"
proposal? [As that proposal violates monotonicity,
I don
Raul Miller wrote:
On Wed, Dec 11, 2002 at 12:54:21AM +1100, Clinton Mead wrote:
This is interesting. But how is the default option different to the
status quo?
The default option resolves nothing.
If the default option is "further discussion": unless a decision is made
to drop the iss
On Sat, Dec 14, 2002 at 07:53:38PM -0500, Raul Miller wrote:
> I've not been able to prove, to my satisfaction, that "drop options
> which don't satisfy supermajority" satisfies monotonicity, but after
> simulating over a million elections I have not been able to find any
> cases where it fails to
On Sat, Dec 14, 2002 at 07:53:38PM -0500, Raul Miller wrote:
> I've not been able to prove, to my satisfaction, that "drop options
> which don't satisfy supermajority" satisfies monotonicity, but after
> simulating over a million elections I have not been able to find any
> cases where it fails to
[I've been working with random elections to examine how well various
voting mechanisms conform to monotonicity.]
"Hybrid theory" violates monotonicity if we consider the default
option as a candidate:
Using the "hybrid theory" proposal, the j wins the election where a a
[I've been working with random elections to examine how well various
voting mechanisms conform to monotonicity.]
"Hybrid theory" violates monotonicity if we consider the default
option as a candidate:
Using the "hybrid theory" proposal, the j wins the election where a a
On Wed, Dec 11, 2002 at 11:34:32PM -0500, Raul Miller wrote:
> On Thu, Dec 12, 2002 at 01:51:34PM +1000, Anthony Towns wrote:
> > Ah. Same thing still applies though, all you need is some way to make the B
> > versus C defeat eliminated before you do whatever special casing you have.
> > 40 A B
On Thu, Dec 12, 2002 at 01:51:34PM +1000, Anthony Towns wrote:
> Ah. Same thing still applies though, all you need is some way to make the B
> versus C defeat eliminated before you do whatever special casing you have.
>
> 40 A B C F
> 10 A C B F
> 10 F C B A
>
> F superdef
On Wed, Dec 11, 2002 at 07:06:07PM +0100, Matthias Urlichs wrote:
> Raul Miller:
> > > (Ah, assertions without examples. How helpful.)
> > [ Example ]
> > c wins
> c would win without any supermajority rule, so there's no need to remove
> option A in the first place, so there's no problem.
Yes, th
On Wed, Dec 11, 2002 at 11:34:32PM -0500, Raul Miller wrote:
> On Thu, Dec 12, 2002 at 01:51:34PM +1000, Anthony Towns wrote:
> > Ah. Same thing still applies though, all you need is some way to make the B
> > versus C defeat eliminated before you do whatever special casing you have.
> > 40 A B
On Wed, Dec 11, 2002 at 06:48:58PM -0500, Buddha Buck wrote:
> A->b->c->A
> where A is a supermajority option, and b, c are normal options and the
> b->c defeat was the weakest.
> (late-dropping): c won, because we discounted the votes of the people
> that preferred b over c, but counted the vot
On Wed, Dec 11, 2002 at 02:08:41PM -0500, Raul Miller wrote:
> > I'm sorry, I didn't follow the special casing you do for "superdefeats".
> False: once again you're eliminating a defeat of an option involved
> in a superdefeat, but the proposal requires that the superdefeated
> option be eliminated
On Thu, Dec 12, 2002 at 01:51:34PM +1000, Anthony Towns wrote:
> Ah. Same thing still applies though, all you need is some way to make the B
> versus C defeat eliminated before you do whatever special casing you have.
>
> 40 A B C F
> 10 A C B F
> 10 F C B A
>
> F superdef
On Wed, Dec 11, 2002 at 07:06:07PM +0100, Matthias Urlichs wrote:
> Raul Miller:
> > > (Ah, assertions without examples. How helpful.)
> > [ Example ]
> > c wins
> c would win without any supermajority rule, so there's no need to remove
> option A in the first place, so there's no problem.
Yes, th
On Wed, Dec 11, 2002 at 06:48:58PM -0500, Buddha Buck wrote:
> A->b->c->A
> where A is a supermajority option, and b, c are normal options and the
> b->c defeat was the weakest.
> (late-dropping): c won, because we discounted the votes of the people
> that preferred b over c, but counted the vot
On Wed, Dec 11, 2002 at 02:08:41PM -0500, Raul Miller wrote:
> > I'm sorry, I didn't follow the special casing you do for "superdefeats".
> False: once again you're eliminating a defeat of an option involved
> in a superdefeat, but the proposal requires that the superdefeated
> option be eliminated
Raul Miller wrote:
On Thu, Dec 12, 2002 at 04:29:49AM +1000, Anthony Towns wrote:
Sorry, I don't buy this.
Ok.
I'm wondering if other people agree. [I wish Buddha wasn't
on vacation, this was his example.]
Sorry... I'm back, but my computer at home is having some problems (old
power su
Raul Miller wrote:
On Thu, Dec 12, 2002 at 04:29:49AM +1000, Anthony Towns wrote:
Sorry, I don't buy this.
Ok.
I'm wondering if other people agree. [I wish Buddha wasn't
on vacation, this was his example.]
Sorry... I'm back, but my computer at home is having some problems (old
power sup
On Thu, Dec 12, 2002 at 04:29:49AM +1000, Anthony Towns wrote:
> Sorry, I don't buy this.
Ok.
I'm wondering if other people agree. [I wish Buddha wasn't
on vacation, this was his example.]
> > > Define "like Condorcet".
> > Same outcome as Condorcet for the same votes.
>
> Heh. Condorcet doesn
On Thu, Dec 12, 2002 at 04:15:55AM +1000, Anthony Towns wrote:
> I'm sorry, I didn't follow the special casing you do for "superdefeats".
> Here's the corrected example:
>
> 40 A B C F (A requires 3:1 supermajority, F is the default option)
> 10 C B F A
> 10 F C A B
>
> F
On Thu, Dec 12, 2002 at 04:29:49AM +1000, Anthony Towns wrote:
> Sorry, I don't buy this.
Ok.
I'm wondering if other people agree. [I wish Buddha wasn't
on vacation, this was his example.]
> > > Define "like Condorcet".
> > Same outcome as Condorcet for the same votes.
>
> Heh. Condorcet doesn
On Wed, Dec 11, 2002 at 11:51:27AM -0500, Raul Miller wrote:
> A defeats b 8:3
> c defeats A 8:3
> b defeats c 6:5
> eliminate 6:5
Sorry, I don't buy this. You're looking to choose amongst A, b, c and
N to work out what should be done. A can't win, since it doesn't have
supermajority support, leav
On Wed, Dec 11, 2002 at 03:52:13PM +1000, Anthony Towns wrote:
> If you want a more complicated example, try:
> 40 A B C F (A requires 3:1 supermajority, F is the default option)
> 10 C B F A
> 10 F C B A
> which Condorcet would rank as A first, B second, C third and F last;
> bu
Hi,
Raul Miller:
> > (Ah, assertions without examples. How helpful.)
>
> [ Example ]
> c wins
>
c would win without any supermajority rule, so there's no need to remove
option A in the first place, so there's no problem.
IMHO, option A should only be removed if it would win, but doesn't satisfy
On Thu, Dec 12, 2002 at 04:15:55AM +1000, Anthony Towns wrote:
> I'm sorry, I didn't follow the special casing you do for "superdefeats".
> Here's the corrected example:
>
> 40 A B C F (A requires 3:1 supermajority, F is the default option)
> 10 C B F A
> 10 F C A B
>
> F
On Wed, Dec 11, 2002 at 03:52:13PM +1000, Anthony Towns wrote:
> > I don't think such cases exist (I'm working on how to show this). On the
> > other hand, there are cases where "drop all failed supermajority before
> > CpSSD" gives results which are l
On Wed, Dec 11, 2002 at 11:51:27AM -0500, Raul Miller wrote:
> A defeats b 8:3
> c defeats A 8:3
> b defeats c 6:5
> eliminate 6:5
Sorry, I don't buy this. You're looking to choose amongst A, b, c and
N to work out what should be done. A can't win, since it doesn't have
supermajority support, leav
On Wed, Dec 11, 2002 at 03:52:13PM +1000, Anthony Towns wrote:
> If you want a more complicated example, try:
> 40 A B C F (A requires 3:1 supermajority, F is the default option)
> 10 C B F A
> 10 F C B A
> which Condorcet would rank as A first, B second, C third and F last;
> bu
A defeats B (40:20)
> B defeats D (40:20)
>
> Drop weakest defeats, leaving D defeats A;
> Hence B and D draw
I'm not sure what you're talking about, here.
Here, the weakest defeats involve A, and A is involved in a superdefeat,
so "Hybrid Theory" w
Hi,
Raul Miller:
> > (Ah, assertions without examples. How helpful.)
>
> [ Example ]
> c wins
>
c would win without any supermajority rule, so there's no need to remove
option A in the first place, so there's no problem.
IMHO, option A should only be removed if it would win, but doesn't satisfy
On Wed, Dec 11, 2002 at 03:52:13PM +1000, Anthony Towns wrote:
> > I don't think such cases exist (I'm working on how to show this). On the
> > other hand, there are cases where "drop all failed supermajority before
> > CpSSD" gives results which are l
A defeats B (40:20)
> B defeats D (40:20)
>
> Drop weakest defeats, leaving D defeats A;
> Hence B and D draw
I'm not sure what you're talking about, here.
Here, the weakest defeats involve A, and A is involved in a superdefeat,
so "Hybrid Theory" w
B defeats F, and a draw between B and C.
> I don't think such cases exist (I'm working on how to show this). On the
> other hand, there are cases where "drop all failed supermajority before
> CpSSD" gives results which are less like condorcet than "Hybrid Theory&q
B defeats F, and a draw between B and C.
> I don't think such cases exist (I'm working on how to show this). On the
> other hand, there are cases where "drop all failed supermajority before
> CpSSD" gives results which are less like condorcet than "Hybrid Theory&q
it had some bad effects as well [defeating options which should not
have been defeated].
The mechanism in "Hybrid Theory" starts out using an artificial defeat
of insufficient-supermajority options. This has less effect on the
outcome than eliminating that supermajority entirely.
At one en
it had some bad effects as well [defeating options which should not
have been defeated].
The mechanism in "Hybrid Theory" starts out using an artificial defeat
of insufficient-supermajority options. This has less effect on the
outcome than eliminating that supermajority entirely.
At one en
the vote.
(2c) Options with a supermajority requirement should be treated as
similarly to other options as possible.
However, for the case described in
http://lists.debian.org/debian-vote/2002/debian-vote-200211/msg00162.html
the "Hybrid Theory" voting mechanics draft
On Wed, Dec 11, 2002 at 12:54:21AM +1100, Clinton Mead wrote:
> This is interesting. But how is the default option different to the
> status quo?
The default option resolves nothing.
If the default option is "further discussion": unless a decision is made
to drop the issue [and this is an indepe
the vote.
(2c) Options with a supermajority requirement should be treated as
similarly to other options as possible.
However, for the case described in
http://lists.debian.org/debian-vote/2002/debian-vote-200211/msg00162.html
the "Hybrid Theory" voting mechanics draft
On Wed, Dec 11, 2002 at 12:54:21AM +1100, Clinton Mead wrote:
> This is interesting. But how is the default option different to the
> status quo?
The default option resolves nothing.
If the default option is "further discussion": unless a decision is made
to drop the issue [and this is an indepe
Anthony Towns wrote
Here's a start:
(0) The default option should be to leave the vote unresolved;
if people wish to actively preserve the status quo, they should
ensure that is listed as a separate option on the ballot.
This is interesting. But how is the def
Anthony Towns wrote
Here's a start:
(0) The default option should be to leave the vote unresolved;
if people wish to actively preserve the status quo, they should
ensure that is listed as a separate option on the ballot.
This is interesting. But how is the default option different
On Tue, Dec 10, 2002 at 05:53:07AM -0500, Anthony DeRobertis wrote:
> Assuming, of course, that there are no harmful side-effects from adding
> the quorum requirement to the voting method.
If the quorum is always met, which you're presupposing anyway, then
there are no possible side-effects, har
On Monday, December 9, 2002, at 12:00 PM, Raul Miller wrote:
On Mon, Dec 09, 2002 at 12:35:22AM -0500, Anthony DeRobertis wrote:
No decided issues have less than 100 votes.
So, suggest go ahead with it: Drop all ocurances of "Q" and quorum
from
the Consitution.
"Votes have always met quor
On Tue, Dec 10, 2002 at 05:53:07AM -0500, Anthony DeRobertis wrote:
> Assuming, of course, that there are no harmful side-effects from adding
> the quorum requirement to the voting method.
If the quorum is always met, which you're presupposing anyway, then
there are no possible side-effects, har
On Monday, December 9, 2002, at 12:00 PM, Raul Miller wrote:
On Mon, Dec 09, 2002 at 12:35:22AM -0500, Anthony DeRobertis wrote:
No decided issues have less than 100 votes.
So, suggest go ahead with it: Drop all ocurances of "Q" and quorum
from
the Consitution.
"Votes have always met quorum"
On Mon, Dec 09, 2002 at 11:18:41AM +0100, Sven Luther wrote:
> Yes, but you don't answered the question of why it should be handled
> such.
It's because the resulting voting system behaves better with my proposal:
A vote against an option will not cause that option to win. With your
proposal, a
On Mon, Dec 09, 2002 at 12:35:22AM -0500, Anthony DeRobertis wrote:
> No decided issues have less than 100 votes.
>
> So, suggest go ahead with it: Drop all ocurances of "Q" and quorum from
> the Consitution.
"Votes have always met quorum" is not the same thing as "quorum is
useless".
For all we
On Mon, Dec 09, 2002 at 11:18:41AM +0100, Sven Luther wrote:
> Yes, but you don't answered the question of why it should be handled
> such.
It's because the resulting voting system behaves better with my proposal:
A vote against an option will not cause that option to win. With your
proposal, a
On Mon, Dec 09, 2002 at 12:35:22AM -0500, Anthony DeRobertis wrote:
> No decided issues have less than 100 votes.
>
> So, suggest go ahead with it: Drop all ocurances of "Q" and quorum from
> the Consitution.
"Votes have always met quorum" is not the same thing as "quorum is
useless".
For all we
Sven Luther <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> writes:
> Well, you cannot say that. If the quorum is met, then the option wins.
> It is because you voted, sure, but if you had not voted, then the
> election is not valid, and you cannot say that you you did loose.
You can, actually -- your hypothetical preferenc
Sven Luther <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> writes:
> Well, you cannot say that. If the quorum is met, then the option wins.
> It is because you voted, sure, but if you had not voted, then the
> election is not valid, and you cannot say that you you did loose.
You can, actually -- your hypothetical preferenc
On Sun, Dec 08, 2002 at 04:09:09PM -0500, Raul Miller wrote:
> > > Or: the addition of 22 people voting against A caused A to win. In my
> > > opinion, this is very wrong.
>
> On Sun, Dec 08, 2002 at 09:38:46PM +0100, Sven Luther wrote:
> > Why ?
>
> I answered this in the message you were respo
On Sun, Dec 08, 2002 at 04:09:09PM -0500, Raul Miller wrote:
> > > Or: the addition of 22 people voting against A caused A to win. In my
> > > opinion, this is very wrong.
>
> On Sun, Dec 08, 2002 at 09:38:46PM +0100, Sven Luther wrote:
> > Why ?
>
> I answered this in the message you were respo
On Mon, Dec 09, 2002 at 02:51:18PM +1000, Anthony Towns wrote:
> It's irrelevant, we don't have votes without quorum/supermajority
> requirement.
Sorry, I didn't know that :-(
> I think the above is a counterexample to your idea:
Which idea? A counterexample to per-vote (and not pre-option)
quoru
On Sun, 2002-12-08 at 23:51, Anthony Towns wrote:
> I can't give a reason for (1); quorums in real meetings are used to
> make sure enough people are able to participate in decisions for them
> to be meaningful. Since we do everything over mailing lists and have a
> couple of weeks for every issu
On Sun, Dec 08, 2002 at 09:03:22PM +0100, Jochen Voss wrote:
> > (1) We want a voting system that handles quorums.
> > (1a) Quorums are handled on a per-option basis.
> > (1b) Electors are counted toward the quorum if they vote, and if they
> > rank the option above the default
On Mon, Dec 09, 2002 at 02:51:18PM +1000, Anthony Towns wrote:
> It's irrelevant, we don't have votes without quorum/supermajority
> requirement.
Sorry, I didn't know that :-(
> I think the above is a counterexample to your idea:
Which idea? A counterexample to per-vote (and not pre-option)
quoru
On Sun, 2002-12-08 at 23:51, Anthony Towns wrote:
> I can't give a reason for (1); quorums in real meetings are used to
> make sure enough people are able to participate in decisions for them
> to be meaningful. Since we do everything over mailing lists and have a
> couple of weeks for every issu
On Sun, Dec 08, 2002 at 09:03:22PM +0100, Jochen Voss wrote:
> > (1) We want a voting system that handles quorums.
> > (1a) Quorums are handled on a per-option basis.
> > (1b) Electors are counted toward the quorum if they vote, and if they
> > rank the option above the default
Hi,
Raul Miller:
> Anthony Towns:
> > In particular, dropping the options that don't meet their supermajority
> > requirement before applying CpSSD meets the above criteria better than
> > strengthening the default versus supermajority-option defeat: it avoids
> > scaling transitive comparisons an
> > Or: the addition of 22 people voting against A caused A to win. In my
> > opinion, this is very wrong.
On Sun, Dec 08, 2002 at 09:38:46PM +0100, Sven Luther wrote:
> Why ?
I answered this in the message you were responding to, immediately
following the paragraph you quoted.
> You are trying
On Sun, Dec 08, 2002 at 03:18:16PM -0500, Raul Miller wrote:
> On Sun, Dec 08, 2002 at 09:03:22PM +0100, Jochen Voss wrote:
> > Can you give reasons for (1a) and (1b)? As far as I understood the
> > debate, the reason for a quorum is to avoid "stealth-decision-making",
> > i.e. to assert that enou
On Sun, Dec 08, 2002 at 09:03:22PM +0100, Jochen Voss wrote:
> Can you give reasons for (1a) and (1b)? As far as I understood the
> debate, the reason for a quorum is to avoid "stealth-decision-making",
> i.e. to assert that enough developers notice the election and take part
> in it. Because of
Hello
On Mon, Dec 09, 2002 at 03:20:20AM +1000, Anthony Towns wrote:
> Can we possibly stop coming up with full blown voting systems while
> we still don't have a firm idea of the underlying things we're trying
> to achieve?
Good idea :-)
> (1) We want a voting system that handles quorums.
Hi,
Raul Miller:
> Anthony Towns:
> > In particular, dropping the options that don't meet their supermajority
> > requirement before applying CpSSD meets the above criteria better than
> > strengthening the default versus supermajority-option defeat: it avoids
> > scaling transitive comparisons an
> > Or: the addition of 22 people voting against A caused A to win. In my
> > opinion, this is very wrong.
On Sun, Dec 08, 2002 at 09:38:46PM +0100, Sven Luther wrote:
> Why ?
I answered this in the message you were responding to, immediately
following the paragraph you quoted.
> You are trying
On Sun, Dec 08, 2002 at 03:18:16PM -0500, Raul Miller wrote:
> On Sun, Dec 08, 2002 at 09:03:22PM +0100, Jochen Voss wrote:
> > Can you give reasons for (1a) and (1b)? As far as I understood the
> > debate, the reason for a quorum is to avoid "stealth-decision-making",
> > i.e. to assert that enou
On Sun, Dec 08, 2002 at 09:03:22PM +0100, Jochen Voss wrote:
> Can you give reasons for (1a) and (1b)? As far as I understood the
> debate, the reason for a quorum is to avoid "stealth-decision-making",
> i.e. to assert that enough developers notice the election and take part
> in it. Because of
On Mon, Dec 09, 2002 at 03:20:20AM +1000, Anthony Towns wrote:
[what are the underlying things we're trying to achieve]:
> Here's a start:
>
> (0) The default option should be to leave the vote unresolved;
> if people wish to actively preserve the status quo, they should
>
Hello
On Mon, Dec 09, 2002 at 03:20:20AM +1000, Anthony Towns wrote:
> Can we possibly stop coming up with full blown voting systems while
> we still don't have a firm idea of the underlying things we're trying
> to achieve?
Good idea :-)
> (1) We want a voting system that handles quorums.
On Sun, Dec 08, 2002 at 11:13:23AM -0500, Raul Miller wrote:
> "RATIONALE": Options which voters rank above the default option are
> options they find acceptable. Options ranked below the default
> option are unacceptable options. Supermajority options require
> some approxima
On Mon, Dec 09, 2002 at 03:20:20AM +1000, Anthony Towns wrote:
[what are the underlying things we're trying to achieve]:
> Here's a start:
>
> (0) The default option should be to leave the vote unresolved;
> if people wish to actively preserve the status quo, they should
>
Focusing on just A.6 again, in this draft:
(*) Weakest defeats can now be eliminated: before a defeat of the default
option is eliminated, all options which fail to meet their supermajority
requirements are deleted.
(*) When artificial supermajority defeats are eliminated the corresponding
option
On Sun, Dec 08, 2002 at 11:13:23AM -0500, Raul Miller wrote:
> "RATIONALE": Options which voters rank above the default option are
> options they find acceptable. Options ranked below the default
> option are unacceptable options. Supermajority options require
> some approxima
Focusing on just A.6 again, in this draft:
(*) Weakest defeats can now be eliminated: before a defeat of the default
option is eliminated, all options which fail to meet their supermajority
requirements are deleted.
(*) When artificial supermajority defeats are eliminated the corresponding
option
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