On Sat, May 31, 2003 at 11:11:00AM -0400, Andrew Pimlott wrote:
> On Sat, May 31, 2003 at 03:29:57PM +1000, Anthony Towns wrote:
> > I'm sorry, but I don't think it's reasonable to use the default option in
> > a traditional Condorcet variant. Selecting a result where the majority
> > would have pr
On Sat, May 31, 2003 at 03:29:57PM +1000, Anthony Towns wrote:
> I'm sorry, but I don't think it's reasonable to use the default option in
> a traditional Condorcet variant. Selecting a result where the majority
> would have preferred the vote to default instead of that winning is an
> unacceptable
On Fri, May 30, 2003 at 03:07:29PM -0400, Andrew Pimlott wrote:
> Eg, sincere:
> 9 ABD A>B 12:8
> 6 BAD A>D 15:5
> 3 DAB B>D 15:5
> 2 DBA
> B can swap and make D>A 11:9, but in Condorcet/CpSSD A still wins.
> I think this is related to the Strong Defensive Strategy
On Sat, May 31, 2003 at 11:11:00AM -0400, Andrew Pimlott wrote:
> On Sat, May 31, 2003 at 03:29:57PM +1000, Anthony Towns wrote:
> > I'm sorry, but I don't think it's reasonable to use the default option in
> > a traditional Condorcet variant. Selecting a result where the majority
> > would have pr
On Sat, May 31, 2003 at 03:29:57PM +1000, Anthony Towns wrote:
> I'm sorry, but I don't think it's reasonable to use the default option in
> a traditional Condorcet variant. Selecting a result where the majority
> would have preferred the vote to default instead of that winning is an
> unacceptable
On Sat, May 31, 2003 at 02:23:07AM +1000, Anthony Towns wrote:
> On Fri, May 30, 2003 at 10:48:06AM -0400, Nathanael Nerode wrote:
> > In a pure Condorcet system with a default option, lying about the
> > acceptability of A *doesn't* help B.
>
> 40 C A B
> 30 A B C
> 20 B C A
>
> C
On Fri, May 30, 2003 at 10:48:06AM -0400, Nathanael Nerode wrote:
> In a pure Condorcet system with a default option, lying about the
> acceptability of A *doesn't* help B.
40 C A B
30 A B C
20 B C A
C defeats A 60:30, A defeats B 70:20, B defeats C 50:40; the weakest
defeat is dro
Manoj said:
>Ah, so now it is a matter of determining intent. So, short of
> providing code for telepathically determining the voters intent, how
> can one cater to people who really find A unacceptable, and are
> voting honestly, from people who would consider A acceptable, but are
> lying to
On Fri, May 30, 2003 at 03:07:29PM -0400, Andrew Pimlott wrote:
> Eg, sincere:
> 9 ABD A>B 12:8
> 6 BAD A>D 15:5
> 3 DAB B>D 15:5
> 2 DBA
> B can swap and make D>A 11:9, but in Condorcet/CpSSD A still wins.
> I think this is related to the Strong Defensive Strategy
On Sat, May 31, 2003 at 02:23:07AM +1000, Anthony Towns wrote:
> On Fri, May 30, 2003 at 10:48:06AM -0400, Nathanael Nerode wrote:
> > In a pure Condorcet system with a default option, lying about the
> > acceptability of A *doesn't* help B.
>
> 40 C A B
> 30 A B C
> 20 B C A
>
> C
On Fri, May 30, 2003 at 10:48:06AM -0400, Nathanael Nerode wrote:
> In a pure Condorcet system with a default option, lying about the
> acceptability of A *doesn't* help B.
40 C A B
30 A B C
20 B C A
C defeats A 60:30, A defeats B 70:20, B defeats C 50:40; the weakest
defeat is dro
Manoj said:
>Ah, so now it is a matter of determining intent. So, short of
> providing code for telepathically determining the voters intent, how
> can one cater to people who really find A unacceptable, and are
> voting honestly, from people who would consider A acceptable, but are
> lying to
On Wed, 28 May 2003 03:59:32 +0200, Matthias Urlichs <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> said:
> Hi,
> Manoj Srivastava wrote:
>> Ah, so now it is a matter of determining intent. So, short of
>> providing code for telepathically determining the voters intent,
>> how can one cater to people who really find A unac
On Tue, 27 May 2003 18:07:00 -0400, Nathanael Nerode <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> said:
> Yes, you're missing something. Of course the voting system should
> allow you to express your belief. However, it should also treat it
> properly.
I see. If I consider A to be unacceptable, what is the pro
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