d
because you want something better than non-pairwise methods.
And it is. So I made my suggestion because maybe you're interested
in the best.
And of course the possible value of the example that debian would
be setting in that wa
airwise count method
because you want something better than non-pairwise methods.
And it is. So I made my suggestion because maybe you're interested
in the best.
And of course the possible value of the example that debian would
be setting i
is an unbeaten set that doesn't
contain a smaller unbeaten set.
SSD:
Drop the weakest defeat that is between members of an
innermost unbeaten set. Repeat till there's an unbeaten
candidate.
***
If members of debian want to perfect their voting system,
then I suggest changing the cou
t" is an unbeaten set that doesn't
contain a smaller unbeaten set.
SSD:
Drop the weakest defeat that is between members of an
innermost unbeaten set. Repeat till there's an unbeaten
candidate.
***
If members of debian want to perfect their voting system,
then I suggest changing
candidate in
the Schwartz set can't have an unreturned defeat means that if
any B in the Schwartz is beaten by some A, then B must have a
beatpath to A.
That means that any defeat in the Schwartz set is in a cycle, and
the rest of that page is correct.
***
Sorry about the typos,
nreturned beatpath to him. That means that any defeat
in the Schwartz set must be in a cycle. That's what I originally
said I'd prove.
That means that SSD never drops a candidate unless that candidate
is the weakest defeat in a cycle (
idate with a Schulze win
over each one of the other candidates, and that B can't win.
***
I've shown that the Cycle Condorcet methods and SSD &
Schulze meet BC, and therefore meet all 5 of the defensive
strategy criteria.
Now, in my last of these messages, I'd like to show, as I said
I would, that SSD can be counted as one of the Cycle Condorcet
versions, because if a defeat is among the Schwartz set members,
it is in a cycle. That will be the next & last of this series
of messages.
Mike Ossipoff
__
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ensure that B won't win,
even if every member of that majority sincerely votes every
pairwise preference that he has, involving one or two candidates
whom he prefers to B.
***
Like SDSC, SrDSC is met only by those Condorcet versions that
only drop a defeat
ny defeats were dropped.
***
Of course Plain Condorcet could be reworded to say:
"The winner is the candidate whose greatest defeat is the least."
***
I recommend SSD, SD, DCD, or Schulze. Schulze doesn't have the
obvious natural motivation & justification that the others in
that list have, which could make it more difficult to get
adopted.
***
Plain Condorcet or Smith//Condorcet could be used if computational
simplicity were a goal. But implementation software is available
for all of the methods mentioned in this letter.
Mike Ossipoff
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