On Mon 02 Apr 2018 at 09:07:16 -0400, rhkra...@gmail.com wrote:
> Just continuing to think (or maybe not think ;-) about password managers /
> password security, changing the focus slightly (I think) but keeping the same
> thread.
>
> I'm now thinking about the security (or vulnurability) of p
On 4/3/18, Richard Hector wrote:
> On 03/04/18 01:07, rhkra...@gmail.com wrote:
>> the plaintext passwords would
>> disappear from RAM (except to the extent that (iiuc) there are (NSA) ways
>> to
>> recover the contents of RAM if power is restored to the machine fairly
>> quickly).
>
> I'm not sur
On Tuesday, April 03, 2018 01:50:45 AM Richard Hector wrote:
> On 03/04/18 01:07, rhkra...@gmail.com wrote:
> > the plaintext passwords would
> > disappear from RAM (except to the extent that (iiuc) there are (NSA) ways
> > to recover the contents of RAM if power is restored to the machine
> > fair
On Mon 02 Apr 2018 at 09:07:16 -0400, rhkra...@gmail.com wrote:
> Just continuing to think (or maybe not think ;-) about password managers /
> password security, changing the focus slightly (I think) but keeping the same
> thread.
>
> I'm now thinking about the security (or vulnurability) of p
On 03/04/18 01:07, rhkra...@gmail.com wrote:
> the plaintext passwords would
> disappear from RAM (except to the extent that (iiuc) there are (NSA) ways to
> recover the contents of RAM if power is restored to the machine fairly
> quickly).
I'm not sure you actually need to be the NSA for that.
Am 02. Apr, 2018 schwätzte rhkra...@gmail.com so:
moin moin,
Just continuing to think (or maybe not think ;-) about password managers /
password security, changing the focus slightly (I think) but keeping the same
thread.
I'm now thinking about the security (or vulnurability) of passwords duri
rhkra...@gmail.com writes:
>* during copy and paste operations, the plaintext password could
> remain on the C&P "stack". thus making it vulnurable: Some notes:
>
> (1) I've read about at least one password manager that, somehow,
> deletes the plaintext password from the copy and paste "
Thanks to tomas, Roberto, and likcoras! All good points!
I'm embarrassed to admit that I hadn't thought (at least to the best of my
recent recollection) of the need to encrypt swap--that's something I'll want
to deal with soon.
On Monday, April 02, 2018 09:15:08 AM to...@tuxteam.de wrote:
> O
On 04/02/2018 10:07 PM, rhkra...@gmail.com wrote:
>* during copy and paste operations, the plaintext password could remain on
> the C&P "stack". thus making it vulnurable: Some notes:
This is a semi-valid concern, depends on your usage patterns. For
example, some browsers may expose a JS API
On Mon, Apr 02, 2018 at 09:07:16AM -0400, rhkra...@gmail.com wrote:
>
> The first two situations that come to mind include:
>
>* during copy and paste operations, the plaintext password could remain on
> the C&P "stack". thus making it vulnurable: Some notes:
>
> (1) I've read about
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On Mon, Apr 02, 2018 at 09:07:16AM -0400, rhkra...@gmail.com wrote:
> Just continuing to think (or maybe not think ;-) about password managers /
[...]
I don't know of the others (I never felt the need for a PW manager
myself) but...
>* during
Just continuing to think (or maybe not think ;-) about password managers /
password security, changing the focus slightly (I think) but keeping the same
thread.
I'm now thinking about the security (or vulnurability) of passwords during
"normal" usage--I mean, I'm thinking about the times when
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