Re: [SECURITY] [DSA 1605-1] DNS vulnerability impact on the libc stub resolver

On Tue, Jul 08, 2008 at 07:05:29PM +0200, Florian Weimer wrote: > Package: glibc > > At this time, it is not possible to implement the recommended > countermeasures in the GNU libc stub resolver. The following > workarounds are available: > > 1. Install a local BIND 9 resoler on the host

Re: [SECURITY] [DSA 1605-1] DNS vulnerability impact on the libc stub resolver

* Josip Rodin: > Why is this phrased in a way that it prefers BIND as a recursive resolver, > when that same software was *only just* patched to be acceptable for the > same purpose? PowerDNS is not available on all architectures, and Unbound and tinydns are not part of etch. So it's lack of alt

Re: [SECURITY] [DSA 1605-1] DNS vulnerability impact on the libc stub resolver

On Tue, Jul 08, 2008 at 07:50:44PM +0200, Florian Weimer wrote: > > Why is this phrased in a way that it prefers BIND as a recursive resolver, > > when that same software was *only just* patched to be acceptable for the > > same purpose? > > PowerDNS is not available on all architectures, and Unbo

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Re: [SECURITY] [DSA 1605-1] DNS vulnerability impact on the libc stub resolver

Florian Weimer yazmış: > * Josip Rodin: > >> Why is this phrased in a way that it prefers BIND as a recursive resolver, >> when that same software was *only just* patched to be acceptable for the >> same purpose? > > PowerDNS is not available on all architectures, and Unbound and tinydns > are no

Re: [SECURITY] [DSA 1605-1] DNS vulnerability impact on the libc stub resolver

* Mert Dirik: >> PowerDNS is not available on all architectures, and Unbound and tinydns >> are not part of etch. >> >> So it's lack of alternatives, more or less. > I don't really know much about these things but can't maradns MaraDNS could be used, I think. However, I'm not familiar with tha

Re: [SECURITY] [DSA 1605-1] DNS vulnerability impact on the libc stub resolver

On Tue, 08 Jul 2008, Florian Weimer wrote: > 1. Install a local BIND 9 resoler on the host, possibly in > forward-only mode. BIND 9 will then use source port randomization > when sending queries over the network. (Other caching resolvers can > be used instead.) > > 2. Rely on IP address spoofing

Re: [SECURITY] [DSA 1605-1] DNS vulnerability impact on the libc stub resolver

Debian Security Team wrote: At this time, it is not possible to implement the recommended countermeasures in the GNU libc stub resolver. The following workarounds are available: 1. Install a local BIND 9 resolver on the host, possibly in forward-only mode. Uh .. is there any documentation

Re: [SECURITY] [DSA 1605-1] DNS vulnerability impact on the libc stub resolver

Quoting Josip Rodin ([EMAIL PROTECTED]): > Why is this phrased in a way that it prefers BIND as a recursive resolver, > when that same software was *only just* patched to be acceptable for the > same purpose? Although I'm not much of a BIND9 fan -- it remains RAM-hogging, slow, overfeatured, and

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