Re: GPG verification of apt packages

2021-02-04 Thread Clément Hermann
On 03/02/2021 21:50, Ramin Doe wrote: > It's not entirely clear to me what the CIS guideline was expecting me to > do. It says: > >     Verify GPG keys are configured correctly for your package manager: >     # apt-key list > > Perhaps they want me to install apt-key, and use it to look at the

Re: GPG verification of apt packages

2021-02-03 Thread Ramin Doe
So after doing my reading and digging around a bit, I get a vague sense of the pieces involved. I can see the various data files available on the mirror site, that *could* be used to verify that all the files we receive are what we'd expect to be getting, based on some initial data (a trusted key)

Re: GPG verification of apt packages

2021-02-01 Thread Ramin Doe
> > >This all sounds pretty promising! Thank you, Noah! Do you happen to > know > >how to access this metadata? I'd love to be able to look at it and > >understand it better. > > See the signed InRelease files in /var/lib/apt/lists > Ah! I see some files here that are relevant to my se

Re: GPG verification of apt packages

2021-01-28 Thread Noah Meyerhans
On Thu, Jan 28, 2021 at 10:08:32AM -0800, Ramin Doe wrote: > The signed metadata includes cryptographic checksums of the package > contents.  Thus, package contents can't be modified in storage on the > mirror or in transit to your system without invalidating the checksum, > and

Re: GPG verification of apt packages

2021-01-28 Thread Clément Hermann
Hi, On 28/01/2021 19:08, Ramin Doe wrote: > "Currently there are two different implementations for signing > individual packages..." > I think this is referring to the GPG signature verification mechanisms > that are disabled by default. I'm happy to not try to not go down the > route of enabling

Re: GPG verification of apt packages

2021-01-28 Thread Ramin Doe
On Wed, Jan 27, 2021 at 9:27 PM Noah Meyerhans wrote: > > The signed metadata includes cryptographic checksums of the package > contents. Thus, package contents can't be modified in storage on the > mirror or in transit to your system without invalidating the checksum, > and the checksums can't

Re: GPG verification of apt packages

2021-01-27 Thread Noah Meyerhans
On Wed, Jan 27, 2021 at 10:23:44AM -0800, Ramin Doe wrote: >This lead me to search for more answers online, where I have found an >article that suggests that package metadata is verified, but that package >contents are not. > > ([1]https://blog.packagecloud.io/eng/2014/10/28/howto-g

Re: GPG verification of apt packages

2021-01-27 Thread Jonathan Hutchins
If this were an actual problem thousands of people would be having it. Trust the force. -- Jonathan

GPG verification of apt packages

2021-01-27 Thread Ramin Doe
Sorry if this has been brought up before. If there's a prior discussion anyone can point me to, I'd really appreciate it. I am trying to set up a Debian 10 based server to host a web app that's visible to the public. Putting some time into finding out best practices in this situation, I came acros