Re: DSA 557-1 and CAN-2004-0564

2004-10-06 Thread Max Vozeler
On Wed, Oct 06, 2004 at 02:11:32PM +0200, Marco d'Itri wrote: > On Oct 06, Max Vozeler <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote: > > > It would make it possible for /usr/sbin/pppoe to get rid of setuid root > > and still work for unprivileged users. Marco, how does this look to you? > > Would you consider includ

Re: DSA 557-1 and CAN-2004-0564

2004-10-06 Thread Henrique de Moraes Holschuh
On Wed, 06 Oct 2004, Marco d'Itri wrote: > On Oct 06, Max Vozeler <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote: > > > It would make it possible for /usr/sbin/pppoe to get rid of setuid root > > and still work for unprivileged users. Marco, how does this look to you? > > Would you consider including such an option in

Re: DSA 557-1 and CAN-2004-0564

2004-10-06 Thread Marco d'Itri
On Oct 06, Max Vozeler <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote: > It would make it possible for /usr/sbin/pppoe to get rid of setuid root > and still work for unprivileged users. Marco, how does this look to you? > Would you consider including such an option in ppp? I think I'm missing something. What's wrong w

Re: DSA 557-1 and CAN-2004-0564

2004-10-06 Thread Max Vozeler
On Mon, Oct 04, 2004 at 12:14:56PM -0400, Christian Hudon wrote: > Max Vozeler wrote: > > >The pppd in Debian appears to change privileges back to those of the > >invoking user before calling the program specified in the pty option, > >preventing normal users from controlling PPPOE connections lik

Re: DSA 557-1 and CAN-2004-0564

2004-10-04 Thread Christian Hudon
Max Vozeler wrote: The pppd in Debian appears to change privileges back to those of the invoking user before calling the program specified in the pty option, preventing normal users from controlling PPPOE connections like other normal PPP connections. If this is really the case, then maybe the b

Re: DSA 557-1 and CAN-2004-0564

2004-10-04 Thread Max Vozeler
Hi David, On Mon, Oct 04, 2004 at 10:27:28AM -0400, David F. Skoll wrote: > On Mon, 4 Oct 2004, Martin Schulze wrote: > > > There are reasons users install it setuid / setgid, and these installations > > are vulnerable. > > I disagree. There is absolutely *no* reason to install rp-pppoe > setui

Re: DSA 557-1 and CAN-2004-0564

2004-10-04 Thread Martin Schulze
David F. Skoll wrote: > On Mon, 4 Oct 2004, Martin Schulze wrote: > > > There are reasons users install it setuid / setgid, and these installations > > are vulnerable. > > I disagree. There is absolutely *no* reason to install rp-pppoe > setuid-root. It is normally invoked by pppd, and pppd mus

Re: DSA 557-1 and CAN-2004-0564

2004-10-04 Thread David F. Skoll
On Mon, 4 Oct 2004, Martin Schulze wrote: > There are reasons users install it setuid / setgid, and these installations > are vulnerable. I disagree. There is absolutely *no* reason to install rp-pppoe setuid-root. It is normally invoked by pppd, and pppd must be either invoked by root or setui

Re: DSA 557-1 and CAN-2004-0564

2004-10-04 Thread Martin Schulze
David F. Skoll wrote: > The rp-pppoe "security advisory" is totally bogus. rp-pppoe is > not meant to run SUID-root, and nowhere in the documentation is this > recommended. There are reasons users install it setuid / setgid, and these installations are vulnerable. > You might as well post a secu

Re: DSA 557-1 and CAN-2004-0564

2004-10-04 Thread David F. Skoll
Hi, The rp-pppoe "security advisory" is totally bogus. rp-pppoe is not meant to run SUID-root, and nowhere in the documentation is this recommended. You might as well post a security advisory about "ls" because it doesn't drop privileges if it's installed SUID-root. Arguably, rp-pppoe should se