Re: "Certification Authorities are recommended to stop using MD5 altogether"

2009-01-11 Thread Simon Josefsson
Sam Morris writes: > Maybe in a few years, NSS will have disabled the use of MD5 and the > ancient MD2 algorithm. I wonder how many other insecure algorithms are > still lurking in NSS, OpenSSL, GNU TLS, Java, etc... In GnuTLS, we decided in 2005 that certificate signatures with MD5 should be

Re: "Certification Authorities are recommended to stop using MD5 altogether"

2009-01-02 Thread Aiko Barz
On Thu, Jan 01, 2009 at 12:45:22PM -0500, Micah Anderson wrote: > >>On Wed, 31 Dec 2008, Micah Anderson wrote: > >> > >> Does anyone have a legitimate reason to trust any particular Certificate > >> Authority? > > Yves-Alexis Perez writes: > > > > > I may b

Re: "Certification Authorities are recommended to stop using MD5 altogether"

2009-01-01 Thread Jacob Appelbaum
Cristian Ionescu-Idbohrn wrote: > http://www.win.tue.nl/hashclash/rogue-ca/ > > Could some skilled person comment on the article? > > I noticed around 20 certificates distributed with the package > ca-certificates have "Signature Algorithm: md5WithRSAEncryption". > Reason to worry? > > Hi, (I

Re: Certification Authorities are recommended to stop using MD5 altogether

2009-01-01 Thread Bernd Eckenfels
In article <0901011447100.8...@somehost> you wrote: >Signature Algorithm: md5WithRSAEncryption >^ > should be distributed at all. Yes, because it is the self signature, but since we distribute the CA certificate it is not checked but trusted. The qu

Re: "Certification Authorities are recommended to stop using MD5 altogether"

2009-01-01 Thread Micah Anderson
>>On Wed, 31 Dec 2008, Micah Anderson wrote: >> >> Does anyone have a legitimate reason to trust any particular Certificate >> Authority? > Yves-Alexis Perez writes: > > > I may be wrong, but I trust the CAs in ca-certificates. I've followed > > the add of

Re: "Certification Authorities are recommended to stop using MD5 altogether"

2009-01-01 Thread Michael Marsh
On Thu, Jan 1, 2009 at 9:56 AM, Sam Morris wrote: > Maybe in a few years, NSS will have disabled the use of MD5 and the > ancient MD2 algorithm. I wonder how many other insecure algorithms are > still lurking in NSS, OpenSSL, GNU TLS, Java, etc... Having programmed with OpenSSL a fair amount, I c

Re: "Certification Authorities are recommended to stop using MD5 altogether"

2009-01-01 Thread Sam Morris
On Wed, 31 Dec 2008 02:39:53 +0100, Cristian Ionescu-Idbohrn wrote: > http://www.win.tue.nl/hashclash/rogue-ca/ > > Could some skilled person comment on the article? > > I noticed around 20 certificates distributed with the package > ca-certificates have "Signature Algorithm: md5WithRSAEncryptio

Re: "Certification Authorities are recommended to stop using MD5 altogether"

2009-01-01 Thread Russ Allbery
Yves-Alexis Perez writes: > I may be wrong, but I trust the CAs in ca-certificates. I've followed > the add of French Gvt CA Certificates, and the procedure was enough > strict to give me this trust impression. > > I would hope that other CA are checked to be trustworthy enough before > adding th

Re: "Certification Authorities are recommended to stop using MD5 altogether"

2009-01-01 Thread Sam Morris
On Wed, 31 Dec 2008 02:39:53 +0100, Cristian Ionescu-Idbohrn wrote: > http://www.win.tue.nl/hashclash/rogue-ca/ > > Could some skilled person comment on the article? > > I noticed around 20 certificates distributed with the package > ca-certificates have "Signature Algorithm: md5WithRSAEncryptio

Re: Certification Authorities are recommended to stop using MD5 altogether

2009-01-01 Thread Peter Palfrader
On Thu, 01 Jan 2009, Cristian Ionescu-Idbohrn wrote: > Still, the original question was (sort of) whether MD5 signed certificates > like this one: > Certificate: > Data: > Version: 3 (0x2) > Serial Number: 1 (0x1) > Signature Algorithm: md5WithRSAEncryption > ^

Re: "Certification Authorities are recommended to stop using MD5 altogether"

2009-01-01 Thread Yves-Alexis Perez
On mer, 2008-12-31 at 14:15 -0500, Micah Anderson wrote: > > Does anyone have a legitimate reason to trust any particular > Certificate Authority? I may be wrong, but I trust the CAs in ca-certificates. I've followed the add of French Gvt CA Certificates, and the procedure was enough strict to g

Re: Certification Authorities are recommended to stop using MD5 altogether

2009-01-01 Thread Cristian Ionescu-Idbohrn
On Wed, 31 Dec 2008, Micah Anderson wrote: > Does anyone have a legitimate reason to trust any particular Certificate > Authority? Right. Thing is it's not straight forward to remove package ca-certificates. On my systems, some 60 other packages depend on it :( The alternative may be to reconfi

Re: "Certification Authorities are recommended to stop using MD5 altogether"

2008-12-31 Thread Nikolai Lusan
On Wed, 2008-12-31 at 14:15 -0500, Micah Anderson wrote: > Does anyone have a legitimate reason to trust any particular Certificate > Authority? The trust comes with knowing the procedures a CA uses to verify the particulars of the people asking (or indeed paying) them to sign certificates. The

Re: "Certification Authorities are recommended to stop using MD5 altogether"

2008-12-31 Thread Michael Stone
On Wed, Dec 31, 2008 at 02:15:18PM -0500, Micah Anderson wrote: Does anyone have a legitimate reason to trust any particular Certificate Authority? Of course--some charge *lots* of money, and we all know that expensive bits are better than cheap bits. Mike Stone -- To UNSUBSCRIBE, email t

Re: "Certification Authorities are recommended to stop using MD5 altogether"

2008-12-31 Thread Micah Anderson
* bgr...@toplitzer.net [2008-12-31 05:47-0500]: > On Mittwoch, 31. Dezember 2008, Cristian Ionescu-Idbohrn wrote: > > http://www.win.tue.nl/hashclash/rogue-ca/ > > > > Could some skilled person comment on the article? > > > > I noticed around 20 certificates distributed with the package > > ca-cer

Re: "Certification Authorities are recommended to stop using MD5 altogether"

2008-12-31 Thread Florian Weimer
* Cristian Ionescu-Idbohrn: > I noticed around 20 certificates distributed with the package > ca-certificates have "Signature Algorithm: md5WithRSAEncryption". > Reason to worry? These are self-signatures and typically not checked anyway. When these CA certificates are used to issue other certif

Re: "Certification Authorities are recommended to stop using MD5 altogether"

2008-12-31 Thread bgrpt3
On Mittwoch, 31. Dezember 2008, Cristian Ionescu-Idbohrn wrote: > http://www.win.tue.nl/hashclash/rogue-ca/ > > Could some skilled person comment on the article? > > I noticed around 20 certificates distributed with the package > ca-certificates have "Signature Algorithm: md5WithRSAEncryption". > R

"Certification Authorities are recommended to stop using MD5 altogether"

2008-12-30 Thread Cristian Ionescu-Idbohrn
http://www.win.tue.nl/hashclash/rogue-ca/ Could some skilled person comment on the article? I noticed around 20 certificates distributed with the package ca-certificates have "Signature Algorithm: md5WithRSAEncryption". Reason to worry? Cheers, -- Cristian -- To UNSUBSCRIBE, email to debia