Apologies, hit the wrong reply to! Please ignore and thanks for all the good
work.
On Tue, May 14, 2013 at 09:15:48PM +0100, Jon Marshall wrote:
> Saw this earlier, apparently there is a serious issue that affects all of the
> kernels up to 3.8
>
> Will do a security thing tomorrow
the ability to assign devices could cause a denial of service due to a
> memory page leak.
>
> CVE-2012-3552
>
> Hafid Lin reported an issue in the IP networking subsystem. A remote user
> can cause a denial of service (system crash) on servers running
> appli
Hi,
This DSA was signed with key 0x401DAC04, which is not in any debian-keyring
package I can find, nor on pgp.mit.edu. Is this a mistake? Thanks!
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A
tively turning on "safe mode" does this, I believe.
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On Tue, Oct 25, 2005 at 05:23:19PM +0200, Martin Schulze wrote:
> Package: libgda2
^^^
> http://security.debian.org/pool/updates/main/s/sudo/sudo_1.6.8p7-1.2.dsc
^
Sorry to be a pest :(
-
rtunately, it didn't react on the serial console and to a remotely
issued power-cycle.
The following services are affected by this downtime:
security.debian.org
The public security archive. As a temporary solution, please
switch to <http://ftp.rfc822.org/debian-security/> instea
#x27;t react on the serial console and to a remotely
issued power-cycle.
The following services are affected by this downtime:
security.debian.org
The public security archive. As a temporary solution, please
switch to <http://ftp.rfc822.org/debian-security/> instead.
On Mon, 2003-06-30 at 00:29, Martynas Domarkas wrote:
> Pn, 2003-06-27 05:59, Jean Christophe ANDRÉ rašė:
> > Matt Zimmerman écrivait :
> > > > There are a LOT of connetcions: ~700 in a 5 minutes. I did not find any
> > > > configuration options with that hosts. What could it be?
> > > This is su
On Mon, 2003-06-30 at 00:29, Martynas Domarkas wrote:
> Pn, 2003-06-27 05:59, Jean Christophe ANDRÉ rašė:
> > Matt Zimmerman écrivait :
> > > > There are a LOT of connetcions: ~700 in a 5 minutes. I did not find any
> > > > configuration options with that hosts. What could it be?
> > > This is su
com's XML feed...
> tcp 0 1 192.168.0.1:33933 63.236.73.20:80 SYN_SENT
> 4055/evolution-exec
>
And... I'm not sure about this one, but it's probably another item on
the Summary page.
- Jon
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com's XML feed...
> tcp 0 1 192.168.0.1:33933 63.236.73.20:80 SYN_SENT
> 4055/evolution-exec
>
And... I'm not sure about this one, but it's probably another item on
the Summary page.
- Jon
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On Tue, 2003-06-10 at 08:24, Stefan Neufeind wrote:
> Thank you for the information. Am I right that php-skripts then would
> need an execute-bit set? Currently they don't have ...
>
Unfortunately, yes. Otherwise you'll get a 500 Internal Server Error or
the likes.
On Tue, 2003-06-10 at 08:24, Stefan Neufeind wrote:
> Thank you for the information. Am I right that php-skripts then would
> need an execute-bit set? Currently they don't have ...
>
Unfortunately, yes. Otherwise you'll get a 500 Internal Server Error or
the likes.
which package
maintainers can register interpreters to be used with this module
without having to worry about writing their own init.d scripts, and
which sysadmins can use for a slightly higher-level interface to this
module.
- Jon
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signature.asc
Description: This is a digitally signed message part
which package
maintainers can register interpreters to be used with this module
without having to worry about writing their own init.d scripts, and
which sysadmins can use for a slightly higher-level interface to this
module.
- Jon
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signature.asc
Description: This is a digitally signed message part
side is safer - but then your scripts have to have
#!/path/to/php
at the top - although there are ways around that too. Google has some
success stories where people managed to get it to work.
- Jon
>
> On 6 Jun 2003 at 17:06, Wade Richards wrote:
>
> > On 06 Jun 2003 16:15:
side is safer - but then your scripts have to have
#!/path/to/php
at the top - although there are ways around that too. Google has some
success stories where people managed to get it to work.
- Jon
>
> On 6 Jun 2003 at 17:06, Wade Richards wrote:
>
> > On 06 Jun 2003 16:15:
27;m misunderstanding the problem.
>
I believe Apache would still be executing php/cgi scripts as www-data,
so users could snoop on other users's scripts, session files, etc.
Something like:
- Jon
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sig
m misunderstanding the problem.
>
I believe Apache would still be executing php/cgi scripts as www-data,
so users could snoop on other users's scripts, session files, etc.
Something like:
- Jon
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signature.asc
De
On Fri, 2003-05-09 at 00:27, Jon wrote:
> Sources are patched as of woody.2, according to this changes file[1],
> but only woody.1 images are available[2], as far as I can tell. The
> images at the second URL are still vulnerable:
>
> [1]http://ftp.debian.org/dists/proposed
t; Child process started..
=> Child process started..
=> Child process started.+ 516
- 516 ok!
[1]http://ftp.debian.org/dists/proposed-updates/kernel-source-2.4.20_2.4.20-3woody.2_i386.changes
[2]http://ftp.debian.org/pool/main/k/kernel-image-2.4.20-i386/
- Jon
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On Sat, 2003-03-22 at 04:43, Markus Kolb wrote:
> Jon wrote:
>
> [...]
>
> >>
> >>Linux kmod + ptrace local root exploit by <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
> >>
> >>=> Simple mode, executing /usr/bin/id > /dev/tty
> >>sizeof(shellcode)=9
On Sat, 2003-03-22 at 04:43, Markus Kolb wrote:
> Jon wrote:
>
> [...]
>
> >>
> >>Linux kmod + ptrace local root exploit by <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
> >>
> >>=> Simple mode, executing /usr/bin/id > /dev/tty
> >>sizeof(shellcode)=9
cess started..
> => Child process started..
> => Child process started..
> => Child process started..
> => Child process started..
>
>
> Does this mean the patch I downloaded worked?
Yes.
- Jon
cess started..
> => Child process started..
> => Child process started..
> => Child process started..
> => Child process started..
>
>
> Does this mean the patch I downloaded worked?
Yes.
- Jon
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hive/1/315635
- Jon
hive/1/315635
- Jon
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to it,
or stop using email. I cannot believe the number of
mails I've deleted regarding this off-topic.
'nuff said
Jon
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You don't want to sacrifice security for convenience.
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--oOo--(_)--oOo-------
Jon McCainEmail: [EMAIL PROTECTED]
Sr. Programmer
a menu script (i.e.
/usr/bin/yourmenu instead of /usr/bin/bash) so they can not get to a $
prompt. You also have to define your menu script as a shell
(/etc/shell) so regular ftp will still work.
--
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(@ @)
------oOo--(_)--oOo--
a menu script (i.e.
/usr/bin/yourmenu instead of /usr/bin/bash) so they can not get to a $
prompt. You also have to define your menu script as a shell
(/etc/shell) so regular ftp will still work.
--
___
(@ @)
------oOo--(_)--oOo--
Chris Reeves wrote:
>
> Why not change the users' shell to /usr/bin/menu?
>
Because they need to be able to transfer files to their home
directories. If you do this, then ftp,pscp,etc won't work. My original
goal was to allow them transfer files to/from home directory with
something besides ft
All of this has gotten me to thinking about another flaw in the way I
have things set up. I'm preventing users from getting to a $ by running
a menu from their profile.
exec /usr/bin/menu
This works fine since the exec causes menu to become their shell
process.
But some smart user could get aro
I think some of you misunderstood me. I was not clear about my
concern. Users can ssh into my machine but their profiles are fixed to
run a menu of things I allow them to do. Thus they can't get to the $
prompt and thus can't cd to other directories to see what's there. And
even they did, permi
>
> > The user can change to directories above their home.
> > Is there a way to chroot them
>
> Use restricted bash shell for the user (/bin/rbash) in the
> /etc/passwd.
>
This does not seem to affect sshd. I changed a user to use rbash but I
could still go to a windows machine and use the pu
I'm not sure if this message made it through. Our ISP was having
problems this morning.
Sorry if you get this message twice.
I think some of you misunderstood me. I was not clear about my
concern. Users can ssh into my machine but their profiles are fixed to
run a menu of things I allow them t
Chris Reeves wrote:
>
> Why not change the users' shell to /usr/bin/menu?
>
Because they need to be able to transfer files to their home
directories. If you do this, then ftp,pscp,etc won't work. My original
goal was to allow them transfer files to/from home directory with
something besides f
All of this has gotten me to thinking about another flaw in the way I
have things set up. I'm preventing users from getting to a $ by running
a menu from their profile.
exec /usr/bin/menu
This works fine since the exec causes menu to become their shell
process.
But some smart user could get ar
I think some of you misunderstood me. I was not clear about my
concern. Users can ssh into my machine but their profiles are fixed to
run a menu of things I allow them to do. Thus they can't get to the $
prompt and thus can't cd to other directories to see what's there. And
even they did, perm
>
> > The user can change to directories above their home.
> > Is there a way to chroot them
>
> Use restricted bash shell for the user (/bin/rbash) in the
> /etc/passwd.
>
This does not seem to affect sshd. I changed a user to use rbash but I
could still go to a windows machine and use the p
I'm not sure if this message made it through. Our ISP was having
problems this morning.
Sorry if you get this message twice.
I think some of you misunderstood me. I was not clear about my
concern. Users can ssh into my machine but their profiles are fixed to
run a menu of things I allow them
I've been playing around with the scp and sftp components of putty and
noticed what I consider a security hole. Winscp does the same thing.
The user can change to directories above their home. Is there a way to
chroot them like you can in an ftp config file? I don't see anything in
the sshd con
I've been playing around with the scp and sftp components of putty and
noticed what I consider a security hole. Winscp does the same thing.
The user can change to directories above their home. Is there a way to
chroot them like you can in an ftp config file? I don't see anything in
the sshd co
I'd agree with your comments. I being looking at
OpenBSD (for various reasons) and the default setup is
reasonable secure (there are still some things left on
, which supprised me). Not sure if Debian needs to go
as far as OpenBSD but I think that it is a good
referance base
Jon
--- T
I'd agree with your comments. I being looking at
OpenBSD (for various reasons) and the default setup is
reasonable secure (there are still some things left on
, which supprised me). Not sure if Debian needs to go
as far as OpenBSD but I think that it is a good
referance base
Jon
--- T
On 01 Sep 2001 16:32:50 +0100, Jon Masters wrote:
>-A"Subject: [ABUSE] Forwarded Message";\
> ) | $SENDMAIL -oi -t
Should have a:
-A"Cc: [EMAIL PROTECTED]";\
in there, thus:
:0:
* (^From:[EMAIL PROTECTED])
{
:0 c:
Hi,
I'm sure someone else can do much better with a bit of effort :)
--jcm
--- Begin Message ---
On 01 Sep 2001 16:26:29 +0200, [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:
> On Sat, Sep 01, 2001 at 07:13:06AM -0500, Bud Rogers wrote:
> > I put him in a filter. Every mail I receive from him gets forwarded back
>
On 31 Aug 2001 23:54:40 -0400, Ed Street wrote:
> If not is anyone up for a road trip? ;)
Sure :)
* jcm fires off another abuse report...
...or should that be "I HAVE FIRED OFF ANOTHER ABUSE REPORT AND NOW I
CAN'T FIGURE OUT HOW TO TURN OFF CAPS LOCK" ? :)
--jcm
On 01 Sep 2001 16:32:50 +0100, Jon Masters wrote:
>-A"Subject: [ABUSE] Forwarded Message";\
> ) | $SENDMAIL -oi -t
Should have a:
-A"Cc: [EMAIL PROTECTED]";\
in there, thus:
:0:
* (^From:.*[EMAIL PROTECTED])
{
:0 c:
Hi,
I'm sure someone else can do much better with a bit of effort :)
--jcm
On 01 Sep 2001 16:26:29 +0200, [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:
> On Sat, Sep 01, 2001 at 07:13:06AM -0500, Bud Rogers wrote:
> > I put him in a filter. Every mail I receive from him gets forwarded back to
> > him and to po
On 31 Aug 2001 23:54:40 -0400, Ed Street wrote:
> If not is anyone up for a road trip? ;)
Sure :)
* jcm fires off another abuse report...
...or should that be "I HAVE FIRED OFF ANOTHER ABUSE REPORT AND NOW I
CAN'T FIGURE OUT HOW TO TURN OFF CAPS LOCK" ? :)
--jcm
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olaris, etc..
weren't vulnerable to this.
2) Apache, Boa, thttpd, and others each deal with this differently.
What way is the *correct* way?
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Jon Nelson
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olaris, etc..
weren't vulnerable to this.
2) Apache, Boa, thttpd, and others each deal with this differently.
What way is the *correct* way?
--
Pound for pound, the amoeba is the most vicious animal on earth.
Jon Nelson
[EMAIL PROTECTED]
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Craig wrote:
>
> Goodday ladies and fellas
>
> I have potato installed on a box that will be a proxy and firewall. I needed
> to have the facility of port forwarding so i was told to install kernel 2.4.
>
Does kernel 2.4 have some special feature of port forwarding that the
2.2.x kernels don'
Craig wrote:
>
> Goodday ladies and fellas
>
> I have potato installed on a box that will be a proxy and firewall. I needed
> to have the facility of port forwarding so i was told to install kernel 2.4.
>
Does kernel 2.4 have some special feature of port forwarding that the
2.2.x kernels don
After setting up the IPChains policies and rules, I want to be able to have a
log file of any DENY packets sent to me. We use GroupWise as a email package.
I also want those log files to exist on another Debian server that sits behind
the firewall.
TIA
Jon L. Miller, MCNE
Director/Sr
After setting up the IPChains policies and rules, I want to be able to have a log file
of any DENY packets sent to me. We use GroupWise as a email package. I also want
those log files to exist on another Debian server that sits behind the firewall.
TIA
Jon L. Miller, MCNE
Director/Sr
, so expect to spend several years in jail for contempt of court
(or your local equivalent) should you get raided with such a thing.
I'm not aware of any actual implementations, unfortunately.
The usual reference for this sort of thing is the cypherpunks list.
Jon Leonard
, so expect to spend several years in jail for contempt of court
(or your local equivalent) should you get raided with such a thing.
I'm not aware of any actual implementations, unfortunately.
The usual reference for this sort of thing is the cypherpunks list.
Jon Leonard
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u have more extreme secrecy needs, you might want to look into duress
filesystems or steganographic file storage. Those are only really useful if
you might need to plausibly deny that you had the encrypted files at all.
I'm also not aware of any available implementations.
Jon Leonard
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