> "Michael" == Michael Wood <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> writes:
Michael> Ahhh, but this is quite easily guessable, since for most
Michael> stuff you type, the server echos it. For passwords, it
Michael> doesn't. i.e. just watch the SSH session, and when you see
Michael> packets going to the server
> "Michael" == Michael Wood <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> writes:
Michael> Ahhh, but this is quite easily guessable, since for most
Michael> stuff you type, the server echos it. For passwords, it
Michael> doesn't. i.e. just watch the SSH session, and when you see
Michael> packets going to the server
>>>>> "Ethan" == Ethan Benson <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> writes:
Ethan> On Sat, Jul 07, 2001 at 02:10:09AM +0100, Eric E Moore wrote:
>> I would be very shocked if you could compromise a system with a
>> sudoers entry of: me hostname = (root) /bin/cat
Eth
>>>>> "Ethan" == Ethan Benson <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> writes:
Ethan> On Sat, Jul 07, 2001 at 02:10:09AM +0100, Eric E Moore wrote:
>> I would be very shocked if you could compromise a system with a
>> sudoers entry of: me hostname = (root) /bin/cat
Eth
> "Ethan" == Ethan Benson <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> writes:
Ethan> or even seemingly innocuous things like less or even cat.
Less is a problem, yes, as is anything else with a shell escape.
Ethan> sudo less anything !/bin/sh whoami r00t!
Ethan> echo me ALL=ALL > s sudo 'cat s >> /etc/sudoers'
do
> "Ethan" == Ethan Benson <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> writes:
Ethan> or even seemingly innocuous things like less or even cat.
Less is a problem, yes, as is anything else with a shell escape.
Ethan> sudo less anything !/bin/sh whoami r00t!
Ethan> echo me ALL=ALL > s sudo 'cat s >> /etc/sudoers'
d
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