W. Martin Borgert un jour écrivit:
On 2008-08-28 20:40, Simon Valiquette wrote:
That's obviously true, but that doesn't cover the case when logs are
copied to a second system with sysadmins that doesn't have access to the
first server. And if someone use the standard 514 syslog port instead
On 2008-08-28 20:40, Simon Valiquette wrote:
> That's obviously true, but that doesn't cover the case when logs are
> copied to a second system with sysadmins that doesn't have access to the
> first server. And if someone use the standard 514 syslog port instead of
> using an SSL tunnel or th
Hi,
Please add Debian Security Advisory info for CVE-2008-2812.
http://www.debian.org/security/2008/dsa-1630
and if there is no page for the vulnerability, please check
http://lists.debian.org/debian-security-announce/ , then link
to mail archive.
Thanks.
--
Regards,
Hideki Yamane
A. Dreyer un jour écrivit:
On Thu, 28 Aug 2008, Johan Walles wrote:
Anyway root already has the capability to view passwords
(i.e. by installing alternate login programs, sniffing tty, ...)
That's obviously true, but that doesn't cover the case when logs are
copied to a second system with
Hi,
It is not often that I post but
1) Logging invalid usernames which can be used to detect all manor of
attacks including dictionary username attacks and password brute force
attacks.
2) As pointed out earlier the file is root only access. The argument
that can be read if you physical ac
On Thu, Aug 28, 2008 at 02:37:37PM -0700, Steve Langasek wrote:
> On Thu, Aug 28, 2008 at 09:36:41AM +0200, Giacomo A. Catenazzi wrote:
> > auth.log was invented for this reason, and separated to standard log:
> > it should be readable only by root,
>
> Then there is a bug in another package if th
Nico Golde un jour écrivit:
Hi Johan,
* Johan Walles <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> [2008-08-28 13:14]:
2008/8/28 Giacomo A. Catenazzi <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>:
[...]
So auth.log should log usernames, so that users don't do
wrong assumption that password are not accessible by root!
I can see a point in loggi
On Thu, Aug 28, 2008 at 02:37:37PM -0700, Steve Langasek wrote:
On Thu, Aug 28, 2008 at 09:36:41AM +0200, Giacomo A. Catenazzi wrote:
auth.log was invented for this reason, and separated to standard log:
it should be readable only by root,
Then there is a bug in another package if this is what
On Thu, Aug 28, 2008 at 09:36:41AM +0200, Giacomo A. Catenazzi wrote:
> auth.log was invented for this reason, and separated to standard log:
> it should be readable only by root,
Then there is a bug in another package if this is what "should" be, because
/var/log/auth.log is readable by group adm
On 2008-08-28 13:05, Johan Walles wrote:
> It's readable by anybody with physical access to the hardware.
If their have physical access to the hardware, auth.log would be
my least worry.
> That doesn't mean Debian should *help* root doing that in a default
> install. Security by default, anybody
On Thu, Aug 28, 2008 at 01:05:19PM +0200, Johan Walles wrote:
> 2008/8/28 Giacomo A. Catenazzi <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>:
> > auth.log was invented for this reason, and separated to standard log:
> > it should be readable only by root, because users do errors.
> It's readable by anybody with physical a
This one time, at band camp, Johan Walles said:
> 2008/8/28 Giacomo A. Catenazzi <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>:
> > Johan Walles wrote:
> >> Security shouldn't be based on nobody ever doing more or less common
> >> mistakes.
> >
> > auth.log was invented for this reason, and separated to standard log:
> > it
Mark Brown wrote:
On Thu, Aug 28, 2008 at 01:05:19PM +0200, Johan Walles wrote:
2008/8/28 Giacomo A. Catenazzi <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>:
auth.log was invented for this reason, and separated to standard log:
it should be readable only by root, because users do errors.
It's readable by anybody wi
On Thu, 28 Aug 2008, Johan Walles wrote:
> 2008/8/28 Giacomo A. Catenazzi <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>:
> > Johan Walles wrote:
> >> Security shouldn't be based on nobody ever doing more or less common
> >> mistakes.
> >
> > auth.log was invented for this reason, and separated to standard log:
> > it shoul
Hi Johan,
* Johan Walles <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> [2008-08-28 13:14]:
> 2008/8/28 Giacomo A. Catenazzi <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>:
[...]
> > So auth.log should log usernames, so that users don't do
> > wrong assumption that password are not accessible by root!
>
> I can see a point in logging *valid* usernam
2008/8/28 Giacomo A. Catenazzi <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>:
> Johan Walles wrote:
>> Security shouldn't be based on nobody ever doing more or less common
>> mistakes.
>
> auth.log was invented for this reason, and separated to standard log:
> it should be readable only by root, because users do errors.
It
Hi Johan,
* Johan Walles <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> [2008-08-28 11:46]:
> Let's keep debian-security in the discussion to see what others have
> to say about this.
>
> Technically I agree with you when you say that people shouldn't enter
> anything but their usernames at the login prompt, but the fact is
--On Thursday, August 28, 2008 09:03:05 +0200 Johan Walles
<[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote:
Let's keep debian-security in the discussion to see what others have
to say about this.
you try to solve a non-technical problem in a technical way.
Dirk
--
[EMAIL PROTECTED]
--
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Johan Walles wrote:
Hi Nico!
Let's keep debian-security in the discussion to see what others have
to say about this.
Technically I agree with you when you say that people shouldn't enter
anything but their usernames at the login prompt, but the fact is that
people (like me and the bug submitter
Hi Nico!
Let's keep debian-security in the discussion to see what others have
to say about this.
Technically I agree with you when you say that people shouldn't enter
anything but their usernames at the login prompt, but the fact is that
people (like me and the bug submitter for example) *do* ent
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