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Regarding "Re: are md5sums mandatory for all packages?" of 10:31 AM -0800
1997-12-19, Scott Ellis wrote:
>And the instant someone provides us with free software equivilant to ssh
>or pgp, we'll move to use it.
Kerberos is free software and it is more than equiv
On Dec 19, Santiago Vila <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote:
>Could somebody please explain the rationale for having *all*
>/etc/init.d/* scripts as conffiles?
I find useful to modify some of the scripts. (e.g. I don't need RPC and I
use different command line options for sendmail.)
--
ciao,
Marco
[EMAIL PROTECTED] (Santiago Vila) wrote on 19.12.97 in <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>:
> Could somebody please explain the rationale for having *all*
> /etc/init.d/* scripts as conffiles?
Because they are.
> Please, don't say "you can deactivate the service by modifying the
> scripts",
Example from my ma
Hi,
All right, I think I a beginning to agree. Maybe dpkg *should
have integrity checking (as well as permission and ownership being
recorded record [in the .list file maybe?] -- like a ls -al listing)
If per file mdsums are to be recorded, then maybe hte too
should be pgp-sign
On Fri, 19 Dec 1997, Santiago Vila wrote:
> Policy Manual 3.4.5 says:
>
>Do not include the /etc/rcn.d/* symbolic links in dpkg's conffiles
>list! This will cause problems! Do, however, include the /etc/init.d
>scripts in conffiles.
>
> However, it does not say why /etc/init.d/* scri
On 19 Dec 1997, James Troup wrote:
> Milan Zamazal <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> writes:
>
> > > I still fail to see any advantages in what even you admit is a
> > > half baked security solution. There is a better, more secure, real
> > > solution in terms of tripwire.
> >
> > But we have none -- tripwire
Indeed, I've waited for this feature simply *because* it gives me a
comfortable feeling if the md5sums still check after
1) a hardware flake out [computer at a residential site with
poor environment control, cheap IDE disks -- you know, what most
developers have, as well as many users] tha
On 19 Dec 1997, Milan Zamazal wrote:
> > "MS" == Manoj Srivastava <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> writes:
>
> MS: I still fail to see any advantages in what even you
> MS: admit is a half baked security solution. There is a better, more
> MS: secure, real solution in terms of tripwire.
Milan Zamazal <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> writes:
> > I still fail to see any advantages in what even you admit is a
> > half baked security solution. There is a better, more secure, real
> > solution in terms of tripwire.
>
> But we have none -- tripwire is non-free software.
When has that ever stopped
> "MS" == Manoj Srivastava <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> writes:
MS: I still fail to see any advantages in what even you
MS: admit is a half baked security solution. There is a better, more
MS: secure, real solution in terms of tripwire.
But we have none -- tripwire is non-free soft
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This came from bug #16058.
Policy Manual 3.4.5 says:
Do not include the /etc/rcn.d/* symbolic links in dpkg's conffiles
list! This will cause problems! Do, however, include the /etc/init.d
scripts in conffiles.
However, it does not say why /etc/init.d
One person is against it; for reasons I have yet to understand, and I'm
beginning to have second doubts about it as well (for other reasons).
What I'm thinking is that maybe it should be the responsability of dpkg,
since it is the package manager after all. The package itself works as
is and ther
Hi,
>>"Radu" == Radu Duta <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> writes:
>> Secondly, if I am concerned about security and file integrity, I
>> use tripwire, and write protect the media the database is on. The
>> bad person modifying /usr/bin/make can very well alter
>> /var/lib/dpkg/info/make.md5sum as well.
Radu>
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