Re: [Precise][CVE-2014-9090] x86_64, traps: Stop using IST for #SS

2014-12-08 Thread Luis Henriques
On Sun, Dec 07, 2014 at 09:43:33PM +, Ben Hutchings wrote: > I think you want these too: > > af726f21ed8a x86_64, traps: Fix the espfix64 #DF fixup and rewrite it in C > b645af2d5905 x86_64, traps: Rework bad_iret > > I'm attaching backports to 3.2. > Thanks Ben. Initially Andy asked to wa

Re: [Precise][CVE-2014-9090] x86_64, traps: Stop using IST for #SS

2014-12-07 Thread Ben Hutchings
I think you want these too: af726f21ed8a x86_64, traps: Fix the espfix64 #DF fixup and rewrite it in C b645af2d5905 x86_64, traps: Rework bad_iret I'm attaching backports to 3.2. Ben. -- Ben Hutchings Experience is directly proportional to the value of equipment destroyed.

[Precise][CVE-2014-9090] x86_64, traps: Stop using IST for #SS

2014-12-05 Thread Luis Henriques
From: Andy Lutomirski On a 32-bit kernel, this has no effect, since there are no IST stacks. On a 64-bit kernel, #SS can only happen in user code, on a failed iret to user space, a canonical violation on access via RSP or RBP, or a genuine stack segment violation in 32-bit kernel code. The firs

[Precise][CVE-2014-9090] x86_64, traps: Stop using IST for #SS

2014-12-05 Thread Luis Henriques
From: Andy Lutomirski On a 32-bit kernel, this has no effect, since there are no IST stacks. On a 64-bit kernel, #SS can only happen in user code, on a failed iret to user space, a canonical violation on access via RSP or RBP, or a genuine stack segment violation in 32-bit kernel code. The firs