Re: Command /usr/bin/mv wrong message in German

2024-04-01 Thread Andrey Rakhmatullin
On Mon, Apr 01, 2024 at 01:03:04PM +1000, Russell Stuart wrote: > On 1/4/24 10:18, gregor herrmann wrote: > > % dpkg -S $(which mv > coreutils: /usr/bin/mv > > On bookworm: > > $ dpkg -S $(which mv) > dpkg-query: no path found matching pattern /usr/bin/mv > > This is caused by the /bin -

Re: Command /usr/bin/mv wrong message in German

2024-04-01 Thread Johannes Schauer Marin Rodrigues
Hi, Quoting Andrey Rakhmatullin (2024-04-01 09:58:21) > On Mon, Apr 01, 2024 at 01:03:04PM +1000, Russell Stuart wrote: > > On 1/4/24 10:18, gregor herrmann wrote: > > > % dpkg -S $(which mv > coreutils: /usr/bin/mv > > > > On bookworm: > > > > $ dpkg -S $(which mv) > > dpkg-query: no pa

Re: xz backdoor

2024-04-01 Thread thomas
On Mar 31, 2024 2:37 PM, Pierre-Elliott Bécue Wrote: > The PGP submodule of a Yubikey can host 3 keys, one signing, one > authent, and one encrypt. ISTR accessing the signing key is always > prompting for the PIN. Same for the encryption key. (I think both can be > configured otherwise)

Re: Validating tarballs against git repositories

2024-04-01 Thread Simon Josefsson
"G. Branden Robinson" writes: > At 2024-03-31T22:32:49+, Stefano Rivera wrote: >> Upstreams would probably prefer that we used git repositories >> *directly* as source artifacts, but that comes with a whole other can >> of worms... > > Speaking from my upstream groff perspective, I wouldn't _

Re: xz backdoor

2024-04-01 Thread Stephan Verbücheln
On Mon, 2024-04-01 at 10:59 +0200, tho...@goirand.fr wrote: > Only for the signing operation, one can turn on the "force-sig" > option so that the key always prompt for a pin. And that is not the > default. There are two levels. In the OpenPGP protocol, the smartcard can be configured to require t

Re: xz backdoor

2024-04-01 Thread Bastian Blank
Hi On Sun, Mar 31, 2024 at 07:48:35PM +0300, Adrian Bunk wrote: > > What we can do unilaterally is to disallow vendoring those files. > These files are supposed to be vendored in release tarballs, > the sane approach for getting rid of such vendored files would > be to discourage tarball uploads t

Re: Validating tarballs against git repositories

2024-04-01 Thread Bastian Blank
On Mon, Apr 01, 2024 at 02:31:47AM +0200, gregor herrmann wrote: > That's not mutually exclusive. When adding an additional git remote > and using gbp-import-orig's --upstream-vcs-tag you get the best of > both worlds. And this will error out if there are unexpected changes in the tarball? How wil

Re: xz backdoor

2024-04-01 Thread Iustin Pop
On 2024-03-31 22:23:10, Arto Jantunen wrote: > Didier 'OdyX' Raboud writes: > > > Le dimanche, 31 mars 2024, 14.37:08 h CEST Pierre-Elliott Bécue a écrit : > >> I would object against creating a PGP key on the HSM itself. Not having > >> the proper control on the key is room for disaster as soon

Re: xz backdoor

2024-04-01 Thread Ansgar 🙀
Hi, On Sun, 2024-03-31 at 14:34 +0200, Pierre-Elliott Bécue wrote: > The PGP submodule of a Yubikey can host 3 keys, one signing, one > authent, and one encrypt. ISTR accessing the signing key is always > prompting for the PIN. Same for the encryption key. (I think both can > be configured other

Re: Validating tarballs against git repositories

2024-04-01 Thread Bastian Blank
On Mon, Apr 01, 2024 at 12:03:48PM +0200, Bastian Blank wrote: > On Mon, Apr 01, 2024 at 02:31:47AM +0200, gregor herrmann wrote: > > That's not mutually exclusive. When adding an additional git remote > > and using gbp-import-orig's --upstream-vcs-tag you get the best of > > both worlds. > And thi

Re: xz backdoor

2024-04-01 Thread Bastian Blank
Hi On Mon, Apr 01, 2024 at 12:40:51PM +0200, Ansgar 🙀 wrote: > For OpenSSH it might also be more convenient to use Webauthn, that is, > the keys generated using `ssh-keygen -t ed25519-sk` or `-t ecdsa-sk`. Also those key types allow two different uses. Persistent or non-persistent keys differ in

Re: xz backdoor

2024-04-01 Thread Pierre-Elliott Bécue
De : Ansgar 🙀 À : Pierre-Elliott Bécue ; Luca Boccassi Cc : debian-devel@lists.debian.org Date : 1 avr. 2024 12:47:52 Objet : Re: xz backdoor > > Hi, > > On Sun, 2024-03-31 at 14:34 +0200, Pierre-Elliott Bécue wrote: >> The PGP submodule of a Yubikey can host 3 keys, one signing, one >> authen

Re: Command /usr/bin/mv wrong message in German

2024-04-01 Thread Alexandre Detiste
Le lun. 1 avr. 2024 à 10:43, Johannes Schauer Marin Rodrigues a écrit : > > This is the reason I never expect dpkg -S to work and dpkg -L to be > > correct. The (probably) oldest registered bug report about this is #213907, > > from 2003. RPM has %ghost since before that, of course. > > This is th

Re: Validating tarballs against git repositories

2024-04-01 Thread Colin Watson
On Mon, Apr 01, 2024 at 11:33:06AM +0200, Simon Josefsson wrote: > Running ./bootstrap in a tarball may lead to different results than the > maintainer running ./bootstrap in pristine git. It is the same problem > as running 'autoreconf -fvi' in a tarball does not necessarily lead to > the same re

Re: Validating tarballs against git repositories

2024-04-01 Thread Alexandre Detiste
Le lun. 1 avr. 2024 à 15:49, Colin Watson a écrit : > > The practice of running "autoreconf -fi" or similar via dh-autoreconf > has worked extremely well at scale in Debian. I'm sure there are > complex edge cases where it's caused problems, but it's far from being a > disaster area. It's pretty

Re: Validating tarballs against git repositories

2024-04-01 Thread Andrey Rakhmatullin
On Mon, Apr 01, 2024 at 04:10:55PM +0200, Alexandre Detiste wrote: > Le lun. 1 avr. 2024 à 15:49, Colin Watson a écrit : > > > > The practice of running "autoreconf -fi" or similar via dh-autoreconf > > has worked extremely well at scale in Debian. I'm sure there are > > complex edge cases where

Re: Command /usr/bin/mv wrong message in German

2024-04-01 Thread Fabrice Aeschbacher
"dpkg -S" or "apt-file" give me an incorrect or no answer, most of the times. Whereas this url always returns a correct answer: https://www.debian.org/distrib/packages#search_contents Best, Fabrice Le 01/04/2024 à 09:58, Andrey Rakhmatullin a écrit : On Mon, Apr 01, 2024 at 01:03:04PM +1000,

Re: Command /usr/bin/mv wrong message in German

2024-04-01 Thread Andrey Rakhmatullin
On Mon, Apr 01, 2024 at 05:02:56PM +0200, Fabrice Aeschbacher wrote: > "dpkg -S" or "apt-file" give me an incorrect or no answer, most of the > times. > > Whereas this url always returns a correct answer: > https://www.debian.org/distrib/packages#search_contents Have you tried either of two exampl

Re: xz backdoor

2024-04-01 Thread Russ Allbery
Bastian Blank writes: > I don't understand what you are trying to say. If we add a hard check > to lintian for m4/*, set it to auto-reject, then it is fully irrelevant > if the upload is a tarball or git. Er, well, there goes every C package for which I'm upstream, all of which have M4 macros i

Re: Validating tarballs against git repositories

2024-04-01 Thread Theodore Ts'o
On Sat, Mar 30, 2024 at 08:44:36AM -0700, Russ Allbery wrote: > Luca Boccassi writes: > > > In the end, massaged tarballs were needed to avoid rerunning autoconfery > > on twelve thousands different proprietary and non-proprietary Unix > > variants, back in the day. In 2024, we do dh_autoreconf b

Re: Validating tarballs against git repositories

2024-04-01 Thread Simon Josefsson
Colin Watson writes: > On Mon, Apr 01, 2024 at 11:33:06AM +0200, Simon Josefsson wrote: >> Running ./bootstrap in a tarball may lead to different results than the >> maintainer running ./bootstrap in pristine git. It is the same problem >> as running 'autoreconf -fvi' in a tarball does not neces

Re: xz backdoor

2024-04-01 Thread Colin Watson
On Mon, Apr 01, 2024 at 08:13:58AM -0700, Russ Allbery wrote: > Bastian Blank writes: > > I don't understand what you are trying to say. If we add a hard check > > to lintian for m4/*, set it to auto-reject, then it is fully irrelevant > > if the upload is a tarball or git. > > Er, well, there g

Re: xz backdoor

2024-04-01 Thread Adrian Bunk
On Mon, Apr 01, 2024 at 12:02:09PM +0200, Bastian Blank wrote: > Hi > > On Sun, Mar 31, 2024 at 07:48:35PM +0300, Adrian Bunk wrote: > > > What we can do unilaterally is to disallow vendoring those files. > > These files are supposed to be vendored in release tarballs, > > the sane approach for ge

Re: Validating tarballs against git repositories

2024-04-01 Thread Colin Watson
On Mon, Apr 01, 2024 at 05:24:45PM +0200, Simon Josefsson wrote: > Colin Watson writes: > > On Mon, Apr 01, 2024 at 11:33:06AM +0200, Simon Josefsson wrote: > >> Running ./bootstrap in a tarball may lead to different results than the > >> maintainer running ./bootstrap in pristine git. It is the

Firmwares (was Re: Bits from the DPL)

2024-04-01 Thread Vincent Bernat
On 2024-04-01 18:05, Jonathan Carter wrote: The included firmware contributed to Debian 12 being a huge success, but it wasn't the only factor. Unfortunately, the shipped firmwares are now almost a year old, including for unstable. I am following the progress since quite a few years and I hav

Re: Validating tarballs against git repositories

2024-04-01 Thread Vincent Bernat
On 2024-04-01 12:44, Bastian Blank wrote: So in the end you still need to manually review all the stuff that the tarball contains extra to the git. And for that I don't see that it actually gives some helping hands and makes it easier. So I really don't see how this makes the problem in hand a

Re: Validating tarballs against git repositories

2024-04-01 Thread Theodore Ts'o
On Mon, Apr 01, 2024 at 06:36:30PM +0200, Vincent Bernat wrote: > > I think that if Debian was using git instead of the generated tarball, this > part of the backdoor would have just been included in the git repository as > well. If we were able to magically switch everything to git (and we won't,

Re: xz backdoor

2024-04-01 Thread Theodore Ts'o
On Mon, Apr 01, 2024 at 04:47:05PM +0100, Colin Watson wrote: > On Mon, Apr 01, 2024 at 08:13:58AM -0700, Russ Allbery wrote: > > Bastian Blank writes: > > > I don't understand what you are trying to say. If we add a hard check > > > to lintian for m4/*, set it to auto-reject, then it is fully ir

Re: Firmwares (was Re: Bits from the DPL)

2024-04-01 Thread Andrey Rakhmatullin
On Mon, Apr 01, 2024 at 06:27:29PM +0200, Vincent Bernat wrote: > On 2024-04-01 18:05, Jonathan Carter wrote: > > The included firmware contributed to Debian 12 being a huge success, > > but it wasn't the only factor. > > Unfortunately, the shipped firmwares are now almost a year old, including >

Re: Validating tarballs against git repositories

2024-04-01 Thread Bastian Blank
On Mon, Apr 01, 2024 at 06:36:30PM +0200, Vincent Bernat wrote: > On 2024-04-01 12:44, Bastian Blank wrote: > > So in the end you still need to manually review all the stuff that the > > tarball contains extra to the git. And for that I don't see that it > > actually gives some helping hands and m

autoreconf --force not forcing (was Re: Validating tarballs against git repositories)

2024-04-01 Thread Guillem Jover
Hi! On Sat, 2024-03-30 at 14:16:21 +0100, Guillem Jover wrote: > Let's try to go in detail on how this was done on the build system > side (I'm doing this right now, as previously only had skimmed over > the process). > > The build system hook was planted in the tarball by adding a modified > m4/

Re: Bits from the DPL

2024-04-01 Thread Christian Kastner
Hi Jonathan, just a brief correction: On 2024-04-01 18:05, Jonathan Carter wrote: > I don't want to single out DSA there, it's difficult and affects many > other teams. The Salsa CI team also spent a lot of resources (time and > money wise) to extend testing on AMD GPUs and other AMD hardware. It

Debian packaging for git-credential-libsecret

2024-04-01 Thread M Hickford
Hi. It'd be great to package Git credential helper git-credential-libsecret in Debian. There's a patch prepared, but it needs the attention of a Debian developer. Is anyone here able to help? https://bugs.debian.org/cgi-bin/bugreport.cgi?bug=878599 Kind regards -M

Bug#1068206: ITP: jolt -- A multi core friendly rigid body physics and collision detection library, written in C++, suitable for games and VR applications.

2024-04-01 Thread Bret Curtis
Package: wnpp Severity: wishlist Owner: Bret Curtis X-Debbugs-Cc: debian-devel@lists.debian.org * Package name: jolt Version : 4.0.2 Upstream Contact: Jorrit Rouwe * URL : https://github.com/jrouwe/JoltPhysics * License : MIT Programming Lang: C++ Descript

Re: Validating tarballs against git repositories

2024-04-01 Thread Gioele Barabucci
On 31/03/24 08:59, Sven Joachim wrote: The coreutils bootstrap script fetches files over the network, so it is not possible to build the Debian package from upstream git tags. At the very least it would lack any translations, and there is also the problem of the gnulib submodule. Aren't these t

Bug#1068212: ITP: python-grpcio-status -- Status proto mapping for gRPC

2024-04-01 Thread Yogeswaran Umasankar
Package: wnpp Severity: wishlist Owner: Yogeswaran Umasankar X-Debbugs-Cc: debian-devel@lists.debian.org, kd8...@gmail.com * Package name: python-grpcio-status Version : 1.62.1 Upstream Contact: The gRPC Authors * URL : https://github.com/OctopusAI/grpcio-status * Lic

Debian openssh option review: considering splitting out GSS-API key exchange

2024-04-01 Thread Colin Watson
[I've CCed openssh-unix-dev for awareness, but set Mail-Followup-To to just debian-devel and debian-ssh to avoid potentially spamming them with a long discussion. If you choose to override this then that's your call, but please be mindful of upstream's time.] Following the xz-utils backdoor, I'm

Re: Debian openssh option review: considering splitting out GSS-API key exchange

2024-04-01 Thread Damien Miller
On Tue, 2 Apr 2024, Colin Watson wrote: [I'm not subscribed to the debian-* lists, please Cc me in replies if you want me to see them] > [I've CCed openssh-unix-dev for awareness, but set Mail-Followup-To to > just debian-devel and debian-ssh to avoid potentially spamming them > with a long discu

Re: Debian openssh option review: considering splitting out GSS-API key exchange

2024-04-01 Thread Christoph Anton Mitterer
Hey. On Tue, 2024-04-02 at 01:30 +0100, Colin Watson wrote: > All the same, I'm aware that some people now depend on having this > facility in Debian's main openssh package: I get enough occasional > bug > reports to convince me that it's still in use. Being one of those people, and having even a

Bug#1068215: ITP: python-undetected-chromedriver -- test undetected chromedrive

2024-04-01 Thread Josenilson Ferreira da Silva
Package: wnpp Severity: wishlist Owner: Josenilson Ferreira da Silva X-Debbugs-Cc: debian-devel@lists.debian.org, nilsonfsi...@hotmail.com * Package name: python-undetected-chromedriver Version : 3.5.5 Upstream Contact: UltrafunkAmsterdam * URL : https://github.com/u

Re: Debian openssh option review: considering splitting out GSS-API key exchange

2024-04-01 Thread Russ Allbery
Christoph Anton Mitterer writes: > Actually I think that most sites where I "need"/use GSSAPI... only > require the ticket for AFS, and do actually allow pubkey auth (but > right now, one doesn't have AFS access then). In past discussions of this patch, this has not been the case. One of the ad

Re: Debian openssh option review: considering splitting out GSS-API key exchange

2024-04-01 Thread Sirius
In days of yore (Tue, 02 Apr 2024), Colin Watson thus quoth: > TCP wrappers > Not used hosts.{allow,deny} for the last 17 years (since I started my current employment) so I am biased. Honest opinion is that firewall and fail2ban have pretty much obsoleted TCP wrappers. > SELinux > =

Re: Debian openssh option review: considering splitting out GSS-API key exchange

2024-04-01 Thread Howard Chu
Damien Miller wrote: > Another thing we're considering in OpenSSH is changing how we integrate > with PAM. PAM's API demands loading modules into the authenticating > process' address space, but obviously we've just been reminded that this > is risky. This was a long-standing problem with pam/nss-