On Mon, 2010-05-17 at 09:40 -0400, micah anderson wrote:
> RFC 5081 is still quite a while off from widespread adoption. When it is
> more widely adopted, we will be in a much better situation, until then
> the monkeysphere is operating as an interim translation step (keeping
> the on-the-wire prot
On Mon, 17 May 2010 08:25:50 +, Christoph Anton Mitterer
wrote:
> On Mon, 17 May 2010 00:12:56 -0400, Micah Anderson
> wrote:
> > Can you clarify what you mean by "standardised technology"? I work on
> > the monkeysphere project, and from my point of view, I'd have to
> > disagree with you,
On Mon, 17 May 2010 00:12:56 -0400, Micah Anderson
wrote:
> Can you clarify what you mean by "standardised technology"? I work on
> the monkeysphere project, and from my point of view, I'd have to
> disagree with you, but I may not understand what you mean.
What I mean was simply something that is
Christoph Anton Mitterer writes:
> On Sat, 2010-05-15 at 21:01 +0800, Paul Wise wrote:
>> You might be interested in monkeysphere
> ...and in RFC 5081
> I haven't had a detailed look on monkeyspehre so
> far, but it seemed at a first glance, that it does not use
> standardised technology, does
Christoph Anton Mitterer writes:
> On Sat, 2010-05-15 at 21:01 +0800, Paul Wise wrote:
>> You might be interested in monkeysphere
> ...and in RFC 5081
>
> I haven't had a detailed look on monkeyspehre so far, but it seemed at a
> first glance, that it does not use standardised technology, does it
On Sat, 2010-05-15 at 21:01 +0800, Paul Wise wrote:
> You might be interested in monkeysphere
...and in RFC 5081
I haven't had a detailed look on monkeyspehre so far, but it seemed at a
first glance, that it does not use standardised technology, does it?
Cheers,
Chris.
smime.p7s
Description: S/
On Sat, May 15, 2010 at 8:34 PM, Eray Aslan wrote:
> Amen. PKI is a naive design and for all intents and purposes will
> remain a pipe-dream. All security relationships that is worth anything
> is bilateral and no trusted third party is willing to accept enough risk
> to warrent full trust.
>
On 15.05.2010 08:24, Russ Allbery wrote:
> Christoph Anton Mitterer writes:
>> And personally, I really do _not_ trust some of the CAs which are
>> included/enabled per default.
>
> Having done business with several of them, I don't trust any commercial
> CA. This is a way more fundamental probl
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