Bug#886224: printer-driver-cups-pdf: Virtual pdf printer error: no output and config problem

. Rudolf Polzer

Bug#886224: printer-driver-cups-pdf: Virtual pdf printer error: no output and config problem

Package: printer-driver-cups-pdf Version: 3.0.1-4 Severity: grave Justification: renders package unusable -- System Information: Debian Release: buster/sid APT prefers stable-updates APT policy: (500, 'stable-updates'), (500, 'unstable'), (500, 'stable') Architecture: amd64 (x86_64) Foreign

Bug#334113: kernel allows loadkeys to be used by any user, allowing for local root compromise

Scripsis, quam aut quem »Krzysztof Halasa« appellare soleo: > Rudolf Polzer <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> writes: > > That's the only thing that might actually work - an inductive device wrapped > > around the keyboard cable. But I've never seen those available ready to buy.

Bug#334113: kernel allows loadkeys to be used by any user, allowing for local root compromise

Scripsis, quam aut quem »Krzysztof Halasa« appellare soleo: > Rudolf Polzer <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> writes: > > >> Ok. So they are exposed to known attacks with quite high probability. > > > > Which others? Are there other places that assume only trusted use

Bug#334113: kernel allows loadkeys to be used by any user, allowing for local root compromise

Scripsis, quam aut quem »Krzysztof Halasa« appellare soleo: > Rudolf Polzer <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> writes: > > However, pool computers like in this case are neither servers nor > > terminals. If they were terminals, we would need about 30 servers to > > handle the load

Bug#334113: kernel allows loadkeys to be used by any user, allowing for local root compromise

Scripsis, quam aut quem »Krzysztof Halasa« appellare soleo: > Rudolf Polzer <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> writes: > > That does not help against the loadkeys issue if the attacking user is still > > logged in on another virtual console. Even when tty1 is active, a user > > ownin

Bug#334113: kernel allows loadkeys to be used by any user, allowing for local root compromise

Scripsis, quam aut quem »Krzysztof Halasa« appellare soleo: > Horms <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> writes: > > >> Then log out and let root login (in a computer pool, you can usually get > >> an admin to log on as root on a console somehow). The next time he'll > >> press TAB to complete a file name, he inst

Bug#334113: linux-image-2.6.12-1-powerpc: kernel allows loadkeys to be used by any user, allowing for local root compromise

Package: linux-image-2.6.12-1-powerpc Version: 2.6.12-10 Severity: critical Tags: security Justification: root security hole The non-suid command "loadkeys" can be used by any local user having console access. It does not just apply to the current virtual console but to all virtual consoles and i

Bug#330602: irssi-text: also happens on unstable's latest irssi

Package: irssi-text Version: 0.8.9-3.1 Followup-For: Bug #330602 It also happens on unstable's latest irssi-text package and when loading ANY script - even an empty file or just typing "/script exec 1". -- System Information: Debian Release: testing/unstable APT prefers unstable APT policy: