note that it didn't eliminate the economies of scale of network operation
there is still massive investment required in things like fiber. some
amount of the current pricing could possibly be an "overbuilt" &
"over-invested" infrastructure ... some number of operations going bankrupt
... and
PKI.
"Opinion is divided on the subject" -- Captain Rum, Blackadder, "Potato".
The use with SSL is what Anne|Lynn Wheeler refer to as "certificate
manufacturing" (marvellous term). You send the CA (and lets face it,
that's
going to be Verisign) your n
"security modules" are also inside the swipe & pin-entry boxes that you see
at check-out counters.
effectively both smartcards and dongles are forms of hardware tokens
the issue would be whether a smartcard form factor might be utilized in a
copy protection scheme similar to TCPA paradigm ..
and just to make sure there is a common understanding regarding SSL cert
operation ... the browser code
1) checks that the SSL server cert can be validated by ANY public key that
is in the browser preloaded list (I haven't verified whether they totally
ignore all of the "cert" part of these prelo
small discussion of security proportional to risk:
http://www.garlic.com/~lynn/2002h.html#61 security proportional to risk
slightly related
http://www.garlic.com/~lynn/2001j.html#5 E-commerce security
http://www.garlic.com/~lynn/2001j.html#54 Does "Strong Security" Mean
Anything?
also slight
oops, finger slip that should be
http://www.garlic.com/~lynn/2001h.html#61 security proportional to risk
aka 2001h.html not 2002h.html
[EMAIL PROTECTED] on 8/10/2002 11:25 pm wrote:
small discussion of security proportional to risk:
http://www.garlic.com/~lynn/2002h.html#61 security propor
actually it is possible to build chips that generate keys as part of
manufactoring power-on/test (while still in the wafer, and the private key
never, ever exists outside of the chip) ... and be at effectively the same
trust level as any other part of the chip (i.e. hard instruction ROM).
using s
I arrived at that decision over four years ago ... TCPA possibly didn't
decide on it until two years ago. In the assurance session in the TCPA
track at spring 2001 intel developer's conference I claimed my chip was
much more KISS, more secure, and could reasonably meet the TCPA
requirements at the
At 06:12 PM 6/8/2003 -0600, Anne & Lynn Wheeler wrote:
>at a recent cybersecurity conference, somebody made the statement that (of
>the current outsider, internet exploits, approximately 1/3rd are buffer
>overflows, 1/3rd are network traffic containing virus that infects a
>ma
secret key.
--
Anne & Lynn Wheelerhttp://www.garlic.com/~lynn/
Internet trivia 20th anv http://www.garlic.com/~lynn/rfcietff.htm
iness
relationship. This negates the basic original assumptions about the
environment that PKIs are targeted at addressing.
--
Anne & Lynn Wheelerhttp://www.garlic.com/~lynn/
Internet trivia 20th anv http://www.garlic.com/~lynn/rfcietff.htm
ttle client/server startup in menlo park (later moved to mountain
view and have since been bought by AOL) and people saying that SSL didn't
exist ... misc ref from the past
http://www.garlic.com/~lynn/aadsm5.htm#asrn2
http://www.garlic.com/~lynn/aadsm5.htm#asrn3
--
Anne & Lynn Wheeler
Bill Stewart wrote:
Yup. It's the little keychain frob that gives you a string of numbers,
updated every 30 seconds or so, which stays roughly in sync with a server,
so you can use them as one-time passwords
instead of storing a password that's good for a long term.
So if the phisher cons you into
Peter Gutmann wrote:
Neither. Currently they've typically been smart-card cores glued to the
MB and accessed via I2C/SMB.
and chips that typically have had eal4+ or eal5+ evaluations. hot topic
in 2000, 2001 ... at the intel developer's forums and rsa conferences
Erwann ABALEA wrote:
> I've read your objections. Maybe I wasn't clear. What's wrong in
installing a cryptographic device by default on PC motherboards?
I work for a PKI 'vendor', and for me, software private keys is a
nonsense. How will you convice "Mr Smith" (or Mme Michu) to buy an
expensive CC
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