i'm constructing a pipenet application and
one of the biggest headaches is traffic padding.
end-to-end traffic padding is too costly, so its outta the question.
another similar problem to traffic padding is connection establishment
and tear-down. w/o significant enough traffic, you can't
really
that's a *great* summary.
the attack summary leaves me thinking, tho:
if you take the pipenet model (w/ end-to-end padding replaced by
link padding), and layer on top of that a virtual circuit that is a
composite of multiple routes through the pipenet, than are you
not resistant to traffic analy
ahhh, nevermind 'bout request for info on mix-nets i mis-read.
i thought they were something new.
Bill
On Wed, Nov 28, 2001 at 04:49:53PM -0800, Anton Stiglic wrote:
> You might be interested in this paper:
>
> http://crypto.cs.mcgill.ca/~stiglic/Papers/traffic.pdf
>
> In case you have not
