Re: dangers of TCPA/palladium

2002-08-12 Thread Mike Rosing
On Mon, 12 Aug 2002, AARG! Anonymous wrote: > I don't believe that is an accurate paraphrase of what Mike Rosing said. > He said the purpose (not effect) was to remove (not reduce) his control, > and make the platform trusted to one entity (not "for the benefit of > others"). Unless you want to

Re: dangers of TCPA/palladium

2002-08-12 Thread AARG! Anonymous
Mike Rosing wrote: > The difference is fundamental: I can change every bit of flash in my BIOS. > I can not change *anything* in the TPM. *I* control my BIOS. IF, and > only IF, I can control the TPM will I trust it to extend my trust to > others. The purpose of TCPA as spec'ed is to remove my

Re: dangers of TCPA/palladium

2002-08-12 Thread Ben Laurie
David Wagner wrote: > Ben Laurie wrote: > >>Mike Rosing wrote: >> >>>The purpose of TCPA as spec'ed is to remove my control and >>>make the platform "trusted" to one entity. That entity has the master >>>key to the TPM. >>> >>>Now, if the spec says I can install my own key into the TPM, then ye

TCPA/Palladium -- likely future implications (Re: dangers of TCPA/palladium)

2002-08-09 Thread Adam Back
On Thu, Aug 08, 2002 at 09:15:33PM -0700, Seth David Schoen wrote: > Back in the Clipper days [...] "how do we know that this > tamper-resistant chip produced by Mykotronix even implements the > Clipper spec correctly?". The picture is related but has some extra wrinkles with the TCPA/Palladium a