Ok Mr. Smarty Pants Aarg! Anonymous remailer user, you come up with such a
method. Cypherpunsk write code, yes? So write some code.
Meanwhile, this is why it can't be done:
If you have a client that sends a signature of it's binary back to it's
mommy, you can also have a rogue client that send
At 4:17 PM -0400 on 8/11/02, Sean Smith wrote:
> i guess it's appropriate that the world's deepest
> hole is next to something labelled a "trust territory" :)
Tears run down my face, I laughed so much. My cheeks hurt, I'm smiling so
hard...
Cheers,
RAH
--
-
R. A. Hettinga
T
i guess it's appropriate that the world's deepest
hole is next to something labelled a "trust territory" :)
--Sean
:)
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I'm genuinely sorry, but I couldn't resist this...
At 12:35 PM -0400 on 8/11/02, Sean Smith wrote:
> Actually, our group at Dartmouth has an NSF "Trusted Computing"
> grant to do this, using the IBM 4758 (probably with a different
> OS) as the hard
Actually, our group at Dartmouth has an NSF "Trusted Computing"
grant to do this, using the IBM 4758 (probably with a different
OS) as the hardware.
We've been calling the project "Marianas", since it involves a chain of
islands.
--Sean
>If only there were a technology in which clients could
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At 4:12 AM + on 8/11/02, David Wagner wrote:
> I hope I don't need to point out that always using the same exit
> remailer does *not* prove that he is using just one hop. One can
> hold the exit remailer fixed while varying other hops in the pa
R. A. Hettinga wrote:
>[Ob Cypherpunks: Seriously, folks. How clueful can someone be who
>clearly doesn't know how to use more than one remailer hop, as proven
>by the fact that he's always coming out of the *same* remailer all
>the time?
I hope I don't need to point out that always using the sam
There is a better way than the traditional 'client/server' approach
(distributed or not). It addresses each and every one of these issues and
its already written (by the people who invented Unix no less). And it's
Open Source (under it's own license). Even has crypto built in.
Plan 9.
http://pl
AARG!Anonymous wrote:
> I will just point out that it was not my idea, but rather that Salon
> said that the Gnutella developers were considering moving to authorized
> clients. According to Eric, those developers are "fundamentally stupid."
> According to Bram, the Gnutella developers don't und
On Sat, 10 Aug 2002, R. Hirschfeld wrote:
> Calling Lucky a liar is no more illuminating than others calling you
> an idiot.
You're confusing a classification for an argument. The argument is over.
You can read it up in the archives. If you think there's still anything
left to discuss, I've go
> Date: Fri, 9 Aug 2002 20:25:40 -0700
> From: AARG!Anonymous <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
> Right, as if my normal style has been so effective. Not one person has
> given me the least support in my efforts to explain the truth about TCPA
> and Palladium.
Hal, I think you were right on when you wrote:
On Fri, Aug 09, 2002 at 08:25:40PM -0700, AARG!Anonymous wrote:
> Several people have objected to my point about the anti-TCPA efforts of
> Lucky and others causing harm to P2P applications like Gnutella.
The point that a number of people made is that what is said in the
article is not workable:
Several people have objected to my point about the anti-TCPA efforts of
Lucky and others causing harm to P2P applications like Gnutella.
Eric Murray wrote:
> Depending on the clients to "do the right thing" is fundamentally
> stupid.
Bran Cohen agrees:
> Before claiming that the TCPA, which is f
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At 1:03 AM +0200 on 8/10/02, Some anonymous, and now apparently
innumerate, idiot in my killfile got himself forwarded to Mr. Leitl's
cream of cypherpunks list:
> They will protect us from being able
> to extend trust across the network.
As Dan Gee
From: AARG!Anonymous <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
> An article on Salon this morning (also being discussed on slashdot),
> http://www.salon.com/tech/feature/2002/08/08/gnutella_developers/print.html,
> discusses how the file-trading network Gnutella is being threatened by
> misbehaving clients. In respon
Antonomasia wrote:
> My copy of "Peer to Peer" (Oram, O'Reilly) is out on loan but I think
> Freenet and Mojo use protocols that require new users to be
> contributors before they become consumers. (Leaving aside that
> Gnutella seems doomed on scalability grounds.)
Freenet and Mojo Nation have
Anonymous wrote:
> ... the file-trading network Gnutella is being threatened by
> misbehaving clients. In response, the developers are looking at limiting
> the network to only authorized clients:
This is the wrong solution. One of the important factors in the
Internet's growth was that the IE
On Fri, 9 Aug 2002, Jay Sulzberger wrote:
> There are many solutions at the level of "technical protocols" that solve
> the projection of these problems down to the low dimensional subspace of
> "technical problems". Some of these "technical protocols" will be part of
> a full system which accom
On Fri, 9 Aug 2002, AARG!Anonymous wrote:
< ... />
> Not discussed in the article is the technical question of how this can
> possibly work. If you issue a digital certificate on some Gnutella
> client, what stops a different client, an unauthorized client, from
> pretending to be the legitimat
AARG!Anonymous wrote:
> If only there were a technology in which clients could verify and yes,
> even trust, each other remotely. Some way in which a digital certificate
> on a program could actually be verified, perhaps by some kind of remote,
> trusted hardware device. This way you could know
On Fri, Aug 09, 2002 at 10:05:15AM -0700, AARG! Anonymous wrote:
> > On Gnutella discussion sites, programmers are discussing a number of
> > technical proposals that would make access to the network contingent
> > on good behavior: If you write code that hurts Gnutella, in other
> > words, you
An article on Salon this morning (also being discussed on slashdot),
http://www.salon.com/tech/feature/2002/08/08/gnutella_developers/print.html,
discusses how the file-trading network Gnutella is being threatened by
misbehaving clients. In response, the developers are looking at limiting
the net
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