> Also, can your tool use floppies instead of USB keys?
It's a freakin' C program that works on a file - but carrying a floppy around
is so ... ordinary.
> There are problems with KGB-quality attackers recovering overwritten data
> which are probably much more serious for disks than flash rom,
>
At 10:52 PM 10/17/2002 -0700, Morlock Elloi wrote:
> >I have a working OTP system on $40 64 Mb USB flash disk on my keychain.
>
> Cute. Is it available?
$39 + tax in Fry's.
I don't mean the disk - there are lots of those.
I mean your software.
Also, can your tool use floppies instead of USB ke
At 02:04 PM 10/17/2002 +0200, Eugen Leitl wrote:
It is important to note that currently NMR bases systems only allow for
6 qubits. Only very recently we're getting practical qubits in solid state.
.
Everybody realizes that we're discussing currently completely theoretical
vulnerabilities, righ
At 12:16 PM 10/17/2002 -0700, Morlock Elloi wrote:
I have a working OTP system on $40 64 Mb USB flash disk on my keychain.
Cute. Is it available?
How do you prevent other applications from reading the file off your
USB disk, either while your application is using it or some other time?
That's
gt; Date: Thu, 17 Oct 2002 13:45:01 +0100
> To: "Email List: Cypherpunks" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
> Subject: Re: One time pads
>
> at Thursday, October 17, 2002 2:20 AM, Sam Ritchie
> <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> was seen to say:
>> ACTUALLY, quantum computing does
> Pretty much, yes. at least one "real world" OTP system assumes you will
> be using three CDRW disks; the three are xored (as you say) together,
I have a working OTP system on $40 64 Mb USB flash disk on my keychain.
The disk mounts on windoze and macs, and also contains all s/w required to
enc
At 09:20 PM 10/16/2002 -0400, Sam Ritchie wrote:
> ACTUALLY, quantum computing does more than just halve the effective key
>length. With classical computing, the resources required to attack a given
>key grow exponentially with key length. (a 128-bit key has 2^128
>possibilities, 129 has 2^129
> > David E. Weekly[SMTP:[EMAIL PROTECTED]]
> > > Which means that you should start thinking about
> > > using OTP *now* if you have secrets you'd like to keep past when an
> > > adversary of yours might have access to a quantum computer. ...
>
> OTPs won't help a bit for that problem.
> They're
AIL PROTECTED]>, "Email List: Cypherpunks"
> <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>, "'David E. Weekly'" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
> Subject: RE: One time pads
>
>> David E. Weekly[SMTP:[EMAIL PROTECTED]]
>>
>> Naive question here, but what if you made mul
> > David E. Weekly[SMTP:[EMAIL PROTECTED]]
> > As for PKI being secure for 20,000 years, it sure as hell won't be if
> > those million-qubit prototypes turn out to be worth their salt.
> > Think more like 5-10 years. In fact, just about everything except
> > for OTP solutions will be totally, tot
> David E. Weekly[SMTP:[EMAIL PROTECTED]]
>
> Naive question here, but what if you made multiple one time pads (XORing
> them all together to get your "true key") and then sent the different pads
> via different mechanisms (one via FedEx, one via secure courier, one via
> your best friend)? Unles
<[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
To: "Email List: Cypherpunks" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
Sent: Wednesday, October 16, 2002 7:52 AM
Subject: Re: One time pads
> at Wednesday, October 16, 2002 2:01 PM, Sarad AV
> <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> was seen to say:
> > Though it has a large key len
12 matches
Mail list logo
