actually it is possible to build chips that generate keys as part of
manufactoring power-on/test (while still in the wafer, and the private key
never, ever exists outside of the chip) ... and be at effectively the same
trust level as any other part of the chip (i.e. hard instruction ROM).
using s
On Tue, 13 Aug 2002, AARG!Anonymous wrote:
< ... />
>
> However the larger vision of trusted computing leverages the global
> internet and turns it into what is potentially a giant distributed
> computer. For this to work, for total strangers on the net to have
> trust in the integrity of appli
Brian LaMacchia writes:
> So the complexity isn't in how the keys get initialized on the SCP (hey, it
> could be some crazy little hobbit named Mel who runs around to every machine
> and puts them in with a magic wand). The complexity is in the keying
> infrastructure and the set of signed state
I just want to point out that, as far as Palladium is concerned, we really
don't care how the keys got onto the machine. Certain *applications* written
on top of Palladium will probably care, but all the hardware & the security
kernel really care about is making sure that secrets are only divulged
On Mon, 5 Aug 2002, Russell Nelson wrote:
> AARG!Anonymous writes:
> > So don't read too much into the fact that a bunch of anonymous postings
> > have suddenly started appearing from one particular remailer. For your
> > information, I have sent over 400 anonymous messages in the past year
>
Lucky Green wrote:
> Ray wrote:
>
>>>From: "James A. Donald" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
>>>Date: Tue, 30 Jul 2002 20:51:24 -0700
>>
>>>On 29 Jul 2002 at 15:35, AARG! Anonymous wrote:
>>>
both Palladium and TCPA deny that they are designed to restrict
what applications you run. The TPM FAQ at
>
On Saturday 03 August 2002 05:12 pm, Morlock Elloi wrote:
> UUCP will work as long as people can talk over telephone and there are
> modems available. The harder and more inconvenient it becomes to connect
> the higher average IQ of participants will be.
>
> There is hope.
>
> Just imagine the ab
On Sat, 3 Aug 2002, Morlock Elloi wrote:
> Ah, the computers. Well, those that want computers will have them.
> They may not be as cheap as today and there will not be as many of
> them, but I think that all people *I* deal with will have them, so I
> don't really care.
Sure, people will have co
The principal philosophical issue here is that the ownership of the "computer"
terminates.
So far most people owned their computers in the sense that they could make
transistors inside do anything they liked, provided they had some
easily-obtainable knowledge. Content/software vendors had their s
On Fri, 2 Aug 2002, AARG! Anonymous wrote:
> You don't have to send your data to Intel, just a master storage key.
> This key encrypts the other keys which encrypt your data. Normally this
> master key never leaves your TPM, but there is this optional feature
> where it can be backed up, encrypt
On Fri, 2 Aug 2002, AARG! Anonymous wrote:
> I have sent over 400 anonymous messages in the past year
> to cypherpunks, coderpunks, sci.crypt and the cryptography list (35
> of them on TCPA related topics).
I see you are no too worries about traffic analysis?
--
Yours,
J.A. Terranson
[EMAIL
> AARG! Anonymous[SMTP:[EMAIL PROTECTED]] writes
[...]
> Now, there is an optional function which does use the manufacturer's key,
> but it is intended only to be used rarely. That is for when you need to
> transfer your sealed data from one machine to another (either because you
> have b
On Fri, 2 Aug 2002, James A. Donald wrote:
> --
> On 2 Aug 2002 at 10:43, Trei, Peter wrote:
> > Since the position argued involves nothing which would invoke
> > the malign interest of government powers or corporate legal
> > departments, it's not that. I can only think of two reasons why
>
On Fri, 2 Aug 2002, Jay Sulzberger wrote:
> To deal with the tiny bit of truth in the claims of AARG! that some
> capabilities of DRM might be beneficial to me: Yes, of coures, there are
> few things that have zero benefits. But this is hardly relevant. A more
> relevant question here is: Can w
--
On 2 Aug 2002 at 10:43, Trei, Peter wrote:
> Since the position argued involves nothing which would invoke
> the malign interest of government powers or corporate legal
> departments, it's not that. I can only think of two reasons why
> our corrospondent may have decided to go undercover...
--
On 2 Aug 2002 at 0:36, David Wagner wrote:
> For instance, suppose that, thanks to TCPA/Palladium, Microsoft
> could design Office 2005 so that it is impossible for StarOffice
> and other clones to read files created in Office 2005. Would
> some users object?
In an anarchic society, o
On Fri, 2 Aug 2002, Wall, Kevin wrote:
> First off, let me say that in general, I am against almost everything
> that the DCMA stands for and am no fan of DRM either. But I do think that
> we will lose credibility if we can't substantiate our claims, and part of
> that means recognizing and ackno
On Mon, Jul 29, 2002 at 03:35:32PM -0700, AARG! Anonymous wrote:
> Declan McCullagh writes at
> http://zdnet.com.com/2100-1107-946890.html:
>
>"The world is moving toward closed digital rights management systems
>where you may need approval to run programs," says David Wagner,
>an ass
> Jon Callas[SMTP:[EMAIL PROTECTED]]
>
>
> On 8/1/02 1:14 PM, "Trei, Peter" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote:
>
> > So my question is: What is your reason for shielding your identity?
> > You do so at the cost of people assuming the worst about your
> > motives.
>
> Is this a tacit way to suggest tha
Jon Callas wrote:
> On 8/1/02 1:14 PM, "Trei, Peter" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote:
>
>
>>So my question is: What is your reason for shielding your identity?
>>You do so at the cost of people assuming the worst about your
>>motives.
>
>
> Is this a tacit way to suggest that the only people who nee
Mr AARG! writes...
> Eric Murray writes:
> > Yes, the spec says that it can be turned off. At that point you
> > can run anything that doesn't need any of the protected data or
> > other TCPA services. But, why would a software vendor that wants
> > the protection that TCPA provides allow his
First off, let me say that in general, I am against almost everything that
the DCMA stands for and am no fan of DRM either. But I do think that
we will lose credibility if we can't substantiate our claims, and part
of that means recognizing and acknowledging what appears to be legitimate
claims fr
Sampo Syreeni writes:
> On 2002-08-01, AARG!Anonymous uttered to [EMAIL PROTECTED],...:
>
> >It does this by taking hashes of the software before transferring
> >control to it, and storing those hashes in its internal secure
> >registers.
>
> So, is there some sort of guarantee that the transfer
On 8/1/02 1:14 PM, "Trei, Peter" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote:
> So my question is: What is your reason for shielding your identity?
> You do so at the cost of people assuming the worst about your
> motives.
Is this a tacit way to suggest that the only people who need anonymity or
pseudonymity are
James A. Donald wrote:
>According to Microsoft, the end user can turn the palladium
>hardware off, and the computer will still boot. As long as that
>is true, it is an end user option and no one can object.
Your point is taken. That said, even if you could turn off TCPA &
Palladium and run so
On Thu, Aug 01, 2002 at 02:33:43PM -0700, James A. Donald wrote:
> According to Microsoft, the end user can turn the palladium
> hardware off, and the computer will still boot. As long as that
> is true, it is an end user option and no one can object.
>
> But this is not what the content prov
On Wed, Jul 31, 2002 at 11:45:35PM -0700, AARG! Anonymous wrote:
> Peter Trei writes:
> > AARG!, our anonymous Pangloss, is strictly correct - Wagner should have
> > said "could" rather than "would".
>
> So TCPA and Palladium "could" restrict which software you could run.
TCPA (when it isn't tur
--
On 31 Jul 2002 at 23:45, AARG! Anonymous wrote:
> So TCPA and Palladium "could" restrict which software you could
> run. They aren't designed to do so, but the design could be
> changed and restrictions added.
Their design, and the institutions and software to be designed
around them, i
I'm going to respond to AARGH!, our new Sternlight, by asking two questions.
1. Why can't I control what signing keys the Fritz chip trusts?
If the point of TCPA is make it so *I* can trust that *my* computer
to run the software *I* have approved, and refuse to run something
which a virus or
On Wed, 31 Jul 2002 16:10:26 +0100, you wrote:
>
> On Wednesday, July 31, 2002, at 04:51 am, James A. Donald wrote:
> On 29 Jul 2002 at 15:35, AARG! Anonymous wrote:
> both Palladium and TCPA deny that they are designed to restrict
> what applications you run. The TPM FAQ at
> http://www.trusted
--
29 Jul 2002 at 15:35, AARG! Anonymous wrote:
> > > both Palladium and TCPA deny that they are designed to
> > > restrict what applications you run.
James A. Donald:
> > They deny that intent, but physically they have that
> > capability.
On 31 Jul 2002 at 16:10, Nicko van Someren wrote:
> AARG! Anonymous wrote:
> James Donald wrote:
>> On 29 Jul 2002 at 15:35, AARG! Anonymous wrote:
>>> both Palladium and TCPA deny that they are designed to restrict
>>> what applications you run. The TPM FAQ at
>>> http://www.trustedcomputing.org/docs/TPM_QA_071802.pdf reads
>>
>> They deny th
On Tue, 30 Jul 2002, James A. Donald wrote:
> --
>
>
> On 29 Jul 2002 at 15:35, AARG! Anonymous wrote:
> > both Palladium and TCPA deny that they are designed to restrict
> > what applications you run. The TPM FAQ at
> > http://www.trustedcomputing.org/docs/TPM_QA_071802.pdf reads
> >
>
> AARG! Anonymous[SMTP:[EMAIL PROTECTED]] writes:
> Declan McCullagh writes at
> http://zdnet.com.com/2100-1107-946890.html:
>
>"The world is moving toward closed digital rights management systems
>where you may need approval to run programs," says David Wagner,
>an assistant professo
I imagine there's a world of difference between "will" and "would."
-Declan
On Mon, Jul 29, 2002 at 03:35:32PM -0700, AARG!Anonymous wrote:
> Can you find anything in this spec that would do what David Wagner says
> above, restrict what applications you could run? Despite studying this
> spec
On Wednesday, July 31, 2002, at 04:51 am, James A. Donald wrote:
> On 29 Jul 2002 at 15:35, AARG! Anonymous wrote:
>> both Palladium and TCPA deny that they are designed to restrict
>> what applications you run. The TPM FAQ at
>> http://www.trustedcomputing.org/docs/TPM_QA_071802.pdf reads
>> ..
James Donald wrote:
> On 29 Jul 2002 at 15:35, AARG! Anonymous wrote:
> > both Palladium and TCPA deny that they are designed to restrict
> > what applications you run. The TPM FAQ at
> > http://www.trustedcomputing.org/docs/TPM_QA_071802.pdf reads
>
> They deny that intent, but physically they
--
On 29 Jul 2002 at 15:35, AARG! Anonymous wrote:
> both Palladium and TCPA deny that they are designed to restrict
> what applications you run. The TPM FAQ at
> http://www.trustedcomputing.org/docs/TPM_QA_071802.pdf reads
>
They deny that intent, but physically they have that capa
38 matches
Mail list logo
