On Fri, 13 Oct 2000, Trei, Peter wrote:
> A spammer (or your spammer's proxy) is not going to
> individually encrypt messages to thousands or
> millions of end-recipients, each with their own public
> key - the time factor makes this uneconomical, and
> the hassle factor of finding all the rec
> --
> From: Jim Choate[SMTP:[EMAIL PROTECTED]]
> Reply To: Jim Choate
> Sent: Thursday, October 12, 2000 7:09 PM
> To: [EMAIL PROTECTED]
> Subject: CDR: Re: Anonymous Remailers cpunk
>
>
> On Tue, 3 Oct 2000, Steve Furlong wrote
At 10:33 AM 10/5/00 -0400, Trei, Peter wrote:
>So when is the HavenCo remailer going up?
I'm not sure that there will be a HavenCo remailer;
the alternative is a some-customer-of-HavenCo remailer,
or a some-customer-of-a-HavenCo-hosting-customer remailer.
Thanks!
> --
>
> Ralf-Philipp Weinmann[SMTP:[EMAIL PROTECTED]] wrote:
> On Thu, 5 Oct 2000, Sampo A Syreeni wrote:
>
> > On Wed, 4 Oct 2000, David Honig wrote:
> > One variation of the original proposal would be to only allow egress to
> > addresses known to lay in a jurisdiction different fro
reasonable due
diligence to stop spammers and filter out non-contrived
unencrypted content.
Peter Trei
> --
> From: Tom Vogt[SMTP:[EMAIL PROTECTED]]
> Sent: Wednesday, October 04, 2000 4:36 AM
> To: Trei, Peter
> Cc: Multiple recipients of list
&g
Steve Furlong wrote:
> > > I would like to suggest that a remailer could eliminate nearly all it's
> > > problems by only sending out encrypted mails - that is, if after
> > > removing the encryption that was applied using it's own private
> > > key, it finds that the result is plaintext, it simpl
Jim Choate wrote:
> And just exactly what algorithm is that you're using to determine
> crypt-v-plaintext?
that's a problem. if no such algorithm exists, I suggest that - for this
specific purpose - a few heuristics would do. suggestion (version 0.1):
- dictionary of 100 most common words from e
"Trei, Peter" wrote:
> I would like to suggest that a remailer could eliminate nearly all it's
> problems by only sending out encrypted mails - that is, if after
> removing the encryption that was applied using it's own private
> key, it finds that the result is plaintext, it simply drops the mess
Steve Furlong wrote:
> Why not just read the first 20 bytes of the body? If 90% or more aren't
> printable ASCII assume the message is encrypted.
Or compressed, or a bitmap, or executable code, or coming from an EBCDIC
machine, or using a weird variant of Unicode that you weren't previously
aw
At 02:05 AM 10/4/00 -0400, Sean Roach wrote:
>At 05:22 PM 10/3/2000, Steve Furlong wrote:
>...
>>I'm assuming there's a way to tell with minimal difficulty if a message
>>is encrypted, without relying on an easily-spoofed X header line.
>>Perhaps someone who knows more about all of the many messag
At 05:22 PM 10/3/2000, Steve Furlong wrote:
...
>I'm assuming there's a way to tell with minimal difficulty if a message
>is encrypted, without relying on an easily-spoofed X header line.
>Perhaps someone who knows more about all of the many message protocols
>can weigh in here.
...
Excuse me for
At 10:26 PM 10/3/00 -0500, Jim Choate wrote:
>On Tue, 3 Oct 2000, Bill Stewart wrote:
>> Remember that we're talking about detecting spam on *outgoing* messages -
>
>No, we're not. We ARE talking bout checking incoming messages to ensure
>the body of the message is encrypted. No unencrypted traffi
On Tue, 3 Oct 2000, Steve Furlong wrote:
> Why not just read the first 20 bytes of the body? If 90% or more aren't
> printable ASCII assume the message is encrypted.
So, how come all of a sudden we're injecting algorithms that the users
must know to even access the network? What sort of regulat
Jim Choate wrote:
>
> On Tue, 3 Oct 2000, Trei, Peter wrote:
>
> > I would like to suggest that a remailer could eliminate nearly all it's
> > problems by only sending out encrypted mails - that is, if after
> > removing the encryption that was applied using it's own private
> > key, it finds th
> --
> From: Jim Choate[SMTP:[EMAIL PROTECTED]]
>
> On Tue, 3 Oct 2000, Trei, Peter wrote:
>
> > I would like to suggest that a remailer could eliminate nearly all it's
> > problems by only sending out encrypted mails - that is, if after
> > removing the encryption that was a
On Tue, 3 Oct 2000, Trei, Peter wrote:
> I would like to suggest that a remailer could eliminate nearly all it's
> problems by only sending out encrypted mails - that is, if after
> removing the encryption that was applied using it's own private
> key, it finds that the result is plaintext, it
> --
> From: R. A. Hettinga[SMTP:[EMAIL PROTECTED]]
> Sent: Tuesday, October 03, 2000 3:59 PM
> To: Trei, Peter; Multiple recipients of list
> Subject: RE: Anonymous Remailers cpunk
>
> At 10:48 AM -0400 on 10/3/00, Trei, Peter wrote:
>
&
At 10:48 AM -0400 on 10/3/00, Trei, Peter wrote:
> The only bad point:
>
> * All recipients need to have key pairs. Thus, a crypto-only remailer
> can't be a terminal remailer to mailing lists, newsgroups, or
> individuals without keypairs.
Not a problem, one would think. Just need to have a ke
> --
> From: dmolnar[SMTP:[EMAIL PROTECTED]]
> On Tue, 3 Oct 2000, Steve Furlong wrote:
>
> > cost might be a little extra electricity. No funding is necessary unless
> > the usage is so high that my ISP bitches at me. Personal time involved
> > in maintaining the system will, I
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