At 10:07 PM 8/13/04 +0200, Thomas Shaddack wrote:
>On Fri, 13 Aug 2004, Tyler Durden wrote:
>
>> And it seems to me to be a difficult task getting ahold of enough
photos
>> that would be believably worth encrypting.
>
>Homemade porn?
Your 16 year old son's homemade porn.
[google on Heidl & rape;
>On Fri, 13 Aug 2004, Thomas Shaddack wrote:
>> In the world of industrial espionage and divorce lawyers, the FedZ
aren't
>> the only threat model.
At 03:06 PM 8/13/04 -0400, Sunder wrote:
>Right, in which case GPG (or any other decent crypto system) is just
fine,
>or you wouldn't be looking for s
At 02:11 PM 8/13/04 -0400, Sunder wrote:
>If you're suspected of something really big, or you're middle eastern,
>then you need to worry about PDA forensics. Otherwise, you're just
>another geek with a case of megalomania thinking you're important
enough
>for the FedZ to give a shit about you.
Pe
At 01:46 PM 8/13/04 -0400, John Kelsey wrote:
>>From: "Major Variola (ret)" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
>>Obvious lesson: Steganography tool authors, your programs
>>should use the worm/HIV trick of changing their signatures
>>with every invocation. Much harder for the forensic
>>fedz to recognize your to
On Fri, 13 Aug 2004, Tyler Durden wrote:
> And it seems to me to be a difficult task getting ahold of enough photos
> that would be believably worth encrypting.
Homemade porn?
IL PROTECTED]" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
Subject: Re: Forensics on PDAs, notes from the field
Date: Fri, 13 Aug 2004 14:11:36 -0400 (edt)
On Fri, 13 Aug 2004, Morlock Elloi wrote:
> The purpose would be that they do not figure out that you are using some
> security program, so they
Right, in which case GPG (or any other decent crypto system) is just fine,
or you wouldn't be looking for stego'ing it inside of binaries in the
first place.
--Kaos-Keraunos-Kybernetos---
+ ^ + :"Our enemies are innovative and resourceful, and so are we
On Fri, 13 Aug 2004, Sunder wrote:
> If you're suspected of something really big, or you're middle eastern,
> then you need to worry about PDA forensics. Otherwise, you're just
> another geek with a case of megalomania thinking you're important enough
> for the FedZ to give a shit about you.
I
On Fri, 13 Aug 2004, Morlock Elloi wrote:
> The purpose would be that they do not figure out that you are using some
> security program, so they don't suspect that noise in the file or look for
> stego, right?
>
> The last time I checked the total number of PDA programs ever offered to public
> i
>From: "Major Variola (ret)" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
>Sent: Aug 11, 2004 9:21 PM
>To: "[EMAIL PROTECTED]" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
>Subject: Forensics on PDAs, notes from the field
...
>Obvious lesson: Steganography tool authors, your programs
>should u
On Fri, 13 Aug 2004, Morlock Elloi wrote:
> > A cool thing for this purpose could be a patch for gcc to produce unique
> > code every time, perhaps using some of the polymorphic methods used by
> > viruses.
>
> The purpose would be that they do not figure out that you are using some
> security
> A cool thing for this purpose could be a patch for gcc to produce unique
> code every time, perhaps using some of the polymorphic methods used by
> viruses.
The purpose would be that they do not figure out that you are using some
security program, so they don't suspect that noise in the file o
On Thu, 12 Aug 2004, Thomas Shaddack wrote:
> > The NIST CDROM also doesn't seem to include source code amongst its
> > sigs, so if you compile yourself, you may avoid their easy glance.
>
> A cool thing for this purpose could be a patch for gcc to produce unique
> code every time, perhaps usi
Quoth Thomas Shaddack <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
> Obvious lesson: Steganography tool authors, your programs
> should use the worm/HIV trick of changing their signatures
> with every invocation. Much harder for the forensic
> fedz to recognize your tools. (As suspicious, of course).
It should be enoug
On Wed, 11 Aug 2004, Major Variola (ret) wrote:
> Obvious lesson: Steganography tool authors, your programs
> should use the worm/HIV trick of changing their signatures
> with every invocation. Much harder for the forensic
> fedz to recognize your tools. (As suspicious, of course).
It should b
Saint John of Cryptome has a particularly tasty link to
http://csrc.nist.gov/publications/drafts.html#sp800-72
which describes the state of the art in PDA forensics.
There is also a link to a CDROM of secure hashes of
various "benign" and less benign programs that the
NIST knows about. Including
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