Re: Firm invites experts to punch holes in ballot software

2004-04-08 Thread R. Hirschfeld
> Date: Wed, 07 Apr 2004 15:42:47 -0400 > From: Ian Grigg <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> > > It seems to me that the requirement for after-the-vote > verification ("to prove your vote was counted") clashes > rather directly with the requirement to protect voters > from coercion ("I can't prove I voted in a p

Re: Firm invites experts to punch holes in ballot software

2004-04-08 Thread Paul Zuefeldt
dt" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> Cc: <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>; <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> Sent: Wednesday, April 07, 2004 11:01 PM Subject: Re: Firm invites experts to punch holes in ballot software > On 1081373018 seconds since the Beginning of the UNIX epoch > "Paul Zuefeldt" wro

Re: Firm invites experts to punch holes in ballot software

2004-04-08 Thread Ian Grigg
Brian McGroarty wrote: On Wed, Apr 07, 2004 at 03:42:47PM -0400, Ian Grigg wrote: It seems to me that the requirement for after-the-vote verification ("to prove your vote was counted") clashes rather directly with the requirement to protect voters from coercion ("I can't prove I voted in a particu

Re: Firm invites experts to punch holes in ballot software

2004-04-08 Thread Brian McGroarty
On Wed, Apr 07, 2004 at 03:42:47PM -0400, Ian Grigg wrote: > Trei, Peter wrote: > >Frankly, the whole online-verification step seems like an > >unneccesary complication. > > It seems to me that the requirement for after-the-vote > verification ("to prove your vote was counted") clashes > rather di

Re: Firm invites experts to punch holes in ballot software

2004-04-07 Thread Roland C. Dowdeswell
On 1081373018 seconds since the Beginning of the UNIX epoch "Paul Zuefeldt" wrote: > >Maybe the receipt should only allow the voter to check that his vote has >been counted. To get the detail you could require him to appear in person >with his receipt AND a photo ID or some such, then only allow hi

Re: Firm invites experts to punch holes in ballot software

2004-04-07 Thread Paul Zuefeldt
: <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> To: <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>; <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> Sent: Wednesday, April 07, 2004 3:14 PM Subject: RE: Firm invites experts to punch holes in ballot software > From: [EMAIL PROTECTED] > [mailto:[EMAIL PROTECTED] On Behalf Of Trei, Peter > Sent: Wednes

RE: Firm invites experts to punch holes in ballot software

2004-04-07 Thread Trei, Peter
> [EMAIL PROTECTED]:[EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote: > Peter Trei wrote: > > > > Frankly, the whole online-verification step seems like an > > unnecessary complication. > > > Except to those of us who don't trust the system. > > Implemented correctly it could be cheap and complications could be

RE: Firm invites experts to punch holes in ballot software

2004-04-07 Thread Michael_Heyman
> From: [EMAIL PROTECTED] > [mailto:[EMAIL PROTECTED] On Behalf Of Trei, Peter > Sent: Wednesday, April 07, 2004 1:17 PM > [SNIP] > > Frankly, the whole online-verification step seems like an > unnecessary complication. > Except to those of us who don't trust the system. Implemented correctly

RE: Firm invites experts to punch holes in ballot software

2004-04-07 Thread R. A. Hettinga
At 1:16 PM -0400 4/7/04, Trei, Peter wrote: >I give VoteHere kudos for releasing their source, but it doesnt >solve the e-voting problem. As far as I can figure, the only way to solve the "voting problem" is to sell your votes. Frankly, I think the "voting problem" is a boundry problem between fi

Re: Firm invites experts to punch holes in ballot software

2004-04-07 Thread Ed Gerck
The principle here is that no one should be able to prove how the voter voted, not even the voter. Yes, votes need to be verified and voters are certainly one party that can do it. However, you never want to allow the voter to take any kind of "receipt" out of the voting station if that rece

RE: Firm invites experts to punch holes in ballot software

2004-04-07 Thread Trei, Peter
> Ian Grigg[SMTP:[EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote: > > Trei, Peter wrote: > > Frankly, the whole online-verification step seems like an > > unneccesary complication. > > It seems to me that the requirement for after-the-vote > verification ("to prove your vote was counted") clashes > rather directly with