At 06:58 PM 11/5/03 -0800, James A. Donald wrote:
I want to store information deniably.
...
This would contain various items of information that one could
extract by supplyin a secret, symmetric, key. A random key would
extract a block of gibberish of random length There would be no
indication
Tarapia Tapioco wrote:
> James A. Donald ([EMAIL PROTECTED]) wrote on 2003-11-06:
>> I want fully deniable information storage -- information
>> theoretic deniable, not merely steganographic deniable, for
>> stenography can never be wholly secure.
Information-theoretic deniability is impossible (
On Wed, Nov 05, 2003 at 06:58:58PM -0800, James A. Donald wrote:
> --
> I want fully deniable information storage -- information
> theoretic deniable, not merely steganographic deniable, for
> stenography can never be wholly secure.
>
> So I would have a fixed sized block of data containi
James A. Donald ([EMAIL PROTECTED]) wrote on 2003-11-06:
> I want fully deniable information storage -- information
> theoretic deniable, not merely steganographic deniable, for
> stenography can never be wholly secure.
So, StegFS is not "deniable enough"? I'm not much of a theory buff,
but it
hi,
Keep
K =Original Key
P =Original Plain Text
C =Original cipher text
D=Dummy plain text
C'=Dummy cipher text
K'=Dummy key
use a symmetric key encryption algorithm with a secret
key 'k' over plain text 'P' to obtain cipher text 'C'
Then we find
k'= C (xor) D
Preferably D is atleast as long
On Wed, Nov 05, 2003 at 06:58:58PM -0800, James A. Donald wrote:
> So one could store one's password list under one key, and the
> location of the dead bodies under another key, and absent that key,
> there would be no evidence that they key, or information hidden under
> that key, existed.
>
>
I want to store information deniably.
So there would be a fixed sized block of data, say one megabyte,
increasing by multiples of 8 as needed.
This would contain various items of information that one could
extract by supplyin a secret, symmetric, key. A random key would
extract a block of gi
--
I want fully deniable information storage -- information
theoretic deniable, not merely steganographic deniable, for
stenography can never be wholly secure.
So I would have a fixed sized block of data containing a
variable number of smaller secret chunks of data. A random key
would