Re: Private Homes may be taken for public good

On Thu, 23 Jun 2005, Tyler Durden wrote: > How do you take out a bulldozer? Anti-tank mine?

Re: Stash Burn?

On Mon, 2 May 2005, Tyler Durden wrote: > yes, this reminded me of another brilliant idea. > > Why don't some cars have a little tiny furnace for stash destruction? > > If you've got an on-board stash and some Alabama hillbilly with a badge pulls > you over, you just hit the button and have you'

Re: Your epapers, please?

On Thu, 31 Mar 2005, Major Variola (ret) wrote: > At 10:08 PM 3/31/05 +0200, Eugen Leitl wrote: > > government plan to insert remotely readable chips in American > > passports, calling the chips [2]homing devices for high-tech > > muggers, > > So the market for faraday-cages for your passpo

Re: SHA1 broken?

FPGAs will have very hard time to be as fast as "dedicated" CPUs, frequency-wise. The FPGA structures have to be too generic, and are much bigger than specialized structures of the CPUs, so they have higher capacity, which limits the maximum achievable switching frequency. The length of the wi

RE: Team Building?? WIMPS!!

On Thu, 10 Feb 2005, Tyler Durden wrote: > Well, I didn't say it would be easy. We'd definitely need to split up into > teams...one to handle the alarm systems, Teamwork is essential here. Maybe attract a lightning with a rocket on a wire[1], the induced current will do the job with the sensors

Re: campus network admins

On Thu, 4 Nov 2004 [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote: > > I recently violated the network user agreement (they packet-sniffed and > got the username/password for my FTP server and didn't like what I was > sharing with myself) and was informed by the admin that I am now 'under > observation' and that they "

Re: Airport insanity

On Tue, 19 Oct 2004, James A. Donald wrote: > The US government should expose and condemn these objectionable > practices, subvert moderately objectionable regimes, and > annihilate more objectionable regimes. The pentagon should > deprive moderately objectionable regimes of economic resources

Re: Airport insanity

On Mon, 18 Oct 2004, James A. Donald wrote: > Sadre protected himself with Iraqi women and young children as > human shields, showing that he expected the Pentagon to show > more concern for Iraqi lives than he did. Pentagon protects their people by distance - being it by bombing from high alt

RE: Airport insanity

On Mon, 18 Oct 2004, James A. Donald wrote: > Thomas Shaddack wrote: > > It isn't a problem for you until it happens to you. Who knows > > when being interested in anon e-cash will become a ground to > > blacklist *you*. > > I know when it will hap

RE: Airport insanity

On Mon, 18 Oct 2004, James A. Donald wrote: > > a. The probability ratios don't work out so that the > > overwhelming majority of people you throw off planes are > > innocent. > > Provided the number of people you throw off planes is rather > small, I don't see the problem. It isn't a proble

Re: Airport insanity

On Sun, 17 Oct 2004, James A. Donald wrote: > > -- > James A. Donald: > > > > > If you really look like the shoe bomber, then you > > > > > should have to drive, or use public transport. > > Thomas Shaddack > > Ever tried to drive to Euro

Re: Airport insanity

On Sat, 16 Oct 2004, James A. Donald wrote: > > > If you really look like the shoe bomber, then you should have to > > > drive, or use public transport. Ever tried to drive to Europe? Or to Hawaii? Why airplanes don't count as a form of public transport? > > So by that rationale, every Arab sho

Re: RFID Driver's licenses for VA

On Thu, 7 Oct 2004, Sunder wrote: > So the cops and RFID h4x0rZ can know your true name from a distance. and > since RFID tags, are what, $0.05 each, the terrorists and ID > counterfitters will be able to make fake ones too... Whee! Given the power requirements for doing anything more than dum

Re: Foreign Travelers Face Fingerprints and Jet Lag

On Sun, 3 Oct 2004, J.A. Terranson wrote: > (1) There are also a number of non-rebar+concrete "walls" in place to keep > US citizens from leaving; Please elaborate?

Re: Geopolitical Darwin Awards

On Sun, 19 Sep 2004, James A. Donald wrote: > I don't recall the American revolutionaries herding children > before them to clear minefields, nor surrounding themselves > with children as human shields. Using children to clear minefields has its logic. They are often not heavy enough to trigger

Re: potential new IETF WG on anonymous IPSec

On Thu, 16 Sep 2004, Major Variola (ret) wrote: > At 02:17 PM 9/16/04 -0700, Joe Touch wrote: > >Except that certs need to be signed by authorities that are trusted. > > Name one. You don't have to sign the certs. Use self-signed ones, then publish a GPG signature of your certificate in a known

Re: Geopolitical Darwin Awards

On Tue, 14 Sep 2004, Major Variola (ret) wrote: > How about Iran stating that they're messing with UF6, when Israel[1] is > a known pre-emptive bomber of Facilities to the East? That's pretty > much tickling the dragon. Maybe they are playing a different game. They couldn't use the eventually

Re: whatever is necessary

On Fri, 3 Sep 2004, Major Variola (ret) wrote: > Just heard Clinton's going in the hospital to get a heart. Clinton was a victim of an assassination attempt by junk food. McQaeda, the cardiovascular terrorist organization endangering the Developed World and deemed responsible for millions live

Re: gmail as a gigabyte of an external filesystem

On Sun, 29 Aug 2004, Thomas Shaddack wrote: > Question for the crowd: How difficult it would be to write a suitable > crypto engine as a plug-in module for FUSE itself? Then we could have > support for encrypted files on any filesystem accessible through FUSE. > > ---

Suggestion

I hereby suggest to postpone the flamewars for the winter, when the weather brings the need of some spare waste heat. I thought we're above name-calling here. But perhaps it was just a quiet period and the current situation will rectify on its own in couple days, as it usually does. Besides,

Re: yes, they look for stego, as a "Hacker Tool"

On Fri, 13 Aug 2004, Major Variola (ret) wrote: > Even if you map a particular hash into one of a million known-benign > values, which takes work, there are multiple orthagonal hash algorithms > included on the NIST CD. (Eg good luck finding values that collide in > MD5 & SHA-1 & SHA-256 simulta

Re: yes, they look for stego, as a "Hacker Tool"

On Sat, 14 Aug 2004, Thomas Shaddack wrote: > > polymorphic or encrypted, but then they would be in the "unknown" > > category, along with user-created files. And programs :-) To be > > manually inspected by a forensic dude. > > Run a tool for signature c

Re: yes, they look for stego, as a "Hacker Tool"

On Fri, 13 Aug 2004, Major Variola (ret) wrote: > Any jpg which looks like noise will be of interest. And any stego > program will make them look at your images (etc) more closely :-) > > Most of the programs they've hashed is so the forensic pigs can discount > them. But they would find know

Re: Forensics on PDAs, notes from the field

On Fri, 13 Aug 2004, Tyler Durden wrote: > And it seems to me to be a difficult task getting ahold of enough photos > that would be believably worth encrypting. Homemade porn?

Re: Forensics on PDAs, notes from the field

On Fri, 13 Aug 2004, Sunder wrote: > If you're suspected of something really big, or you're middle eastern, > then you need to worry about PDA forensics. Otherwise, you're just > another geek with a case of megalomania thinking you're important enough > for the FedZ to give a shit about you. I

Re: Forensics on PDAs, notes from the field

On Fri, 13 Aug 2004, Morlock Elloi wrote: > > A cool thing for this purpose could be a patch for gcc to produce unique > > code every time, perhaps using some of the polymorphic methods used by > > viruses. > > The purpose would be that they do not figure out that you are using some > security

Re: Forensics on PDAs, notes from the field

On Thu, 12 Aug 2004, Thomas Shaddack wrote: > > The NIST CDROM also doesn't seem to include source code amongst its > > sigs, so if you compile yourself, you may avoid their easy glance. > > A cool thing for this purpose could be a patch for gcc to produce unique >

Re: Forensics on PDAs, notes from the field

On Wed, 11 Aug 2004, Major Variola (ret) wrote: > Obvious lesson: Steganography tool authors, your programs > should use the worm/HIV trick of changing their signatures > with every invocation. Much harder for the forensic > fedz to recognize your tools. (As suspicious, of course). It should b

Re: Michael Moore in Cambridge (download speech)

On Tue, 10 Aug 2004, Pete Capelli wrote: > Being still currently undecided myself (although living in one of the > 32 or so 'pre-ordained' states) I found this speech to be "most > cynical, opportunistic, divisive, and un-American" ones I've listend > to in awhile. Define "un-American", please?

Re: On what the NSA does with its tech

On Wed, 4 Aug 2004, Hal Finney wrote: > As you can see, breaking 128 bit keys is certainly not a task which is > so impossible that it would fail even if every atom were a computer. > If we really needed to do it, it's not outside the realm of possibility > that it could be accomplished within 50

Terrorists wear neckties.

I don't worry about car bombs nor hijacked airplanes. I have better chance of being killed in a standardized ISO-compliant CE-marked car crash than getting into mere visual contact with a bomb blast. On the other side, the streams of bureaucrap the Hellhole also known as Brussels spews every d

Re: X-Cypher, SIP VoIP, stupid propriatory crapola

On Wed, 28 Jul 2004, Dave Howe wrote: > Particularly disgusted by the last paragraph > | With encryption comes the problem of either managing public/private > | keys, which must be kept secret, or the annoyance of transmitting a > | secure key to a remote party over other secure methods. X-Ci

Low-cost thermal/multispectral imaging via mechanical slow-scan TV

Thermal imaging is a very powerful and very cool technology with many many applications in both security and engineering. However, the main obstacle for its wider usage in civilian sector is very high cost of the microbolometer array sensors. However, there are affordably cheap remote thermome

Cheap TDR for fibers?

The laser diodes used in eg. CD players have a feedback photodiode, sensing the laser's optical output. If the lasers used for optical fibers have similar mechanism too, and if the diode is sensitive to the light coming to it not only from the chip but also from the fiber itself, and can react

Re: Secure telephones

On Sat, 17 Jul 2004, Steve Schear wrote: > How about building a secure cell phone using GnuRadio as a core? That way you > have maximum control afforded by the protocols. Several reasons valid at this moment (though I suppose (and hope) the situation will improve in next couple years). There i

Re: Secure telephones

On Sun, 18 Jul 2004, Bill Stewart wrote: > If you're trying to build a usable cellphone, > you've got much more stringent design criteria than a deskphone. I am painfully aware of it. > You've got packaging requirements that force you into > serious industrial design if you want something pocke

Secure telephones

Pondering construction of a secure telephone. (Or at least a cellphone in general. The user interfaces and features available on virtually all the mass-market phones suck, to put it very very mildly, not even mentioning that there's no access to their firmware (so no chance of audit), poor or

Re: FIPS chassis/linux security engineer?

On Sat, 17 Jul 2004, Eric Murray wrote: > For a seperate project, does anyone know of a small linux-ready/able > box with ethernet? > Gumstix looks cool but I need hardwire networking. Soekris, . PXA255, Are there more

Re: vacuum-safe laptops ?

On Fri, 16 Jul 2004, Major Variola (ret) wrote: > >Does anyone *know* (first or second hand, I can speculate myself) which > laptops, if any, can safely go to zero air pressure (dropping from 1 atm > to 0 in, say, 1 minute.) > > Sorry so late ---but your can-shaped capacitors might not handle the

Re: Mexico Atty. General gets microchipped (fwd)

On Tue, 13 Jul 2004, J.A. Terranson wrote: > Forwarded for amusement > http://www.cnn.com/2004/WORLD/americas/07/13/mexico.chip.reut/index.html > Mexico attorney general gets microchip implant Politicians getting RFIDs. Will it spur a new generation of smart roadside bombs, landmines, and perh

Re: Bumazhkas

On Tue, 13 Jul 2004, Harmon Seaver wrote: > > Bumazhkas? I thought I was pretty familiar with most weapons of the world, > > but not Bumazhkas. What calibre are they? I've always liked those CZ Model 52 > > pistols and Model 32 subguns in .30Mauser. Loaded hot with a teflon coated > > bullet

Re: USA PATRIOT Act Survives Amendment Attempt

On Sat, 10 Jul 2004 [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote: > >But we have a psychological mechanism here; many people tend to be > >"tough" when not under direct threat. Then they implement the > >mechanism. Then years flow by. Then the prosecutors come. But by then > >it is too late to cooperate. They are

Re: USA PATRIOT Act Survives Amendment Attempt

On Fri, 9 Jul 2004, Steve Schear wrote: > This may best be accomplished by placing the data offshore and empowering the > db operators with some non-repudiatable right of disclosure (especially under > duress of a warrant). This may be impractical in some cases. > Some months back I discussed a

Re: USA PATRIOT Act Survives Amendment Attempt (fwd from brian-slashdotnews@hyperreal.org)

On Fri, 9 Jul 2004, Steve Schear wrote: > Quite a few book stores (including the local Half-Priced Books) now keep no > records not required and some do not even automate and encourage their patron > to pay cash. In California book sellers to such used/remaindered stores must > identify themselv

Re: [IP] Hi-tech rays to aid terror fight

On Thu, 8 Jul 2004, Major Variola (ret) wrote: > 5. One could call terahertz "hard RF" in same way that hard x-rays > bleed into soft gammas. But calling anything "hard" implies danger, > and we mustn't scare the proles. Perhaps soft IR is better. Technically, it's closer to soft IR. If I rem

Querying SSL/TLS capabilities of SMTP servers

I cobbled up together a small bash shell script that does this. It lists the MX records for a domain, and then tries to connect to each of them, issue an EHLO command, disconnect, then list the output of the server, alerting if the server supports STARTTLS. It should be easy to further query t

Re: Privacy laws and social engineering

On Tue, 6 Jul 2004, Major Variola (ret) wrote: > So, which is better, Schneier's books or Mitnick's? I suspect > the former, but am curious what the community opinion is? You may like one side of the coin more than the other one, but they still belong to the same flat, dirty, formerly shiny a

Re: Email tapping by ISPs, forwarder addresses, and crypto proxies

On Tue, 6 Jul 2004, Hal Finney wrote: > > There are various email forwarding services, which are nothing more than a > > SMTP server with pairs of [EMAIL PROTECTED] -- > > [EMAIL PROTECTED] > > Right, mostly for use as disposable email addresses. I've used > spamgourmet to good effect, myself

Email tapping by ISPs, forwarder addresses, and crypto proxies

Reading some news about the email wiretapping by ISPs, and getting an idea. There are various email forwarding services, which are nothing more than a SMTP server with pairs of [EMAIL PROTECTED] -- [EMAIL PROTECTED] Messages in storage have much lower judicial protection than messages in tra

Re: China about to begin realtime censoring SMS messages

On Sat, 3 Jul 2004, Major Variola (ret) wrote: > At 06:25 PM 7/3/04 +0200, Thomas Shaddack wrote: > >automatically send SMS messages to a list of numbers. The government > >already keeps statistics on number of messages sent at time period from > >a single number, and aler

Re: Tyler's Education

On Sat, 3 Jul 2004, Major Variola (ret) wrote: > And digital edges are sharp, in the Ghz even when the "clock" is in the > Mhz. How much do the "spread spectrum clock" feature on the modern motherboards help here? > And boxes need ventilation slots. Not necessarily. There are other ways of he

Unregistered

Found this on the Net couple years ago. Then it vanished. In the light of the INDUCE Act, or whatever it's called now, it is becoming quite relevant... Question for the crowd: In the setting described below, how could one perform a successful long-term disobedience? Original URL: www.keshet.

Re: Silicon carbide in the machine

On Mon, 28 Jun 2004, Major Variola (ret) wrote: > >A GPS receiver doesn't broadcast its location. GPS works purely by > >analyzing the signals received from satellites. This is probably a > >design goal for military use, as well as a consequence of power > >requirements. > > Yes. But a jamme

Re: For Liars and Loafers, Cellphones Offer an Alibi

On Sun, 27 Jun 2004, J.A. Terranson wrote: > > > Even if this is doable, it is out of reach of Jane Citizen. > > > > If a J. Random Hacker with the necessary capabilities is within her reach, > > the countermeasure is available to her regardless of her own tech skills. > > You assume that Jane's

Re: For Liars and Loafers, Cellphones Offer an Alibi

> At 12:41 AM 6/27/04 -0500, J.A. Terranson wrote: > >On Sat, 26 Jun 2004, Major Variola (ret) wrote: > > > >> At 11:56 PM 6/26/04 -0500, J.A. Terranson wrote: > >> > > >> >Hrmmm... Cell Phone. TEMPEST Case. > >> > > >> >What's wrong with this picture??? > >> > >> 1. You can't receive calls. Onl

Re: For Liars and Loafers, Cellphones Offer an Alibi

On Sun, 27 Jun 2004, Riad S. Wahby wrote: > "J.A. Terranson" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote: > > Interestingly, some [early] models had external antenna jacks built in to > > them. > > Many still have test jacks on them. Both my old Samsung A500 and my > current Sanyo SCP-8100 have a connector (eithe

Re: For Liars and Loafers, Cellphones Offer an Alibi

On Sun, 27 Jun 2004, Eugen Leitl wrote: > Triangulation by signal strength is one thing, triangulation by relativistic > ToF (time of flight) -- while still not present in consumer gadgets -- is far > more difficult to fool. Especially if it's tied into the protocol, that > you're getting positio

Re: For Liars and Loafers, Cellphones Offer an Alibi

On Sat, 26 Jun 2004, J.A. Terranson wrote: > Yes, I suppose that the more technical amongst us could selctively jam > only the one signal, however, cellular phones are mighty low power > devices, and I would not hazard a guess as to whether it would be possible > not to overpower the wanted signa

Re: For Liars and Loafers, Cellphones Offer an Alibi

On Sat, 26 Jun 2004, Major Variola (ret) wrote: > I'm fully aware the pigs track you unless the battery is removed or you > have a TEMPEST case. I'm suggesting that regular citizens will have > access to that, if (in my cluelessness) they don't already. If the phone is shielded, it can't transm

Re: For Liars and Loafers, Cellphones Offer an Alibi

On Sat, 26 Jun 2004, J.A. Terranson wrote: > > a mikropower jammer, > > Only if you are willing to forego the phone as well, in which case, just > remove the battery pack :-) I am assuming here that the phone has a dual receiver, one of the GPS signal and one of the cellular service itself. As b

Re: For Liars and Loafers, Cellphones Offer an Alibi

On Sat, 26 Jun 2004, J.A. Terranson wrote: > > Eventually the cellphones will be able to tell another phone approx > > where they are. Remember the 911-locator fascism? > > I hate to break the news to you Major, but GPS enabled phones cannot be > instructed to turn off the GPS feature for law en

Re: [osint] Assassination Plans Found On Internet

On Mon, 14 Jun 2004, R. A. Hettinga wrote: > I can't stop laughing. *This* is why the west will win. > They post their plans, in the clear. It may be also a very cheap method of "attack". Don't spend any money on material nor people; just send out an attack documentation in the clear and watch t

RE: [irtheory] War ain't beanbag. Irony is conserved.

> >Exactly at which point does a war (any war) stop being defensive > >because according to the history books the US has never fought an > >aggressive war. > > I prefer to think about the McDonald's paradox: No country that has a > McDonald's has attacked another. :-). Then either the paradox is

Re: Satellite eavesdropping of 802.11b traffic

On Thu, 27 May 2004, Roy M. Silvernail wrote: > >It seems to me that you'd need a pretty big dish in orbit to get that kind > >of resolution. > > > >The Keyholes(?) are for microwaves, right? > > > Where better to put the big dish than in orbit? Clarke-belt birds are > separated by what, 10 km?

Re: welcoming computer viruses

On Fri, 21 May 2004, Tyler Durden wrote: > Imagine I'm working for a large Fortune 100 Company. Now imagine I hear > about a sasser-like worm that will install atself and spread, BUT "it has > been confirmed" that the worm will proceed to vomit spam at X for a period > of 48 hours. Depend on X (e

RE: EU seeks quantum cryptography response to Echelon

On Tue, 18 May 2004, Tyler Durden wrote: > "Monyk believes there will be a global market of several million users once > a workable solution has been developed. A political decision will have to > be taken as to who those users will be in order to prevent terrorists and > criminals from taking ad

Diffie-Hellman question

I have a standard implementation of OpenSSL, with Diffie-Hellman prime in the SSL certificate. The DH cipher suite is enabled. Is it safe to keep one prime there forever, or should I rather periodically regenerate it? Why? If yes, what's some sane period to do so: day, week, month? If the advers

Re: We're jamming, we're jamming, we hope you like jammin too

> RFID jamming should be very easy and a quite amusing DoS attack > on commercial targets. Easy because its not frequency hopping, low > power, and relatively low frequency. Particularly cute would be > transmitting sex-toy codes intermittently. Considering the transmitting powers of the tags,

Re: Can Skype be wiretapped by the authorities? (fwd from em@em.no-ip.com)

ements are substantial (all the traffic flows through them): see > e.g. John Walker's analysis of the reasons that led him to abandon > SpeakFreely at http://www.fourmilab.ch/speakfree/ . > > Thomas Shaddack suggested to leverage on Jabber, but: > > 1. Jabber uses TCP as trans

Re: Fact checking

On Wed, 28 Apr 2004, Tim Benham wrote: > > I bet people would start voting after that. > If they don't, offer them two vials of crack! It's already being done; it's called "political promises". The candidates are usually pretty high on that stuff. What won't hurt could be making them liable for

Infrared flash?

For bright flashes of visible light, xenon flash tubes are the choice. But when I want a really bright flash on about 800-900 nm, what approach is the best? One application is a security camera taking a snapshot without alerting the adversary with a flash. (Could be a good system against black-b

Re: Mask secures personal displays

> Yamamoto is also optimistic that this technique will find commercial > applications. "Display of secret information on PDA and computer screens > are practical applications," he explained. "Other business applications > include: securing the screen of a terminal at a bank; an operator screen >

Re: cop-proof disk drives

On Sat, 24 Apr 2004, Bill Stewart wrote: > That's really overkill. Computers these days have enough > horsepower to run file system encryption in the CPU. That's true, but it's possible to get access to the key in memory. Once the machine is compromised, the keys are leaked. It's true that whe

Re: [IP] One Internet provider's view of FBI's CALEA wiretap push

On Fri, 23 Apr 2004, A.Melon wrote: > Are there any publicly available documents that detail interrogation > protocols and what brainwave patterns and bloodflow look like during truth > telling and lying? Preferably something that gets into how to consciously > alter brainwave patterns and blood

Re: [IP] One Internet provider's view of FBI's CALEA wiretap push

On Fri, 23 Apr 2004, Major Variola (ret) wrote: > >> filesystems (etc) with layers of deniable stego. > >Are there any decent implementations for Linux/BSD/NT? > > I haven't looked recently. One property that such a FS or app should > have is that it is useful for something *else* besides stego

Re: [IP] One Internet provider's view of FBI's CALEA wiretap push

On Fri, 23 Apr 2004, John Kelsey wrote: > The obvious problem with multiple levels of passwords and data is: When > does the guy with the rubber hose stop beating passwords out of you? > After he gets one? Yeah, that's plausible, if he's convinced there's > only one. But once he's seen a second

Re: [IP] One Internet provider's view of FBI's CALEA wiretap push

On Thu, 22 Apr 2004, Major Variola (ret) wrote: > >However, it's not entirely reliable. At some point, the suspect tells > >you what you want to hear, whether or not it is the truth, just so you > >leave him alone. It can even happen that the suspect convinces himself > >that what he really did w

Re: [IP] One Internet provider's view of FBI's CALEA wiretap push

On Thu, 22 Apr 2004, Major Variola (ret) wrote: > At 12:09 PM 4/22/04 +0200, Eugen Leitl wrote: > > > >Are you truly expecting a worldwide ban on encryption? How do you prove > >somebody is using encryption on a steganographic channel? > > Torture, of the sender, receiver, or their families, has

Behavior pattern recognition

http://us.cnn.com/2004/TRAVEL/04/16/airline.behavior.ap/ http://www.usatoday.com/travel/news/2004-04-16-behaviorscan_x.htm http://news.bostonherald.com/national/view.bg?articleid=1780 Carnival Booth, anyone? Besides, it's matter of time until the checklists "leak" and the "adversaries" adjust th

Idea: Offshore gambling as gateway between real and electronic money

Adoption of anonymous e-money is to great degree hindered by the lack of infrastructure to convert this currency to/from "meatspace" money. However, there is possible a method, using offshore gambling companies. There may be a special kind of "gamble", that looks from the "outside" like regular b

Anonymity vs reputation question

Thinking about something, I found an interesting problem. It is possible to set up a reputation-based system with nyms, where every nym is an identity with attached reputation. The problem is, a nym that exists for a long time can get its anonymity partially or fully compromised. Abandonment of t

Steve Brinich: The Criminal

Dug this from my old archives, after finding out it vanished from the Net. Decade-old, but more truthful than before. May it provide some inspiration. -- Title: The Criminal Lyrics by: Steve Brinich Tune: The Idiot (Stan Rogers) Date: 19

RE: Sttop Spreading Hatred

On Sun, 28 Mar 2004, Tyler Durden wrote: > Another thing that seems to bind us (and again "bind" is probably a poor > choice of words) is an extreme tolerance to opinions very different from > that of any one subscriber. U... like "...and in a flame war bind them? /me hides

Anonymity of prepaid phone chip-cards

Local cops busted somebody who threatened to derail some trains if he won't get paid. That's a common news. Less common, and more important, detail that the TV news reported confirms the suspicion I had from the beginning of deployment of the prepaid cards technology for local payphones. Each pr

Re: chatroom conversation turing computable

On Thu, 18 Mar 2004, Major Variola (ret.) wrote: > http://news.scotsman.com/scitech.cfm?id=312492004 Wondering how it will cope with phonetic English, so often used online. Kids with 100% correct English are not exactly common these days. Will its own perfection become its weakness?

Re: Saving Opportunistic Encryption

On Wed, 17 Mar 2004, Eugen Leitl wrote: > On Tue, Mar 16, 2004 at 03:29:42PM +0800, Sandy Harris wrote: > > > >So, the apparent solution for me seems to be the approach that the SPAM > > >blacklists used - publish information in a subspace of the forward DNS > > >space instead of using the authori

Idea: opportunistic TCP-level crypto

There is plenty of space available in the form of (normally unused) payload of TCP SYN, SYN/ACK, and ACK packets. Could they be used to announce the intention/capabilities for an encrypted connection, eventually serve for authenticating the connection? This way there would be virtually no overhea

Re: [Users] Announce: FreeS/WAN Project Ending

:) > And sure, you use FreeS/WAN, and a company I used to work for used it > too. There are employees of many other companies who post to the > FreeS/WAN lists. But that's hardly representative of the majority of > companies. "Majority" as in number of employees, or as in count? Do mom-and-p

Re: Humorous Airport DoS (from cryptogram)

> Or if I sprayed the seats in the airports lounge or restaurant, the > bomb-sniffing dogs would become butt-sniffing dogs, to the major > embarrassment of security. This last, while humorous, would go a long > way toward discrediting the security force. Chemicals that aren't detected themselves

FCC vs decentralization

Wondering a little. FCC recently mandated fees for Internet radio "broadcasters", based on the number of listeners. However, there are emergent technologies for P2P broadcasting, where some of the clients act as broadcasters themselves, "retranslating" the stream. This way it may not be technical

Re: WiFi Repeater?

I can't be considered an expert on this technology, so probably there is another, much simpler solution. The first idea (and so far the only one) I got is to use a pair of wireless access points, eg, DWL-900AP+ ones (the only ones I have experience with so far); if I'd have a pair of these, I'd c

Re: Quantum Loop Gravity Be For Whitey

On Thu, 1 Jan 2004, Tim May wrote: > A few moments of thought will show the connection between replicators > and general assemblers. A general assembler can make another general > assembler, hence all general assemblers are replicators. And in fact > this is necessary to make mechanosynthesis nan

Re: Vengeance Libertarianism

On Tue, 30 Dec 2003, Tim May wrote: > Vengeance libertarianism is the rational kind. It will result in 20-40 > million of the leeches, the bums, the minority grifters, the so-called > aggrieved, the winos, the addicts, all being sent up the chimneys. It will result in couple dozen (at most) venge

Re: unsub from lne

> An unsubscribe command sent to the lne.com administrivia address was > rejected as spam? > > I find that hard to believe, as that is one of the normal commands, > ones which the lne regular message lists. It's fairly possible the mail was rejected even before the SMTP negotiation itself; it did

Re: unsub from lne

Another alternative could be a couple lines of PHP or perl, unsubscribing via a web form. On related note, what's a good node to migrate to? PS: Thanks, Eric. It was a good node. On Mon, 29 Dec 2003, Harmon Seaver wrote: >Hmm, maybe Eric needs to undo his spam filter so people can unsub

Re: Don't worry...it's just one of Saddam's doubles

On Sun, 14 Dec 2003, Tim May wrote: > How boring. The DNA confirmation was reported on all of the puppet news > organizations here. It made it to the evening news. Which I missed (my info was from the news at noon), and caught only this morning in the evening news rerun. > The Germans and Easter

Idea: Simplified TEMPEST-shielded unit (speculative proposal)

TEMPEST shielding is fairly esoteric (at least for non-EM-specialists) field. But potentially could be made easier by simplifying the problem. If we won't want to shield the user interface (eg. we want just a cryptographic processor), we may put the device into a solid metal case without holes, ba

Patriot Ants (was: Re: Zombie Patriots and other musings)

On Sat, 13 Dec 2003, John Kelsey wrote: > Of course, there's a more fundamental problem with surrendering to the lone > warriors. Imagine that there's such a wave of pro-life terrorism that we > finally agree to ban abortion. You're a fanatically committed pro-choice > activist. What's your nex

Re: Anti-globalization

On Fri, 12 Dec 2003, James A. Donald wrote: > Obvious solution. Require all mandatory uglification of all > foreign scenery -- for example video editing to insert some > smokestacks. Just pay them to decorate their unfairly lovely landscapes with king-sized billboards. *Poof!* Beauty gone, prob

Re: Idea: Using GPG signatures for SSL certificates

> Thomas Shadduck writes: - cute :) Though I am more often called Shaddup. > > The problem that makes me feel uneasy about SSL is the vulnerability of > > the certification authorities when they get compromised, everything > > they signed gets compromised too. > > Technically th

  1   2   3   >