Crypto++ 4.0 has just been released. You can find download instructions
for Crypto++ on its home page at http://www.cryptopp.com.
Updated benchmarks are available at
http://www.weidai.com/benchmarks.html.
Crypto++ is a free C++ class library of cryptographic schemes. Changes
made in version 4.0
On Wed, Dec 06, 2000 at 08:32:54AM -0200, [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:
> I've asked previously, but I hope it won't hurt asking
> again. Has anyone compared the relative speeds of
> (efficient implementations of) the SHA-2 functions and
> Rijndael? Are there any figures available?
There is a speed co
On Sat, Dec 26, 1998 at 05:45:26PM -0500, Austin Hill wrote:
> Zero-Knowledge has put up a draft of a whitepaper explaining the technical
> details of it's coming Freedom Internet Privacy system.
>
> The paper discusses the technical details of our AnonymousIP protocol and
> our Pseudonymous E-ma
On Sun, Jan 03, 1999 at 07:48:11PM +, William Allen Simpson wrote:
> This generates "safe" primes, rather than "strong" primes.
>
> I meant to put this in a RFC someday, but it would be nice to know
> whether I'd done something wrong first Any problems/suggestions?
This code is kind of
On Mon, Jan 11, 1999 at 04:29:42PM +1000, Eric Young wrote:
> The main negative for EDH is that it is very CPU expensive and this is not
> a good thing to do to a web server. An approximate rule of thumb is that
> the CPU load for the same size key (512 RSA vs 512 EDH/RSA) is that the
> EDH is 9
On Tue, Jan 12, 1999 at 03:52:16PM -0500, P. J. Ponder wrote:
> Wei Dai's recently announced crypto library has some notes in it about
> licenses and mentions in the documentation that there may be patent
> restrictions on some of the code included in the distribution. I figure
> the RSA stuff is
On Fri, Jun 18, 1999 at 02:57:19PM +, [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:
> Of course we can dream of having it use X.509 certs and PGP keys and
> every other PKI that comes along, but that is clearly a long way down
> the road. Some simple way to verify keys out of band and mark them
> that way would b
On Mon, Sep 20, 1999 at 03:46:39PM +0100, Adam Back wrote:
> How communication and computationally intensive is the ZK proof as a
> function of the coin list length? Could the proof be used in a
> practical system?
The complexity is polylog in the number of coins, but unfortunately it is
not pra
On Mon, Sep 20, 1999 at 03:46:39PM +0100, Adam Back wrote:
> [1] Wei Dei's b-money protocol: http://www.eskimo.com/~weidei/bmoney.txt
BTW, the correct URL is http://www.eskimo.com/~weidai/bmoney.txt.
On Mon, Sep 20, 1999 at 09:02:17PM +0200, Anonymous wrote:
> Yeah, neat idea! With b-money, newly minted value goes directly into
> someone's account, but if it was used instead to create an anonymous
> coin you would have an accountless system. In that case you don't even
> need the mint for th
I've been reading Stefan Brands' dissertation, and I think it would really
help motivate the ideas and aid in understanding them to have a sample
application design that uses his secret-key certificates to do things that
can't be done with normal public-key certificates.
If anyone has such a desi
On Thu, Nov 11, 1999 at 12:21:44PM -0500, John Young wrote:
> Thanks to Jean-Jacques Quisquater and Jean-François Misarsky
> we offer Sarah Flannery's September 1999 paper on the Cayley-Purser
> Algorithm and her comparison of it to the security and speed of RSA:
The equations in the scanned pap
On Thu, Jan 13, 2000 at 10:28:52AM +, Ben Laurie wrote:
> Perhaps the easy answer is for someone to attempt such an export with
> email notification and see what BXA say about it!
I'm willing to give it a try. I sent an email to BXA and got no reply.
The rules do not say I need permission, j
On Fri, Jan 14, 2000 at 11:54:21AM -0500, Jeffrey Altman wrote:
> You can't do this yet. The rules have been announced but they are not
> yet in effect. The rules do not go into effect until they are
> published in the Federal Register.
>
> [Although rumor has it that they're being published wi
On Wed, Mar 29, 2000 at 02:25:51PM +1000, Greg Rose wrote:
> I use Hal Finney's "secsplit". Google found it in a couple of places; it
> doesn't seem to have been updated since 1993. It doesn't do the more
> complicated schemes, just straight (m, k) splitting.
Crypto++ contains secret sharing co
On Wed, Mar 29, 2000 at 07:54:03AM -0800, [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:
> I'm curious about what all entropy-gathering gizmos, a la "Entropy Gathering
> Deamon" (EGD) http://www.lothar.com/tech/crypto/>, might be available
> for/on NT -- anyone know?
>
> My understanding is that such stuff is effect
On Thu, May 04, 2000 at 09:40:14AM -0400, Arnold G. Reinhold wrote: >
> Can anyone point me to a good definition of "Perfect Forward Security"?
If you mean "Perfect Forward Secrecy", I think it was introduced in
Whitfield Diffie, Paul C. van Oorschot, Michael J. Wiener: Authentication
and Auth
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