Re: What's Wrong With Content Protection

2001-01-19 Thread Ron Rivest
"dark side". In any case, I was asking more for an education (which you have generously provided) than an argument. Cheers, Ron Rivest

The Beer Bottle Cipher (some fun summer reading for you...)

1999-06-30 Thread Ron Rivest
The Beer Bottle Cipher Ron Rivest 6/30/99 Last week an MIT student hacker broke into the famous Yale University secret drinking society known as "Skull and Bones". He made a startling discover

Export control of Java VM ??

1999-12-02 Thread Ron Rivest
s k0 in another representation) than it is like a general-purpose encryption routine. Of course, it may (or may not) be easy to modify such distributed code to handle arbitrary keys (;-)) Food for thought... Cheers, Ron Rivest --- (*) A Post tag system has a number of rewrite

Key agility

2000-04-16 Thread Ron Rivest
subkey * * generation need not be terribly large, even if subkey generation is * * relatively slow compared to encryption/decryption. * I also note that the other statistics I could find seem to indicate that the average IP packet size is *increasing* with time. Comments? Have I overlooked something? Cheers, Ron Rivest

IP packet sizes

2000-04-16 Thread Ron Rivest
Steve -- I asked my colleague, Professor Hari Balakrishnan, also of MIT's Laboratory for Computer Science, about IP packet sizes. He said: "I think they first issue to be aware of is that packet sizes on the Internet are highly bi-modal (actually multi-modal). Many packets are small, about

Average packet size (math)

2000-04-16 Thread Ron Rivest
Steve -- To make the argument clearer (since I received an inquiry about it): (total work) = (setup cost per packet)*(total number of packets) + (encryption cost per byte)(total number of bytes) for any data stream. Thus: (work/byte) = (setup cost per p

Re: key agility and IPsec

2000-04-27 Thread Ron Rivest
Steve -- Don't your statistics support the argument that key agility is *not* likely to be terribly important by itself? With a cache capable of storing only 5 key setups, you get at least a 75% hit rate, by your statistics. This effectively reduces key setup time by a factor of *four*, maki

Re: key agility and IPsec

2000-04-27 Thread Ron Rivest
d estimates of packet size distributions and key miss rates (if you are using key setup caches), so I welcome your data! Cheers, Ron Rivest