Re: A proposal for secure videoconferencing and videomessaging over the Internet

but a weakness in determining true names. > > --digsig > James A. Donald > 6YeGpsZR+nOTh/cGwvITnSR3TdzclVpR0+pr3YYQdkG > f/wePiA4NUqV4TnDEAk3SMnTITqtbXlOE+0v1m/3 > 4r58BUE6S1/oWtoWDbs9VJxhGz07D0ZA1WMhIvFuB > > -- Derek Atkins, SB '

Re: reflecting on PGP, keyservers, and the Web of Trust

it is not a *necessary* condition for a revocation. > > Bear > > > > > > -- Derek Atkins, SB '93 MIT EE, SM '95 MIT Media Laboratory Member, MIT Student Information Processing Board (SIPB) URL: http://web.mit.edu/warlord/ PP-ASEL N1NWH [EMAIL PROTECTED]PGP key available

Re: reflecting on PGP, keyservers, and the Web of Trust

nger). The only problem is that it defaults to '0', which means 'no expiry'. So, I'm not convinced that PGP "missed a trick" here, just that it didn't actually use the feature. -derek -- Derek Atkins, SB '93 MIT EE, SM '95 MIT Media Lab

Re: RSA expiry commemorative version of PGP?

of IDEA would go contrary to it. > > - -- > Frank Tobin http://www.uiuc.edu/~ftobin/ > > -BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE- > Version: GnuPG v1.0.2 (FreeBSD) > Comment: pgpenvelope 2.9.0 - http://pgpenvelope.sourceforge.net/ > > iEYEARECAAYFAjmJnGwACgkQVv/R

Re: Rijndael & Hitachi

othing behind it) was locked using a Medeco lock. For those who don't know, a Medeco is a top-of-the-line lock, practically impossible to pick, drill out, etc. -- Derek Atkins, SB '93 MIT EE, SM '95 MIT Media Laboratory Member, MIT Student Information Processin

Re: Rijndael & Hitachi

ck until you come up with better doors. :) -derek "Arnold G. Reinhold" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> writes: > Derek Atkins adds: > > > > >Why try to pick a Medeco when it's locking a glass door? :-) > > The fact that some people put Medeco's in

Re: snake-oil projects -- 2 University Presidents Will Try to Improve Voting

hey know >exactly > what they have done at the polls." > > and which allows the voter to prove how he voted (and cash in), might > someone add. > > I guess snake-oil projects are getting a good company. Also, they all seem to > like to promise "foolp

Re: 802.11 Wired Equivalent Privacy (WEP) attacks

http://www.isaac.cs.berkeley.edu/isaac/wep-faq.html > > > > -- Derek Atkins, SB '93 MIT EE, SM '95 MIT Media Laboratory Member, MIT Student Information Processing Board (SIPB) URL: http://web.mit.edu/warlord/PP-ASEL-IA N1NWH [EMAIL PROTECTED]PGP key available

Re: A different take on Intel's RSA announcements

m software, wouldn't one just configure one's > operating system to either not reply to these queries or to use some other > ID? > > Anyone know something and want to share with the group? :) > > -- > > Jamie Fifield <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> > > Black hole

Re: bind with DNSSEC finally released

and permanently fix one of the > largest and longest-standing security holes on the Internet. > > ftp://ftp.isc.org/isc/bind/src/8.2/ > > --Lucky Green <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> > PGP 5.x encrypted email preferred > > -- Derek Atkins, SB '93 MIT EE, SM '95

Re: references to password sniffer incident

> From: Greg Rose <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> > > I had no idea there had been so many, so well hushed up! MILNET, JANET (4 > > independent incidents in the UK in Q3 1995 alone), Panix and other ISPs, > > several universities, the USENIX terminal room, ... > > > [EMAIL PR

Re: IPSEC on a Palm III?

ss and until the physics of the smartcard flex requirement > are beaten somehow -- but why bother? Except as a container > object, I'd say that the niche smartcards occupy is going > away and going away fast. Wallet elimination versus wallet > thinning, as it were. >

Re: Summary re: /dev/random

. > > Generic PC's these days come with audio input or can have a sound > card added easily. Open software that would characterize, monitor and > whiten the output of an analog noise source connected to the audio-in > port would meet a lot of needs. > > Arnold Reinh

Re: GPS no longer encrypted

is will mean that > > civilian users of GPS will be able to pinpoint locations up to ten > > times > > more accurately than they do now. GPS is a dual-use, satellite-based > > system that provides accurate location and timing data to users > > worldwide.

Re: GPS integrity

t's reachable from her home page as well as the > > following citation: > > > > D. E. Denning and P. F. MacDoran, "Location-Based Authentication: > Grounding > > Cyberspace for Better Security," Computer Fraud and Security, Feb. 1996 > > > &

Re: Critics blast Windows 2000's quiet use of DES instead of 3DES

primary) the only MUST cipher. > -- > __ > \/ o\ [EMAIL PROTECTED] *NOTE NEW EMAIL ADDRESS* \ / > /\__/ Paul Crowley http://www.cluefactory.org.uk/paul/ /~\ > -- Derek Atkins, SB '93 MIT EE, SM '95 MIT Media Laboratory Member, MIT Student Informat

Re: GPS integrity

ly, I'd like to see cryptographically signed C/A data... Maybe this is where elliptic curve would be useful? Small signature sizes. -derek -- Derek Atkins, SB '93 MIT EE, SM '95 MIT Media Laboratory Member, MIT Student Information Processing B