Re: Is a serial cable as good as thin air?

1998-12-03 Thread David R. Conrad
ogging any invalid packets received (modulo error detection/correction?) and studying them carefully, there should be no difficulty detecting such a condition. David R. Conrad <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> "On two occasions I have been asked [by members of Parliament!], `Pray, Mr. Babbage, if you put i

RE: Is a serial cable as good as thin air?

1998-12-03 Thread David R. Conrad
e a concern for you. But if you're using RSA, DSS, Elliptic Curve, or the like, then it's something you need to think about. David R. Conrad <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> "On two occasions I have been asked [by members of Parliament!], `Pray, Mr. Babbage, if you put into the machine wrong

RE: France Allows 128 Bit Crypto

1999-01-21 Thread David R. Conrad
navoidable. > ... PLAINTEXT, not just the key. That could present problems for > crypto-protection by multi-jurisdictional key-splitting applications. > > Clearly, this has to be nailed down. It could get ugly. Certainly we should find out exactly what they mean, although as you know fa

Re: Intel announcements at RSA '99

1999-01-22 Thread David R. Conrad
ero bit in the flags, well, you can't exactly make moving the flags into the accumulator a privileged instruction. I did a little digging on www.x86.org and didn't come up with anything. Anyone with further details on this, I would really love to see them. David R. Conrad <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> This is why I love America -- that any kid can dream "I'm going to get naked with the President" ... and that dream can actually come true. What a great country! -- Michael Moore

Re: Intel announcements at RSA '99

1999-01-28 Thread David R. Conrad
, "Fail Utterly". If the "noisy diode" or whatever is at the heart of this goes dark, it should start producing a steady stream of 0's. Failure has to be obvious, and no attempt should be made to try to limp along if trouble arises. David R. Conrad <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>

Re: Intel announcements at RSA '99

1999-01-28 Thread David R. Conrad
ssumptions underlying cryptography". [1] You can verb any word in the English language. :-) David R. Conrad <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> This is why I love America -- that any kid can dream "I'm going to get naked with the President" ... and that dream can actually come true

strong authentication without strong crypto?

1999-02-04 Thread David R. Conrad
Hi, Quick question: does anyone know of technology or techniques that would facilitate strong authentication (_not_ encryption) for unattended high volume electronic transactions and does not require strong crypto along the lines of DSA or RSA? Shared secrets are not an option. Thanks, -drc

Arcfour (RC4) in Java

1999-02-06 Thread David R. Conrad
ll, it irks me whenever I think about it. Lastly, to forestall confusion, I'd like to make clear that I'm no relation to the "David R. Conrad <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>" who posted to the list recently (passing odd, that). David R. Conrad <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> PGP keys (0x1993E

RE: PGP compromised on Windows 9x?

1999-02-08 Thread David R. Conrad
ase as the user types it. Anyone know what criteria they use? [1]: > >| ... the Diceware page http://world.std.com/~reinhold/diceware.html > >| ... > >| Arnold Reinhold David R. Conrad <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> PGP keys (0x1993E1AE and 0xA0B83D31): DSS Fingerprint20 = 9942 E27C

Re: Strengthening the Passphrase Model

1999-02-10 Thread David R. Conrad
an iterated hash, instead of a function designed to maximize the resource usage, may be hardware-speed-uppable and embarrassingly parallelizable, but it's much less likely that someone could find an equivalent, simpler calculation. > 3. PGP should be available on a bootable CD-ROM for t

Re: Strengthening the Passphrase Model

1999-02-10 Thread David R. Conrad
urn printf("\n")-1; } -=-=- randpwd.c -=-=- 'return printf("\n")-1;', hey I said it was slightly obfuscated. :-) Coderpunks write cyphe, or something. David R. Conrad <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> PGP keys (0x1993E1AE and 0xA0B83D31): DSS F

Re: Sites for Army "Basic Cryptanalysis" field manual & other resource

1999-02-13 Thread David R. Conrad
character occurance frequency than the Army FM does. Thanks for this link. David R. Conrad <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> PGP keys (0x1993E1AE and 0xA0B83D31): DSS Fingerprint20 = 9942 E27C 3966 9FB8 5058 73A4 83CE 62EF 1993 E1AE RSA Fingerprint16 = 1D F2 F3 90 DA CA 35 5D 91 E4 09 45 95 C8 20 F1

Re: 1024 bit RSA exportable?

1999-03-31 Thread David R. Conrad
Hi, > The way I read it, if you are using RSA for authentication, there are no > export restrictions (except perhaps the awful 5 nations). You do not need > to get a license. The regulations, as written, do seem to imply this. However, in practice, it isn't that simple. For example, one imple

Re: Germany Frees Crypto

1999-06-03 Thread David R. Conrad
Hi, > 5. The Federal Government attaches importance to international >cooperation on encryption policy. It encourages market-driven, >open standards and interoperable systems and will work to >strengthen multilateral and bilateral cooperation. Does this mean the German government wi

Re: "Microsoft to publish details of Kerberos Authorisation Data inWindows 2000"

2000-05-01 Thread David R. Conrad
Hi, Because they want you to agree to their licensing terms for the specification, the executive summary of which would most likely be: "... the Specification is provided to you solely for your informational purposes (for review as specified above) and, pursuant to this Agreement, Microsoft does

Re: random seed generation without user interaction?

2000-06-06 Thread David R. Conrad
> There is an article (somewhere) on the net of digital cameras focused > on lava lamps. This is patented by Bob Mende of SGI. Rgds, -drc