ed by the US government by the way,
and often used to print crypto traffic.
>
>
>
--
Dave Emery N1PRE, [EMAIL PROTECTED] DIE Consulting, Weston, Mass.
PGP fingerprint = 2047/4D7B08D1 DE 6E E1 CC 1F 1D 96 E2 5D 27 BD B0 24 88 C3 18
mored trojan or backdoor does or does not
exist. And this provides some quite significant protection, because it
means that anyone exploiting a backdoor has to do so in such total
secrecy that no hint of the backdoor's existance ever leaks out.
--
Dave Emery N1PRE, [EMAIL PROTECTED] DIE Consulting, Weston, Mass.
PGP fingerprint = 2047/4D7B08D1 DE 6E E1 CC 1F 1D 96 E2 5D 27 BD B0 24 88 C3 18
le that this number might be as low as two or three
or even one depending on how the local telco engineered the physical
fiber links. A single fiber has very large capacity after all... and it
is quite usual to combine a whole bunch of unrelated logical circuits on
one physical facility...
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ld the packet accounting you do detect covert or overt
modifications to your switches or switch configuration that caused them
to copy packet streams sent between two ports to a third port as well ?
Do you check gross flows to convince yourself that for every packet going
in only one comes out ?
--
Dave Emery N1PRE, [EMAIL PROTECTED] DIE Consulting, Weston, Mass.
PGP fingerprint = 2047/4D7B08D1 DE 6E E1 CC 1F 1D 96 E2 5D 27 BD B0 24 88 C3 18
ne plant is GSM, which is
almost always encrypted, which must add significantly to NSAs burden
intercepting it, even if they can break keys very quickly...
--
Dave Emery N1PRE, [EMAIL PROTECTED] DIE Consulting, Weston, Mass.
PGP fingerprint = 2047/4D7B08D1 DE 6E E1 CC 1F 1D 96 E2 5D 27 BD B0 24 88 C3 18
t spoofed signals and the errors could
be readily flagged and alarmed. Granted of course that a really
determined spoofer could also attempt to spoof these signals as seen by
the observer, but of course this raises the bar a bit further.
>
> Phil
>
>
>
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Dave Eme
hods.
In theory, of course, one could equip an aircraft or vehicle with
this gear and make a run and then grovel through the resultant capture
at one's leisure over weeks or months, at least if one was lucky enough
to catch the jammer in operation and from a good vantage point.
>
believe that the security of the US depends on access to
certain computers running Windows or NT, and given that they have
large resources behind them and work in total secrecy with less than
complete review of what they are doing I have to admit that as someone
else has already said, "i
ransmissions would
be much harder for a TSCM electronic countermeasures sweep to find than
something that radiated continuously.
--
Dave Emery N1PRE, [EMAIL PROTECTED] DIE Consulting, Weston, Mass.
PGP fingerprint = 2047/4D7B08D1 DE 6E E1 CC 1F 1D 96 E2 5D 27 BD B0 24 88 C3 18
