Re: names to say in late september

Eric Murray wrote: > > On Thu, Jul 27, 2000 at 07:05:38AM -0700, Rodney Thayer wrote: > > What shall we call > > that-public-key-algorithm-that-will-not-be-patent-protected in late > > September? we should not use a trademarked or copyrighted term, in my > > opinion. > > There was discussion of

Re: Comcast@Home bans VPNs

Russell Nelson wrote: > > Ian Brown writes: > > ... subscribers to agree not to use the service as a means to create a VPN. > > Could someone describe to me (in my ignorance) the problem this rule > is intended to solve? Loss of revenue from leased lines. BT did a number of interesting things

[Fwd: Serious bug in PGP - versions 5 and 6]

-- http://www.apache-ssl.org/ben.html Coming to ApacheCon Europe 2000? http://apachecon.com/ Ralf Senderek has found a horrendous bug in PGP versions 5 and 6. It's of scientific interest because it spectacularly confirms a prediction made by a number of us in the paper on `The Risks of Key Rec

[Fwd: A note to the public - relayed from Ralf Senderek]

-- http://www.apache-ssl.org/ben.html Coming to ApacheCon Europe 2000? http://apachecon.com/ -BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE- A note to the public. I have been warning repeatedly to use newer versions of PGP for over two years now. In a study I put on the net in August 1998 which is a

Re: reflecting on PGP, keyservers, and the Web of Trust

Dave Del Torto wrote: > > At 11:14 pm -0400 2000-09-01, Russell Nelson wrote: > >Ed Gerck writes: > >>Even though the web-of-trust seems to be a pretty good part of PGP, > >>IMO it is actually it's Achilles heel. > > > >Nope. Usability is its Achilles heel. PGP needs to be wrapped in > >somethi

Re: reflecting on PGP, keyservers, and the Web of Trust

Ray Dillinger wrote: > > On Tue, 5 Sep 2000, David Honig wrote: > > > The more hard-core distribute keys to previously known > >parties on physical media, only. > > > > I have long felt that PGP missed a trick when it didn't have > automatic expiry for keys -- It should be possible to build >

Musings on Blinding

Not long ago there was a discussion on blinding which must be read if this is to make perfect sense, but it seems to me that it makes sufficient sense without it to be worth posting without rewriting to allow for the time lag - the context is that I disappeared in the midst of the discussion to go

Re: RSA Security releases RSA algoritm into public domain twoweeks early. [cpunk]

Bill Stewart wrote: > > When will we see the first RSAREF-compatible public-domain code? > > [There already is a European developed RSAREF API replacement. Now it > is legal for U.S. use. --Perry] http://www.openssl.org/ Cheers, Ben. -- http://www.apache-ssl.org/ben.html Coming to ApacheCon

Re: DeCSS and first sale

John R Levine wrote: > CSS is entirely about subverting first sale, since the only useful thing that > the CSS crypto does is to assign each DVD a "region code" so that the DVD can > only be played on players with the same region code. (As has been widely > noted, if you want to pirate a DVD, you

Re: More thoughts on Man in the Middle attacks and PGP

"Arnold G. Reinhold" wrote: > > I had some more thoughts on the question of Man in the Middle attacks > on PGP. A lot has changed on the Internet since 1991 when PGP was > first released. (That was the year when the World Wide Web was > introduced as well.) Many of these changes significantly re

Re: More thoughts on Man in the Middle attacks and PGP

"Arnold G. Reinhold" wrote: > > At 10:15 PM +0100 9/12/2000, Ben Laurie wrote: > >"Arnold G. Reinhold" wrote: > >> > >> I had some more thoughts on the question of Man in the Middle attacks > >> on PGP. A lot has changed on the Internet

[Fwd: [Freesw] [Fwd: software patents in Europe]]

Sorry about the mess of cross-forwarding! Cheers, Ben. -- http://www.apache-ssl.org/ben.html Coming to ApacheCon Europe 2000? http://apachecon.com/ If the information is correct (which I am not in a position to confirm), you should say YEP and not GAK. It seems unlikely that the EPO can obta

UK Crypto Meet

I intend to arrange a short Cypher/Coderpunks-style meeting in London during ApacheCon, which is 23-25th October at the Olympia Conference Centre. The main purpose of the meeting will be to discuss whether we should have real crypto meetings in the London area, and how/where/when to do that. If

Re: [Fwd: [ANNOUNCE] NSS 3.1 Beta 1 Release]

William Allen Simpson wrote: > > Fallout from the early RSA release into public domain, the references > to BSAFE have been replaced, and a bunch of stuff are GPL. Is there > a team of folks doing independent code review? > > Since this is likely to show up on a lot of systems, and any bugs > w

Re: [Fwd: [ANNOUNCE] NSS 3.1 Beta 1 Release]

William Allen Simpson wrote: > > -BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE- > > I remember you expressing such sentiments on the mozilla security list some > months ago. But, there are problems with the OpenSSL license. As far as I can tell, the problems are invented rather than real. At least I can't

Re: [Fwd: [ANNOUNCE] NSS 3.1 Beta 1 Release]

William Allen Simpson wrote: > > -BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE- > > Ben Laurie wrote: > > > > As far as I can tell, the problems are invented rather than real. At > > least I can't recall any real problems except "it isn't the licence we &

REMINDER: UK Crypto meet at ApacheCon

As I mentioned a while back, I'm organising a meeting for anyone interested in crypto in the UK during ApacheCon. I've finally managed to schedule it, and its happening on Tuesday the 24th of October at 15:00 to 16:00, in the "large BOF room" at ApacheCon. Info on ApacheCon can be found at http://

Re: [Fwd: [ANNOUNCE] NSS 3.1 Beta 1 Release]

"William H. Geiger III" wrote: > >What they _should_ do is use OpenSSL and work on that, instead of > >reinventing the wheel. > > IIRC the OpenSSL project was not accepting code from US sources. Has this policy >changed? Hmmm. Weeding out cruft from my mailbox and I found this. Looks like I did

Re: Republic targeted for sale of 'unhackable' system

William Knowles wrote: > The system may run foul of the Regulation of Investigatory Powers Bill > (RIP) in Britain, which, if passed, would insist that security > services should be able to decrypt communications networks to preserve > national security. This part is _definitely_ snakeoil - RIP m

Re: Is PGP broken?

Russell Nelson wrote: > > Is it just me, or is PGP broken? I don't mean any particular version > of PGP -- I mean the fact that there are multiple versions of PGP > which generate incompatible cryptography. Half the time when someone > sends me a PGP-encrypted message, I can't decrypt it. Pres

Re: Is PGP broken?

"L. Sassaman" wrote: > PGP will also never have the platform coverage that open source software > can have. In addition to all the platforms (except Macintosh) that PGP > supports, GnuPG runs on Irix, True64, FreeBSD, NetBSD, OpenBSD, BSD/OS, > SCO, SunOS, and others. That's not PGP's fault; it's

Re: Is PGP broken?

lso > > allows you to do perfect forward secrecy: generate new short-life encryption > > key pairs for each message, sign the public key with your longer-lived > > signature key, and include it in your message for the reply. See > > http://www.ietf.org/internet-drafts/draft-b

Re: UK Sunday Times: "Steal the face right off your head"

"R. A. Hettinga" wrote: > One of the main forms of security to combat such criminals will be > biometrics: voice recognition and the scanning of fingerprints, irises and > face shapes to secure property. Siemens is expected to launch a fingerprint > phone within months. > > In South Africa, where

Security Against Compelled Disclosure

People may be interested in a paper Ian Brown and I wrote, with the above title, for ACSAC. http://www.apache-ssl.org/disclosure.pdf Cheers, Ben. -- http://www.apache-ssl.org/ben.html "There is no limit to what a man can do or how far he can go if he doesn't mind who gets the credit." - Rober

Re: IBM press release - encryption and authentication

David Wagner wrote: > > Enzo Michelangeli wrote: > >OpenPGP tries to detect such "wrong key" situations for > >symmetrically-encrypted packets in a pretty simplistic way, [...] > > The repetition of 16 bits in the 80 bits of random data prefixed to > > the message allows the receiver to immed

Re: Fwd: from Edupage, December 22, 2000

Jaap-Henk Hoepman wrote: > > On Tue, 02 Jan 2001 12:03:40 -0800 David Honig <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> writes: > > At 10:27 PM 1/1/01 +0530, Udhay Shankar N wrote: > > >Did this slip between the cracks in holiday season or has it already been > > >discussed here ? > > > > > >Udhay > > > > Its just yet a

Re: Cryptographic Algorithm Metrics

John Young wrote: > > Last summer, at a workshop on "Security Metrics," conducted > by NIST's Computer System Security and Privacy Advisory > Board, Landgrave Smith, Institute of Defense Analysis, reported > on a pilot study of "the metrics used for determining the > strength of cryptography." >

Re: Cryptographic Algorithm Metrics

Greg Rose wrote: > > At 03:06 PM 1/3/2001 -0500, John Young wrote: > >Yes, the one-time pad. However, I wondered if Smith > >was hinting at another cipher(s) not yet publicized, > >perhaps computational -- or more exotic technology > >such as quantum, DNA, ultra-spectral and beyond. > > It alway

Re: Cryptographic Algorithm Metrics

Peter Fairbrother wrote: > > At Crypto a > > couple of years ago the invited lecture gave some very general results > > about unconditionally secure ciphers... unfortunately I can't remember > > exactly who gave the lecture, but I think it might have been Oded > > Goldreich... forgive me if I'm wr

Re: NONSTOP Crypto Query

Ray Dillinger wrote: > > On Fri, 12 Jan 2001, John Young wrote: > > >Wright also describes the use of supersensitive microphones > >to pick up the daily setting of rotors on cryptomachines of the > >time, in particular the Hagelins made by CryptoAG. > > Hmmm. That sounds like a trick that coul

Re: What's Wrong With Content Protection

John Gilmore wrote: > Few or no manufacturers are willing to put ordinary > digital audio recorders on the market -- you see lots of MP3 *players* > but where are the stereo MP3 *recorders*? They've been chilled into > nonexistence by the threat of lawsuits. The ones that claim to > record, reco

Re: Making One-time pad using the soundcard

David Honig wrote: > >[I would not feel particularly comfortable merely combining the bits > >of a single sample -- distilling entropy using a hash function and > >large blocks of input would probably work out better. I'm sure there > >will be plenty of opinions around here. --Perry] > > A secure

Re: Wassenaar summary (and a funny new loophole)

portable (where k1 is related to k2, of course, by k2=backwards(k1))? Cheers, Ben. -- Ben Laurie|Phone: +44 (181) 735 0686| Apache Group member Freelance Consultant |Fax: +44 (181) 735 0689|http://www.apache.org/ and Technical Director|Email: [EMAIL PROTECTED] | A.L. Digital Ltd,

Re: MD5

e attacker). Surely in the case of MD5 (or any other hash) the question is "how hard would it be for an attacker to compute a value that gives the same result as y?". Of course, y is one candidate, but generally there are an infinity of them, right? Cheers, Ben. -- Ben Laurie

Re: RSA's Australian deal

Steve Bellovin wrote: > "The key to that is neither U.S. technology or U.S. personnel could > be involved in making the product", according to DoC. Hmmm ... so SSL, RC4, DH etc., etc. are not U.S. technology, eh? Cheers, Ben. -- http://www.apache-ssl.org/ben.html "My grandfather once told me

Re: Intel announcements at RSA '99

Steve Bellovin wrote: > > Intel has announced a number of interesting things at the RSA conference. > The most important, to me, is the inclusion of a hardware random number > generator (based on thermal noise) in the Pentium III instruction set. > They also announced hardware support for IPSEC.

Re: Intel announcements at RSA '99

Steven M. Bellovin wrote: > > In message <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>, Ben Laurie writes: > >Steve Bellovin wrote: > >> > >> Intel has announced a number of interesting things at the RSA conference. > >> The most important, to me, is the inclusion of a ha

Re: DCSB: Risk Management is Where the Money Is; Trust in Digital Comm

. Be ready to pay for purchases made > by some crooked cop... Note that none of this has actually happened yet. Also OFTEL is being touted as the issuer of licenses, not the escrower of keys. > I wonder if they have read Rivest's paper on chaffing and winnowing, and > concluded that aft

Re:

Clive D.W. Feather wrote: > > In article <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>, MCKAY john > <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> writes > >Another curiosity of the Mark I's instruction set was a sideways > >add ('population count'), also specified by Turing. I've always > >assumed that the two instructions could be useful for cr

Network Week demonstrate complete lack of clue

In an article entitled "56-bit cipher defeated in just 22 hours", Network Week (3 Feb 1999) say "Eric Young and Tim Hudson used 'brute force' - trying every possible combination - on a $250,000 custom-built super PC". Yeah, right! Cheers, Ben. -- http://www.apache-ssl.org/ben.html "My grandfat

Possible Security Problem: Fake PGP Key

It has come to my attention that there is a faked key out there, purporting to be mine: Key ID: 0x6B722A59 Fingerprint: 428C 1E68 35E1 E96C 177A F49C A906 3F1F 6B72 2A59 Name: Ben Laurie <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> Created: 09/10/98 Type: 2048/1024 DH/DSS It isn't clear to me what the po

Re: Strengthening the Passphrase Model (was Re: PGP compromised on Windows 9x?)

Rodney Thayer wrote: > > At 09:46 AM 2/9/99 -0500, Arnold G. Reinhold wrote: > >Nelson Minar's comments (reproduced below) are right on target. Here are > [...] practical suggestions [...] > > >2. PGP should burn computer time hashing the passphrase. While you cannot > >increase the entropy of a

Re: Rainbow technologies to use P3 serial number.

Austin Hill wrote: > > So if I want to visit e-commerce sites from one of my 6 machines (Which > include a Macintosh, Sun and 4 Pentium's/Pentium Pro's) after having visited > with my new P3 I'll not be able to get access?Chat rooms, corporate > extranets and ecommerce sites such as Amazon ar

Re: Crypto for some of the DNS/TM mess

Anna Lysyanskaya wrote: > So that takes care of your requirements 1) and 2). As for 3): when the > need to establish how many domain names a user owns arises, the user can > be asked to reveal the list of all the credentials of validity ever issued > to him by the CA and prove that all these cred

Re: Azalea Software/Carrick Online Server?????

Matt Crawford wrote: > > > Note that it says that the encrypted file can then be sent > > overseas. Nothing about the software. Ciphertext has never been export > > restricted. > > And they don't address the problem of getting the "secret" (ha!) key > from the sender to the recipient. Sur

Re: Crypto for some of the DNS/TM mess

Anonymous wrote: > The ability to register a few identities which would survive a challenge > won't be too helpful for people who want to secretly register thousands > of DNs without their duplicity being detected... Sure, but suppose I own a block of flats, or an office block. I can rent "identi

Re: IPSEC on a Palm III?

Robert Hettinga wrote: > > Do any of the ipsec folks out there have any idea whether the Palm III has > the oomph to do IPSEC? I do know that an old version of SSLeay was ported to it, and I intend to port OpenSSL at some point. Good reasons for doing so will obviously accelerate the process. Re

Re: New Intel Celeron chip set has random number generator

John Gilmore wrote: > > There have been mumbles about a random number generator in Intel > executives' statements, but no solid information (e.g. where in the > product line is this coming out?) until today. I noticed it at RSA's > web site, but there's very sketchy info at the Intel site also.

Re: FW: FW: Bernstein Opinion Up

Elyn Wollensky wrote: > -Original Message- > From: Lance Rose [ mailto:[EMAIL PROTECTED] > ] > Sent: Friday, May 07, 1999 8:58 AM > To: Elyn Wollensky > Cc: [EMAIL PROTECTED] > Subject: Re: FW: Bernstein Opinion Up [snip] > - the fact > that we reach for the easi

Re: code

Perry E. Metzger wrote: > Source code exists for people first, computers second. If this were > not the case, we'd all just write code in machine language. High level > languages exist *explicitly* to make it easier for people to > comprehend computation tasks. Communicating algorithms, both to th

Re: How to donate a clue to a lawyer?

EKR wrote: > If your purpose in using code is to communicate with other > humans, what you want to communicate is intention with only > the barest amount of procedure. However, in reality programs > are almost all procedure with the barest amount of structure > to attempt to communicate intention

Re: Public-Key algorithm

Hans Viens wrote: > > Anyone know where a could get a public/private key generator (just like > PGP) but not RSA... DH ??? Well, an algorithm that works with a test main > and free... OpenSSL? Cheers, Ben. -- http://www.apache-ssl.org/ben.html "My grandfather once told me that there are two

[ANNOUNCE] OpenSSL 0.9.3 released

http://www.openssl.org/source/ o ftp://ftp.openssl.org/source/ Yours, The OpenSSL Project Team... Mark J. Cox Bodo Moeller Ralf S. Engelschall Ulf Moeller Dr. Stephen Henson Holger Reif Ben Laurie Paul C. Sutton --

Re: personal encryption? (fwd)

Marc Horowitz wrote: > > "Arnold G. Reinhold" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> writes: > > >> It seems to me that you could use the DNA encodings for common words like > >> "the" and "and" as a marker for PCR. A soop of such initiators, followed by > >> a gel for the longest fragments should crack this code

DNA Stego

I found the original article, which wasn't referenced, AFAIR. It appears here: CATHERINE TAYLOR CLELLAND et al: Hiding messages in DNA microdots Nature 399, 533-534 (1999) Scientific Correspondence. These guys may know about DNA, but they don't know much about crypto! To quote: "Encryption is not

Re: MPI & Modular Arithmetic

Hans Viens wrote: > > Hi Folks, > > I would like to know if anyone of you know where I could find a free > (commercial and non-commercial) implementation of a Multiprecision Integer > and modular arithmetic ? http://www.openssl.org/ Cheers, Ben. -- http://www.apache-ssl.org/ben.html "My gr

Re: MPI & Modular Arithmetic

Terence Kelly wrote: > > A friend of mine reported that when he ran a battery of > straightforward random tests on the GNU package, it failed on simple > inputs (things like "4 + 4"). It takes very little effort to set up > random tests and run them, and this kind of testing reveals bugs in > se

Re: Interoperable Micropayment Order

> From: [EMAIL PROTECTED] > To: [EMAIL PROTECTED], [EMAIL PROTECTED], > "James A. Donald" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> > cc: [EMAIL PROTECTED] > Date: Wed, 16 Jun 1999 03:08:41 +0300 > Subject: Interoperable Micropayment Order > Sender: [EMAIL PROTECTED] > Reply-To: [EMAIL PROTECTED] > > Jim and a

Re: so why is IETF stilling adding DES to protocols? (Re: It's official... DES is History)

Adam Back wrote: > My arguments that adding broken ciphersuites to an IETF standard was > in direct and obvious violation of RFC 1984 fell on deaf ears, as > Netscape, microsoft and even openSSL (in the form of Ben Laurie) > busily rushed and implemented the proposed broken ciphersuit

Re: so why is IETF stilling adding DES to protocols? (Re: It's official... DES is History)

Adam Back wrote: > > I presume that the TLS WG is planning to use DES to replace the RC4 > > 40 bit cipher that was used for export compliance. > > I saw no indication that this was the case, though this sounds better > than just adding DES and leaving all the 40 bit ciphersuites intact > which l

Re: so why is IETF stilling adding DES to protocols? (Re: It's official... DES is History)

Lucky Green wrote: > > OpenSSL is a library. It should support whatever the standard supports and > whatever users and/or authors of the lib desire to be in the lib. That may > include broken or null-ciphers. But the user should have to take positive > action to get at the broken ciphers. I belie

Re: Word needed for Entropy

Carl Ellison wrote: > > I've been guilty of sloppy use of English, occasionally, and one such > sloppiness that I run into occasionally is with the word "entropy" > for cryptographic purposes. > > What we need is a word or very short phrase to capture the full > phrase: > > "the conditional ent

Wagner's coins

Several people have asked me where to get the source for Wagner's DH variant on Chaum's blinding I mentioned the other day, and I know I managed to lose at least one request, so I'll post it here instead: Available by anonymous CVS: Repository: :pserver:[EMAIL PROTECTED]:/cvsroot password: anonc

Re: Clear Session ID in SSLV3

"Marcus J. Ranum" wrote: > > Does anyone have a pointer to why the session ID in SSLV3 is > in the clear, rather than encrypted? I'm sure there's a good > reason for it (audit? logging? other...?) but I'm trying to > pin down exactly why it was done that way. Can anyone point > me in the right d

Re: depleting the random number generator

John Denker wrote: > I certainly hope these issues have been analyzed and brought under control. > Can somebody lend me a clue as to the status, and/or where I might read more > about it? If this list is not the optimal forum for discussing such > things, could somebody point me to a better one?

Lucre documentation

For those who care, I've added a little docco to Lucre. Here's the explanation of the executable demos. Also available is the theory, such as it is (check out the CVS for that, or shout at me). bank-new Create a bank. The stuff you should guard with your life is added to an

Re: depleting the random number generator

David Honig wrote: > > At 04:45 PM 7/17/99 -0400, John Denker wrote: > >Hi Folks -- > > > >I have a question about various scenarios for an attack against IPsec by way > >of the random number generator. The people on the linux-ipsec mailing list > >suggested I bring it up here. > > >>..worries

Re: depleting the random number generator

David Honig wrote: > > Ben suggests using "hashcash" to prevent malicious depletion of the entropy > pool, > where the "hashcash" (hashes that are expensive to compute but cheap to > verify) > becomes the limiting resource instead of the server's MIPS. > > This prevents DoS attacks but doesn't s

Re: depleting the random number generator

bram wrote: > > On Mon, 19 Jul 1999, Enzo Michelangeli wrote: > > > Sorry folks, but I can't understand where the problem is supposed to be. The > > entropy of a pool is a measure of the information about its internal state > > that we don't know: which is why in thermodynamics the same name is

Re: depleting the random number generator

John Kelsey wrote: > > -BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE- > > At 09:24 PM 19-07-99 +0100, Ben Laurie wrote: > > >So what you are saying is that you'd be happy to run your > >server forever on an inital charge of 128 bits of entropy > >and no more rando

Re: "If only you knew what we knew"

"James A. Donald" wrote: > > -- > >From time to time the spooks have a talk with various people about the > restrictions on cryptography, and those people stop opposing the > restrictions, and tell us "if only you knew what we knew" i.e. how much dirt the spooks have on them :-) Cheers, Be

Re: Crypto bill will harm children, boost "pedophiles"

Declan McCullagh wrote: > "Child pornographers could distribute their > filth unimpeded," the House Permanent > Select Committee on Intelligence said. Doesn't this give the game away a little? What has intelligence to do with child po

Apache-SSL 1.3.6+1.36 released, with Keynote support!

modules for Apache-SSL. [Ben Laurie] *) Remove spurious printf. [Stefano Ravaioli <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>] *) Add note about environment variables to 1.35 changes. [Ben Laurie] *) Add SSLDenySSL directive. [Bruce Tenison <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>, revised by Ben Lau

Re: And now, a java encoder ring!

Andreas Bogk wrote: > > Udhay Shankar N <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> writes: > > > For me, the highlight of the JavaOne Developer Conference in San > > Francisco last March was Dallas Semiconductor's iButton with Java -- aka > > the Java Ring, a wearable computer that ran Java. It allegedly had a > > hig

Re: IP: Admin Plans to Loosen Encryption Restrictions

Bill Frantz wrote: > > At 9:56 AM -0700 9/14/99, Robert Hettinga forwarded: > >Source: New York Times > >http://www.nytimes.com/library/tech/99/09/cyber/capital/14capital.html > > > >September 14, 1999 > > > >By JERI CLAUSING > > > >Administration Plans to Loosen Encryption Restrictions > > > >I

Re: Why did White House change its mind on crypto?

Declan McCullagh wrote: > Another answer might lie in a > little-noticed section of the legislation the > White House has sent to Congress. It > says that during civil cases or criminal > prose

Re: RSA Security, Inc.

Vin McLellan wrote: > Why did Baltimore Tech's founder flip out and denounce RSA's PKC as > a secret stolen from the British GCHQ... shortly after RSA-Australia began > shipping Eric Young's new SSL implementation code under the RSA brand name > in the international market? (Young's BSAF

Re: The well-travelled packet

Russell Nelson wrote: > > Forwarded with permission (the permission being the short quote below, > the message being the long one). I don't have a copy of the > traceroute, but it definitely showed packets going from Washington DC > to NYC through Paris. This[1] is similar to the argument made

Re: Ecash without a mint, or - making anonymous payments practical

[EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote: > > Anonymous says, (btw, I really wonder what's the point of having a technical > discussion incognito... I hope this is not for a really good/bad reason such as > you are living in some dark country), Frankly, I'm somewhat surprised. There are several really obvious re

Re: Internal vs external threats, any references?

[EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote: > > Jeff says/asks, > > > A commonly-held conception in the commercial world (in my experience) is that > > most threats to "corporate security" come from the Internet-at-large, and > > therefore being behind a firewall is a Good Thing and generally Sufficient. > > I be

Re: "unbreakable code?" with cash prizes

John Gilmore wrote: > > [I'm just forwarding this with the expectation that someone might want to > try for the prize. I don't know anything about the code. -gnu] No, no. You are forwarding it with the expectation that we'll all shout "snake oil" loud enough to deafen you. BTW, I offer $1,00

Re: Almost-Everywhere Superiority for Quantum Computing

Russell Nelson wrote: > > Julian Assange writes: > > Simon as extended by Brassard and H{\o}yer shows that there are > > tasks on which quantum machines are exponentially faster than > > each classical machine infinitely often. The present paper shows > > that there are ta

Re: size of linear function space

[EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote: > > Consider functions of one variable whose domain and range are both > {0,1,2,...,n-1}. There are n^n possible functions. n!, I'd say, since the range of any function that isn't one-to-one is _not_ {0..n-1}. Did you mean that the range was a subset of {0..n-1}? Or per

Re: a smartcard of a different color

Robert Hettinga wrote: > > --- begin forwarded text > > To: [EMAIL PROTECTED] > Subject: a smartcard of a different color > Date: Tue, 16 Nov 1999 22:15:07 -0500 > From: Dan Geer <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> > Sender: <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> > > Yesterday I saw a smartcard of a different color. In particul

Re: Marked cash in Lucre

Anonymous wrote: > > Bill Stewart writes: > > At 10:20 PM 11/21/1999 -, Some Ostensibly Anonymous Person remailed > > an article to coderpunks, which Bob Hettinga reposted to cryptography > > and probably also to cypherpunks. David Wagner's developed a blinding > > method probably not covere

Universal Quantum Computers

People may be interested in last week's Nature article, D. Gottesman and I.L. Chuang, "Demonstrating the viability of universal quantum computation using teleportation and single-qubit operations", Nature 402, 390-392. One thing that should make software authors jump for joy is that the method in

Re: Thawte "SuperCerts"

Marcus Leech wrote: > So: two questions (with a possible answer of "use the source, luke"): > > o What bits are set in a "super cert" to indicate that it's a SGC > or step-up cert? Or is it simply that certs issued by a super-cert > authority (as marked in the browser CA cert databa

Re: Export control of Java VM ??

Ron Rivest wrote: > > Here's a thought exercise: > > What happens if someone applies for an export license for a Java > Virtual Machine, which he intends to use as an "encryption routine"? > The idea (which is not new) is that a Java program (Java byte code) > would be the "key" for the encrypti

Re: Ten Risks of PKI

BPM Mixmaster Remailer wrote: > By using this generic term "PKI" the authors leave a great deal of > confusion about which systems they are criticizing. Some of their > "risks", such as the one quoted above, would apply to all of these > PKIs, including SPKI. Others are more specific to current

Re: Debit card fraud in Canada

David Honig wrote: > > At 10:49 AM 12/13/99 -0500, Steven M. Bellovin wrote: > >true for credit cards? If so, a simple visual recorder -- already used by > >other thieves -- might suffice, and all the tamper-resistance in the world > >won't help. Crypto, in other words, doesn't protect you if t

Seven and a Half Nonrisks of PKI

Be Told about Public Key Infrastructure By Ben Laurie. Carl Ellison and Bruce Schneier wrote a critique of PKI, "Ten Risks of PKI: What You're Not Being Told About Public Key Infrastructure", which can be found here: http://www.counterpane.com/pki-risks.html. Whilst I agr

Re: starting up servers that need access to secrets

Rich Salz wrote: > Another approach would be to double the number of systems that the adversary > must compromise. HostA will run the service, but only when HostB sends > it startup info. At boot A pings B. B "calls back" over over an SSL link > and sends the passphrase using something like S/Ke

Re: BXA press release URL; and where to get the regs in HTML

Phil Karn wrote: > What still confuses me are the circumstances that let you just send > an email pointer to BXA, and which ones require a review of some > sort before you can export. Well, the press release says: > Global Exports of Unrestricted Encryption Source Code > > Encryption source cod

Re: BXA press release URL; and where to get the regs in HTML

Joe Francis wrote: > > Given this: > > "``Open cryptographic interface''. A mechanism which is designed to > allow a customer or other party to insert cryptographic functionality > without the intervention, help or assistance of the manufacturer or its > agents, e.g., manufacturer's signing

Re: Response from Commerce Dept to "Is this man a crypto-criminal?"

Declan McCullagh wrote: > > > > >Date: Tue, 18 Jan 2000 10:01:49 -0500 > >From: "JIM LEWIS" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> > >To: <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>, <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> > >Cc: "EUGENE COTTILLI" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> > >Subject: Re: FC: Is this man a crypto-criminal? The Feds won't say... > > > >De

Re: small authenticator

[EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote: > > I've got something with around 100 bytes of ram and an 8-bit multiply. > Is there an authentication mechanism that can fit in this? HMAC? Cheers, Ben. -- SECURE HOSTING AT THE BUNKER! http://www.thebunker.net/hosting.htm http://www.apache-ssl.org/ben.html "My gr

Re: The problem with Steganography

Rick Smith wrote: > It sounds like there are a number of interesting design questions. For > example, the sender and recipient must obviously share a secret key. Why is that obvious? What's wrong with encoding with the recipient's public key? Cheers, Ben. -- SECURE HOSTING AT THE BUNKER! http:

Re: The problem with Steganography

Rick Smith wrote: > > >Rick Smith wrote: > >> It sounds like there are a number of interesting design questions. For > >> example, the sender and recipient must obviously share a secret key. > > At 10:18 PM 01/26/2000 +, Ben Laurie wrote: > >Why is t

Re: DVD CCA Emergency Hearing to seal DeCSS

John Young wrote: > > This is becoming picayune but: > > I'm told that the court has now sealed Exhibits A and B of Hoy's > declaration. These are the DeCSS notes and the CSS scramble > code. However, the sealing applies only to the paper versions > and will prevent hardcopying. I think you hav

Re: [PGP]: PGP 6.5.2 Random Number Generator (RNG) support

lcs Mixmaster Remailer wrote: > Note that > no thanks have been offered to Intel for releasing the spec, clearly > a step taken in order to facilitate open source development (drivers > already existed for Windows). Apparently gratitude is too much to ask > from the open source security community

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