Re: Is SSL dead?

On Wed, Oct 06, 1999 at 06:28:45PM -0700, Greg Broiles wrote: > This deserves further explanation. In order to begin an SSL session, the > server must present its public key and its site certificate to the client. I think you're missing the point of the article. The issue is, what happens when

TIPEM compatible lib?

I am looking for a TIPEM 2.x API compatible free crypto library. Any pointers? Thanks, --Lucky Green <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>

RE: Is SSL dead?

At 04:35 PM 10/6/99 , Phillip Hallam-Baker wrote: >>This is a problem with SSL 2.0 first discovered by Simon Spero then at EIT. >>It was fixed in SSL 3.0, that must be almost three years ago. >>The server certificate now binds the public key to a specific Web server >>address. That means that you

graphical authentication

Mention was made recently of a graphical keying method out of stanford (?) for palm-pilots. Does anyone have a reference or url for the paper/code involved? Cheers, Julian.

crypto camouflage in software

neat question: http://www.arcot.com/arcot_ieee.pdf a method of protecting private keys using camouflage, in software, to prevent dictionary attacks. one password will decrypt correctly, many other passwords will produce alternate, valid-looking keys to fool an attacker. is this an exampl

Re: Is SSL dead?

Bill Stewart <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> writes: > At 04:35 PM 10/6/99 , Phillip Hallam-Baker wrote: > >>This is a problem with SSL 2.0 first discovered by Simon Spero then at EIT. > >>It was fixed in SSL 3.0, that must be almost three years ago. > >>The server certificate now binds the public key to a s

Re: graphical authentication

> From: Julian Assange <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> > Mention was made recently of a graphical keying method out of stanford (?) for > palm-pilots. Does anyone have a reference or url for the paper/code involved? The paper was presented at USENIX's security '99, and available in ps/pdf on Avi Rubin's

Re: Is SSL dead?

In message <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>, Bill Stewart writes: > At 04:35 PM 10/6/99 , Phillip Hallam-Baker wrote: > > That means that you can only succeed against web-users whose browsers > still accept SSL2.0, which is most Netscape users by default; > I don't know if IE also defaults to that, but it pro

Fourth and final announcement for ECC '99 (fwd)

-- Forwarded message -- Subject: Fourth and final announcement for ECC '99 Date: Fri, 8 Oct 1999 10:52:15 -0400 To: [EMAIL PROTECTED] From: Frances Hannigan <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> = The 3rd workshop on Elliptic Curve Cryptograp

Re: crypto camouflage in software

"paul a. bauerschmidt" wrote: > neat question: > > http://www.arcot.com/arcot_ieee.pdf > > a method of protecting private keys using camouflage, in software, to > prevent dictionary attacks. > > one password will decrypt correctly, many other passwords will produce > alternate, valid-lookin

[SFBCA] SF Bay Area Cypherpunks 09 October 1999 Meeting

SF Bay Area Cypherpunks October 1999 Physical Meeting Announcement General Info: Sat 9 October 1999 1:00 - 6:00 PM Mrs. Fields' Cookies shop, near the payphones* Embarcadero 4, Embarcadero Center complex - Ground floor, North side, a few paces east of Drumm and Washington St. - (*

Disappearing Inc. "Universally Deletes"

>From the website FAQ of Disappearing Inc. (www.disappearing.com/faq3.thtml) >Deletion: Finally, at the end of the message lifecycle, >Disappearing Inc. Universally Deletes? the message from >the local PC, the mail server, a

"Disappearing, Inc."

In the news today: another unknown entity purporting to create secure email. Company Name: "Disappearing, Inc." (cute...) Angle: "shredding" email so it can't linger forever (nothing new to PGP users who've forgotten their passphrase ;). Technology: unknown. Technical Team: unknown. Source Code: