Vin McLellan wrote:
> Why did Baltimore Tech's founder flip out and denounce RSA's PKC as
> a secret stolen from the British GCHQ... shortly after RSA-Australia began
> shipping Eric Young's new SSL implementation code under the RSA brand name
> in the international market? (Young's BSAF
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>From [EMAIL PROTECTED] Mon Sep 20 20:32:30 1999
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> --
> Greg Broiles[SMTP:[EMAIL PROTECTED]] wrote:
> Subject: No liberalization for source code, API's
>
> There's been some discussion of this in the press, but not much discussion
>
> of the specifics. BXA has published a "question-and-answer" document
> discussing the anticipa
I remember Ian, Adam, and I talking about the
card-in-a-floppy thing at CFP '96.
Soulda, woulda, coulda, and all that...
Cheers,
RAH
--- begin forwarded text
From: [EMAIL PROTECTED]
Date: Mon, 20 Sep 1999 08:50:44 -0500
To: [EMAIL PROTECTED]
Subject: IP: Smart Cards with Chips encouraged
Cc
Anonymous writes:
> Consider the following system, not yet completely practical, but perhaps
> with some more work it could be made so. Features:
>
> - A "mint" is used only to create the initial allocation of ecash.
>After that it is not needed.
>
> - Complete anonymity as with Chaum ec
As someone involved in the US smartcard arena, a little more background is
offered for those interest in this emerging technology..
>I remember Ian, Adam, and I talking about the
>card-in-a-floppy thing at CFP '96.
>
>Soulda, woulda, coulda, and all that...
>
>Cheers,
>RAH
>
>
>New Hardwa
> --
> [EMAIL PROTECTED][SMTP:[EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:]
> Subject: Re: more re Encryption Technology Limits Eased
>
> Bill Simpson said:
> >
> > - We just learned a few weeks ago that every copy of Windows has a
> secret
> > NSA key. We don't know why. Remember the Lotus Notes
On Mon, Sep 20, 1999 at 03:46:39PM +0100, Adam Back wrote:
> How communication and computationally intensive is the ZK proof as a
> function of the coin list length? Could the proof be used in a
> practical system?
The complexity is polylog in the number of coins, but unfortunately it is
not pra
> How communication and computationally intensive is the ZK proof as a
> function of the coin list length? Could the proof be used in a
> practical system?
According to the Crypto 99 paper, the ZK proof takes resources O(log^2(N)),
where N is the number of coins issued. However they are vague a
On Mon, 20 Sep 1999, Adam Back wrote:
> - is the ZK proof interactive? If so this would place communication
> restrictions on spending -- payer and payee would need to be
> simultaneously online.
Interactive ZK proofs can be made non-interactive by generating an
encoding of the information
On Mon, Sep 20, 1999 at 03:46:39PM +0100, Adam Back wrote:
> [1] Wei Dei's b-money protocol: http://www.eskimo.com/~weidei/bmoney.txt
BTW, the correct URL is http://www.eskimo.com/~weidai/bmoney.txt.
Can anyone recommend a good product for encrypting information on the fly,
meaning encrypt the file when you close it and decrypt it when you open it.
It would also be nice if it would ask you whether you wanted the file you
are just closing to be encrypted. That is, it builds a list as you use
--- begin forwarded text
Resent-Date: Mon, 20 Sep 1999 14:43:10 -0400
Date: Mon, 20 Sep 1999 11:28:35 -0700 (PDT)
From: Peter A Pongracz-Bartha <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
Cc: [EMAIL PROTECTED]
Subject: Re: Secure Digital Memory Chip??
To: [EMAIL PROTECTED]
Resent-From: [EMAIL PROTECTED]
Resent-Sender:
[Excerpt from CATO Update, 20 Sept. 1999:]
The Cato Institute released a new Cato Briefing Paper, "Strong
Cryptography: The Global Tide of Change," as the Clinton
administration was announcing a relaxation in controls on the export
of encryption technology. In the paper, Arnold G. Reinhold writes
On Mon, Sep 20, 1999 at 09:02:17PM +0200, Anonymous wrote:
> Yeah, neat idea! With b-money, newly minted value goes directly into
> someone's account, but if it was used instead to create an anonymous
> coin you would have an accountless system. In that case you don't even
> need the mint for th
At 1:52 PM -0700 on 9/20/99, Wei Dai wrote:
> Unfortunately it seems unavoidable unless you have a trusted party control
> the money supply.
Yes. In business, they call this quaint phenomenon "financial
intermediation". ;-).
Seriously, if you have *lots* of intermediaries in competition, the
At 3:52 PM -0400 on 9/20/99, Declan McCullagh wrote, on cypherpunks:
> Just maybe. Depends on how long it takes -- I can't justify an overwhelming
> amount of time away from the office. Seems to me there'd be a huge
> difference in terms of time and cost from Boston and Miami. (Heck, how
> abo
Fisher International has been shipping their Smarty smartcard reader in a
floppy for years. The Smarty was an evolution of Fisher's SafeBoot token,
also in a floppy form factor. I received a free SafeBoot kit at the 1994 or
1995 RSA conference.
--Lucky Green <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
> -Original M
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