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At 11:36 PM 18-08-99 +, Sandy Harris wrote:
>The Canadian Dep't of Foreign Affairs & International Trade (DFAIT)
has an
>export law
>page at:
>
>http://www.dfait-maeci.gc.ca/~eicb/notices/ser113-e.htm
[ Text deleted]
>If I read it right, the 64-bit limit s
At 7:09 PM -0400 8/25/99, John Young wrote:
>William Crowell has provided PECSENC's recommendations
>for revising encryption export regulations:
>
> http://cryptome.org/LIB42.htm
>
Has any consideration been given to combining the PECSENC's
recommendations with the administration's "Cyberspace
>>In order to use anything stronger than DES in the government, agencies
>>have to publish a waiver in the Federal Register. The US Attorneys, who
>>are trying to criminalize strong encryption (for everyone except
themselves),
>>were forced to publish that they're moving up to a 3DES VPN. I won
--- begin forwarded text
From: [EMAIL PROTECTED]
To: Jeffrey Schiller <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
cc: Keith Moore <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>, Patrik Faltstrom <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>,
Jeffrey Schiller <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>, Marcus Leech <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>,
[EMAIL PROTECTED], [EMAIL PROTECTED], [E
> If I remember correctly, last time someone tried to pursuade me to use
> Maurer's test, my problem with it was that it was too memory intensive
> and too CPU intensive to use in the kernel. [please] explain to me
> Maurer's test and how to do it in English, and then try to pursuade me
> that it
FWIW, Internet telephony is safe from wiretapping. Reasonable summary:
http://www.wired.com/news/news/politics/story/21477.html
At 03:15 PM 8/27/99 -0700, Ross Harvey wrote:
>
>Or at least, a press release of a summary of pending orders.
>
>The FBI (and every other LEA, there are too many to c
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[ To: Perry's Crypto List ## Date: 08/30/99 ##
Subject: Re: Power analysis of AES candidates ]
>From: "William Whyte" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
>To: "Cryptography@C2. Net" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
>Subject: Power analysis of AES candidates
>Date: Wed, 11 Aug 1999 19:53:
John Kelsey writes:
> There's some question about how hard it will be to design
> hardware that will be DPA-resistant for different
> algorithms.
Big on-chip caps. Lithium batteries. Tamper-resistant housings.
That's what Dallas Semiconductor uses for its 1-Wire devices,
including the famous
That's what FIDNET is for.
One thing at a time.
Rick
At 07:41 AM 08/31/1999 -0700, James Glave wrote:
>FWIW, Internet telephony is safe from wiretapping
James Glave <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> writes:
>> FWIW, Internet telephony is safe from wiretapping. Reasonable summary:
Just because Internet telephony isn't covered by CALEA does not mean
that it is safe from wiretapping. It does mean that a court order is
needed for any kind of wiretapping, and tha
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