Anonymous writes:
> > 8. Receiptfreeness: A voter can't prove to a coercer, how he has
> > voted. As a result, verifiable vote buying is impossible.
>
> It appears that the votehere system does not satisfy this, since the vote
> is published in encrypted form, so the voter can reveal the pl
Anonymous wrote:
> On Sat, 09 Oct 1999 20:35:15 -0700, Ed Gerck <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote:
>
> > In reference to the recent discussions on voting, I am
> > preparing a list of desirable properties of voting, as a
> > secure protocol. Of course, it may not be desirable or even
> > possible for a
On Mon, Oct 11, 1999 at 07:40:16PM +0200, Anonymous wrote:
> > 2. Robustness: Dishonest voters, other participants or outsiders can't
> > disturb or disrupt an election.
>
> Votehere's system depends on a coalition of mutually suspicious parties
> to tally the vote (they mutually share the necess
On Sat, 09 Oct 1999 20:35:15 -0700, Ed Gerck <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote:
> In reference to the recent discussions on voting, I am
> preparing a list of desirable properties of voting, as a
> secure protocol. Of course, it may not be desirable or even
> possible for a particular election process to
List:
In reference to the recent discussions on voting, I am
preparing a list of desirable properties of voting, as a
secure protocol. Of course, it may not be desirable or even
possible for a particular election process to include *all*
of them -- the objective is just to have a list of choices.
