I believe the main reason Peter Wright wanted unconventional
snooping devices was to avoid detection by sweepers who
regularly checked for the usual, known devices.
Intercepting signals from radiated objects was one of those
methods for it avoided having to plant a device within the
targeted s
1 4:37 PM
> To: John Young
> Cc: [EMAIL PROTECTED]
> Subject: Re: NONSTOP Crypto Query
>
>
>
> On Fri, 12 Jan 2001, John Young wrote:
>
> >Wright also describes the use of supersensitive microphones
> >to pick up the daily setting of rotors on cryptoma
> [A quick contemplation of the wavelength of the sounds in question
> would put an end to that speculation I suspect. --Perry]
I know this has been somewhat done to death, but there's a nice
comparison: GPS positioning using carrier phase tracking is equivalent
(well, it's reversed - clicks com
One interesting question is exactly how strong radio frequency
illumination could cause compromise of information being processed by
electronic equipment. I have an idea for a mechanism whereby such
illumination could induce generation of harmonic and beat frequencies
that are modulated by int
On Sat, Jan 13, 2001 at 12:11:13PM -0800, Ray Dillinger wrote:
>
>
> We hear low-frequency sounds when we type. But have we ever checked
> for high-frequency sounds outside of human hearing range? I'd bet
> a keyboard has a number of squeaks and ticks and twangs up there.
> I'd also bet tha
>Ray Dillinger wrote:
>>
>> If you get two sensitive microphones in a room, you
>> should be able to do interferometry to get the exact locations
>> on a keyboard of keystrokes from the sound of someone typing.
>> I guess three would be better, but with some reasonable
>> assumptions about key
At 01:30 AM 1/13/2001 +, Ben Laurie wrote:
>Hmm. 6 kHz has a wavelength of 5 cm. I would guess you can easily get
>resolution to 1/10 of a wavelength under ideal conditions. Which is .5
>cm, which is half the size of a key, more or less.
You don't have to locate the exact key to save a lot of
In a paper on side channel cryptanalysis by John Kelsey, Bruce Schneier,
Chris Hall, and I, we speculated on possible meanings of NONSTOP and HIJACK:
[...]
It is our belief that most operational cryptanalysis makes use of
side-channel information. [...] And Peter Wright discussed data
Ray Dillinger wrote:
>
> On Fri, 12 Jan 2001, John Young wrote:
>
> >Wright also describes the use of supersensitive microphones
> >to pick up the daily setting of rotors on cryptomachines of the
> >time, in particular the Hagelins made by CryptoAG.
>
> Hmmm. That sounds like a trick that coul
Ray Dillinger wrote:
> If you get two sensitive microphones in a room, you
> should be able to do interferometry to get the exact locations
> on a keyboard of keystrokes from the sound of someone typing.
Interesting. Probably not the easiest way to snoop, but you might be
driven to it.
> I
At 01:37 PM 1/12/01 -0800, Ray Dillinger wrote:
>Hmmm. That sounds like a trick that could be brought up to
>date. If you get two sensitive microphones in a room, you
>[A quick contemplation of the wavelength of the sounds in question
>would put an end to that speculation I suspect. --Perry]
Joel McNamara first told me about NONSTOP and its commonly
associated classified codeword, HIJACK, both somehow related
to Tempest.
When you do a search on either of them you get hundreds
(or 1000s) of hits for the generic terms "non-stop" and "hi-jack"
but few entries for the codewords, and t
On Fri, 12 Jan 2001, John Young wrote:
>Wright also describes the use of supersensitive microphones
>to pick up the daily setting of rotors on cryptomachines of the
>time, in particular the Hagelins made by CryptoAG.
Hmmm. That sounds like a trick that could be brought up to
date. If you g
In message <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>, John Young write
s:
>
>This loops back to NONSTOP and the question of what may
>be the signatures and compromising emanations of today's
>cryptosystems which reveal information in ways that go beyond
>known sniffers -- indeed, that known sniffers may divertingly
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