> >
> > Is it a given that IETF standard protocols will contain backdoors? I
> > support the idea of bringing the issue before the IETF. Surely the vast
> > majority will oppose weakening the protocols.
> >
Backdoors not the only consideration. Phone systems have many interesting properti
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On Thu, 14 Oct 1999, James Robertson wrote:
> As an Australian, I am more than a little concerned
> that an American law enforcement agency is trying
> to dictate the design of an international communication
> standard.
As an Australian, you should
On 10/14/99 at 9:49 AM, [EMAIL PROTECTED] (Steven M. Bellovin) wrote:
> In message <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>, Allen Ethridge writes:
> >
> > None of these things happened when CALEA was implemented in the traditional
> > circuit-switched voice network. CALEA advocates already have a success to
poi
> >
At 14:25 10/14/1999 -0700, Steve Reid wrote:
>I'm no lawyer, so I'm probably going out on a limb here, but I don't
>think CALEA can apply to encryption.
Steve, no need to go out on a limb. CALEA most definitely does not apply to
domestic use of encryption. (Though it is fair to say that the same
In message <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>, Steve Reid writes:
> On Wed, Oct 13, 1999 at 03:08:49PM -0400, Steven M. Bellovin wrote:
> > But it's also clear that folks who manufacture this gear for sale in
> > the U.S. market are going to have to support CALEA, which in turn
> > means that someone is going to
On Wed, Oct 13, 1999 at 03:08:49PM -0400, Steven M. Bellovin wrote:
> But it's also clear that folks who manufacture this gear for sale in
> the U.S. market are going to have to support CALEA, which in turn
> means that someone is going to have to standardize the interface --
> the FBI regulations
James Robertson writes:
Boy, things are really heating up on [EMAIL PROTECTED] If you're not
there, you're missing something.
> As an Australian, I am more than a little concerned
> that an American law enforcement agency is trying
> to dictate the design of an international communication
>
In message <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>, Allen Ethridge writes:
> On 10/13/99 at 7:49 PM, [EMAIL PROTECTED] (Peter Gutmann) wrote:
>
> > Why not refrain in the *expectation* that it'll be done incompetently?
> > ...
> >
> > If they want to play big brother, why not give them more than enough rope,
> >
So was the Raven list created on 11-Oct-1999 as seems to be the case given
that the..
http://www.ietf.org/mail-archive/working-groups/raven/current/
..archive apparently begins there? (keep clicking on [next page] till it
doesn't work any more)
Does it map to any particular working group or
At 04:05 14/10/1999 , Declan McCullagh wrote:
> Net Wiretapping: Yes or No?
> by Declan McCullagh ([EMAIL PROTECTED])
>
> 10:30 a.m. 13.Oct.99.PDT
> The FBI says the Internet's standards
> body
On 10/13/99 at 7:49 PM, [EMAIL PROTECTED] (Peter Gutmann) wrote:
> Why not refrain in the *expectation* that it'll be done incompetently? If
> previous efforts along these lines (Clipper, TACDFIPSFKMI) are anything to go
> by then:
>
> - The design and planning process alone will cost enough
Steven M. Bellovin writes:
> So -- how should the back door be installed? In the protocol? In the telco
> endpoint? Is it ethical for security people to work on something that lowers
> the security of the system? Given that it's going to be done anyway, is it
> ethical to refrain, lest i
In message <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>, "P.
J. Ponder" writes:
>
> Is it a given that IETF standard protocols will contain backdoors? I
> support the idea of bringing the issue before the IETF. Surely the vast
> majority will oppose weakening the protocols.
>
No, it is by no means a settled questi
"Steven M. Bellovin" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> writes:
>So -- how should the back door be installed? In the protocol? In the telco
>endpoint? Is it ethical for security people to work on something that lowers
>the security of the system? Given that it's going to be done anyway, is it
>ethical to ref
On Wed, 13 Oct 1999, Steven M. Bellovin wrote:
>< . . . . >
> So -- how should the back door be installed? In the protocol? In the
> telco endpoint? Is it ethical for security people to work on
> something that lowers the security of the system? Given that it's
> going to be done anyway, is
Another point to consider is that if the CALEA standards are arrived
at in an open and public manner, it could be made easy to tell whether
or not a given device is implementing them, and one could then use the
CALEA status of a device as part of the purchasing decision.
If the CALEA protocol is
In message <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>, Declan McCullagh wr
ites:
>
> This followup might be relevant too. Has the FBI ever publicly weighed in
> on an IETF debate before? Are there any implications here in other areas,
> such as taxes, content, or encryption?
There are clearly many aspects to this qu
At 00:03 10/13/1999 -0400, Perry E. Metzger wrote:
>
>I thought this forward from "Interesting People" would be of interest
Perry,
This followup might be relevant too. Has the FBI ever publicly weighed in
on an IETF debate before? Are there any implications here in other areas,
such as taxes, c
The FCC issued yesterday its detailed definitions of what types of
services are and are not subject to CALEA requirements:
http://cryptome.org/fcc101299.txt
This was issued in an attempt is to answer questions from
respondents about what is a "telecommunications carrier."
Excerpts:
"5. CALE
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